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1 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the representation of political conflict in the Zimbabwean press with a 
specific focus on the The Herald, The Sunday Mail, Daily News and The Standard. The thesis 
sought to unpack the representation of political conflict in the four selected newspapers and 
to compare and contrast state-owned and privately-owned press representation of power, 
succession struggles and factionalism in ZANU PF and opposition MDC. The theory is 
undergirded by the framing theory and data was analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis. 
The thesis contends that the representation of political conflict in Zimbabwe was sensational 
and polarized. With clearly separate agendas, the government controlled press, The Herald 
and The Sunday Mail; and the privately owned Daily News and The Standard, have drawn 
upon different framing practices to represent political conflict in Zimbabwe. By selecting to 
report on a particular issue and silencing another, through choice of certain headlines, and 
vocabulary employed, they have produced a construction of events in political parties that 
satisfy their political agendas in an increasingly polarized political environment. The 
newspapers became associated with diverging political opinions, showing political parties 
they support. On the one hand, the state-funded media represented ZANU PF in positive light 
while the opposition, particularly the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was 
represented negatively, mainly depicting the party as harbouring a regime change agenda. On 
the other hand, the privately-owned press was critical of the ruling party, ZANU PF and 
blamed the party for economic problems, corruption, mis-rule, and abuse of human rights. As 
a result of this partisan representation of political reality by the two press camps, they 
became directly implicated in the conflicts thereby ceasing to be credible sources of 
information. This clearly illustrates the enormity of challenges faced by the press in political 
conflicts in politically polarised environments such as Zimbabwe. The thesis argues that 
when reporting political conflicts ideological considerations of the press take precedents at 
the expense of the informational and educational mandate of the press as ethics and 
professional interests of the press are pushed to the back stage. Contrary to the view that the 
press is a neutral and impersonal purveyor of information, it is an active participant in the 
framing of political conflicts and its framing is ideological. The study has broadened the 
body of knowledge on the framing of political conflicts in polarised political environments. 
 
KEY WORDS: Framing, factionalism, conflict, elections, succession, media, referendum, 
representation. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction and Background to Study 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The press is regarded as a critical cog of the liberal democratic system while elections are 
regarded as the barometer of democratic commitment, the principal means through which 
citizens influence their leaders by selecting and deposing them routinely (Moyo, 1992). 
Moyo contends that elections formalise the character of popular elections and influence 
governments, thereby enabling and rendering independent at least, in theory the citizens’ 
capacity to influence the conduct of politicians. The press is therefore the conduit through 
which citizens participate in democratic processes by providing information which the 
citizens need to make informed choices. Thus, the role of the media in elections has been 
summarised as that of: 
 
 
• Educating voters on strategies to exercise their democratic rights. 
 
• Reporting on developments and issues related to the election campaigns. 
 
• Providing a platform for the political parties to communicate their messages to 
their electorate. 
 
• Reporting results and monitoring vote counting. 
 
• Scrutinising the electoral process itself in order to evaluate its fairness, efficiency 
and probity (Esipisn and Khaguli, 2009 cited by Nduhura, 2010:3). 
 
 
However, there is a growing concern that the mass media do not live up to these ideals as 
they are failing to fulfil these functions properly. Some critics argue that commercial mass 
media controlled by a few multinational conglomerates have become an anti-democratic 
force supporting the status quo. This thesis interrogates these assumptions through an 
analysis of private and state press representation of political conflict in Zimbabwe between 
1999 and 2016. The idea is to gain deeper insights into the supposed and actual role of the 
press in society. The perspective of this thesis is that the news-making process is complex 
and circumscribed by wider commercial and political processes (Street, 2001:43). Thus, 
contrary to being dispassionate chroniclers of issues and events, the media are active 
participants who have very strong views and positions on certain matters. Thus media 
framing of issues is not an impersonal, dry, matter-of-fact exercise whereby the reporter is a 
mere cipher, but active participant. 
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Nyamnjoh, cited by Chuma (2007:26) observes how, during elections journalism becomes 
‘an exercise in turning a blind eye to the shortcomings of political allies, while exaggerating 
the weakness of political opponents’. 
 
 
It is widely acknowledged that in reporting political conflict, the media employ language and 
discourse. The way in which language is used shapes the attitudes, opinions and perceptions 
of the readers. By deciding to select certain issues and leave out others, emphasise some 
issues and downplay others the media play an agenda-setting role thereby impacting on 
political conflicts either positively or negatively. The real act of choosing what to include, 
what to emphasise and exclude or downplay in a frame through language is problematic. The 
press is the main source of information in political conflict; for campaigning, during an 
election and post-election events and it influences public opinion and perceptions. The press 
constructs reality by selecting relevant news, amplifying certain issues while downplaying or 
suppressing others. The representation of political conflict and elections demonstrates how 
conflicts and elections impose technical limitations on the press forcing it to operate at the 
service of hegemony and counter-hegemony while professional detachment is shunted to the 
margins as the press become participants in an asymmetrical war. It should be noted that 
representation of an issue at the expense of others culminates in unbalanced or subjective 
news products, among other things. This scenario, in other instances, can leave some if not 
most readers with little information when it comes to the issue of political conflict in 
Zimbabwe. Unbalanced news can culminate in polarised readers in most cases depending on 
which newspaper or newspapers a reader relies on. Thus the media construct and define 
reality and this process takes place inside and not outside media’s different forms of 
representations of reality (Vambe, 2014:4). 
 
 
This thesis examines the representation of political conflict in Zimbabwe. It compares and 
contrasts the representation of political conflict between the state-owned and the privately-
owned press in order to understand better how the press influences politics. The chapter 
introduces the topic of study, gives a background of the situation in order to situate it in a 
context. The chapter also outlines the study focus, the research goals, and the research 
problem. A brief discussion of the relevant literature and the theoretical framework is also 
done. The chapter concludes by outlining the research methodology employed in this thesis 
and its links with the literature and conceptual framework. 
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1.2 Context of Study 
 
For the past three decades, Zimbabwe has been synonymous with political conflict and 
crises. At the onset of independence in 1980 until 1999, the country remained a de facto one-
party state, although it was a de jure multi-party state. This is so because the country 
witnessed the formation of a plethora of small and ephemeral opposition political parties that 
often emerged before elections and disappeared thereafter. Soon after independence there 
was conflict between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU from 1981 to 1987 but the conflict was 
resolved by the Unity Accord of 1987. In 1989 there was yet another conflict between 
ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). Although opposition political parties 
existed before, the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 was 
the first time that Zimbabwe saw the emergence of a credible and strong opposition political 
party. The result was that ZANU-PF faced its first strong election challenge from the then 
MDC in the 2000 parliamentary elections, and led to conflict that has been ongoing in 
Zimbabwe to this day. This is the main focus of this thesis. The thesis critically examines the 
representation of political conflict before, during and after the formation of the Government 
of National Unity in 2009. In particular it analyses how the state-owned newspapers and 
privately-owned newspapers represented political conflicts between 1999 and 2016. 
 
It needs to be pointed out that between 2000 and 2016 Zimbabwe experienced turbulent 
political times marked by increasing polarisation and divisions in political life. It is assumed 
that the print media played a critical role in influencing both the source and interpretation of 
events in Zimbabwe. The press has not only been critical in representing political conflict 
between the ruling ZANU-PF party and the opposition MDC, but also extensively covered 
internal conflict within political parties. The way conflict is reported is determined by the 
political affiliation of the newspapers. In Zimbabwe two types of press exist: the state 
controlled newspapers and privately owned press. 
 
It can be argued that the state controlled press is mainly pro-government while the privately-
owned is anti-government. The basic assumption of this research is that the press has 
political influence and can be instrumental in fuelling or exacerbating conflict and violence. 
In this regard, how newspapers represent conflict is critical. 
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Zimbabwe has since the turn of the millennium been a divided country in which the struggle 
for power has been key epicentre of political conflict. In the representation of conflict, it is 
apparent that the press in Zimbabwe has been fractured along the same fault lines as those 
dividing political parties. Zimbabwe became a polarised society and the press was polarised 
too. 
 
1.3 Purpose of study 
 
The main focus of this study was to explore the different ways in which political conflict is 
represented by the press in Zimbabwe. For several decades, Zimbabwe has experienced 
various levels of conflict between the ruling party ZANU-PF and opposition MDC, and the 
press have been involved, either directly or indirectly, in this conflict. This study investigates 
newspaper representation of this conflict and its focus is to compare and contrast the 
representation of political conflict in the state-owned and the privately-owned press. The 
specific focus is the representation of power, succession struggles and factionalism within the 
ruling party ZANU PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The 
reason being that these are the main political parties that have made more impact on the 
Zimbabwean political scene. 
 
Zimbabwe has experienced political conflict since early 1980s between ruling party and 
opposition parties; however, the conflict between ZANU-PF and MDC is one of the longest 
in Zimbabwean history. This study argues that the language used to represent this conflict in 
the media is frequently commented on by scholars and political commentators. This suggests 
that through their representation practices, such as selection framing and agenda-setting, the 
media have enormous influence in the way in which political conflicts play out in society. 
However, very few studies have attempted a thorough investigation of the press’ 
representation practices on the conflict. The current study aims to fill this knowledge gap by 
employing the framing theory as a conceptual tool for understanding this representation. 
 
Zimbabwean’s ZANU-PF offers important parallels and insights into the challenges which 
confronted former liberation movements in Southern Africa as they become political parties 
and governments. These shared aspects include the importance of personality, ethnic and clan 
politics which helped to shape the liberation movement during the struggle and 
independence. There is also the important legacy of emphasis on solidarity and lack of 
internal discussion and debate. This study argues that the latter led to power struggles and 
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factionalism in the ruling party. Onslow (2011:2) argues that the role of the ‘armed struggle’ 
and the associated use of violence have left lasting influence on society. These formative 
attitudes and experiences forged political cultures which have continued to play out in the 
domestic political arena post-independence. Onslow (2011:2) points out: 
 
ZANU-PF is an extreme case study of the limits of how susceptible and receptive liberation leadership 
may be to internal dissent and debate as they address the considerable difficulties of nation-state 
construction after formal independence. By late 1990s ZANU-PF was facing a profound challenge to 
the legitimacy of its victory, and to the legitimacy and identity of the liberation movement itself. From 
2000 the struggle in Zimbabwe constituted ‘a battle for the state’, and this battle is continuing to play 
out in present day Zimbabwe. 
 
The current study contends that the press is directly implicated in conflicts in the sense that 
they can either fuel conflicts or promote peace through their representation. It is important to 
note that in Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF’s case, the process of centralising power took place in 
stop-start phases. First, there was the period 1980-87 leading to the 1987 pact of unity, after 
which ZAPU was absorbed within ZANU-PF. From 1980 the one party phase dominated the 
political scene until 1999, and the period ended with the emergency of the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. In the third phase, from 2000, ZANU-PF maintained its 
dominance by restructuring state power, and attempting to manipulate the constitution and 
the electoral process until the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of September 2008. The 
Government of National Unity (GNU) was finally implemented in February 2009 which 
ushered in the fourth phase of significant transition. The Government of National Unity 
which ended after ZANU PF emphatically won the 2013 elections could be the fifth phase 
and is significant in the sense that it has witnessed intense intra-political party struggles than 
any other period in Zimbabwe. These struggles have been manifested through succession 
plots, party splits and factional battles that have had serious impact on the political scene in 
Zimbabwe. Following the disputed July 2013 elections ZANU-PF effectively retained its 
hegemony leaving opposition political parties severely weakened and disoriented. After the 
MDC failed in its legal and diplomatic manoeuvres to ensure the conduct of fresh elections, it 
started to battle strong internal conflicts. Disgruntled with the party’s loss, some high ranking 
members began to call for leadership renewal, especially regarding the party presidency 
calling for early congress to elect a successor to Tsvangirai in order to renew the party and 
the leadership. There were also fresh conflicts within ZANU-PF in which presidium officials 
were accused of plotting President Mugabe’s ouster. Hence the current phase is characterised 
by power, succession struggles and factionalism in political parties. 
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The printed press in the country extensively reported on these conflicts. The aim therefore, is 
to analyse representation of these conflicts in the identified newspapers in order to 
understand the extent to which press is implicated in these conflicts. 
 
1.4 Political Conflict in Zimbabwe: A Historical Background 
 
In Zimbabwe, political conflict goes as far back as the 1960s. In order to fully comprehend 
contemporary power and succession struggles and factionalism it is pertinent to locate these 
political conflicts in a historical context. Hence historical trends in nationalist and opposition 
politics need to be briefly explored. Several studies of African opposition politics in 
Zimbabwe during both the colonial and post-colonial periods stress the importance of a triple 
legacy in undermining the growth of a democratic tradition. This legacy includes the 
influence of the politics of citizen and subject (Mamdani: 1996). The authoritarian structures 
of colonial rule and the commandist politics of the liberation struggle with its attendant view 
that only liberation parties can represent the ‘will of the people’ for the foreseeable future 
deserve to be interrogated (Moyo, 1993; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2004; Masunungure, 2004). 
 
Raftopoulos (2006) argues that during the colonial period nationalist politics was often 
characterised by violent ruptures both between and within nationalist parties. The 1963 split 
between ZAPU and its splitter organisation ZANU was marked by a series of violent clashes 
and mutual demonization that continued until the formation of the Patriotic Front on the eve 
of the 1979 Lancaster House Conference. The rivalry between two parties continued in the 
aftermath of the post-1980 settlement, punctuated by the Gukurahundi violence of the new 
state in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the mid -1980s. This massive deployment of state 
violence effectively led to the formal subsumption or assimilation of PF-ZAPU to the ruling 
ZANU-PF in the form of the 1987 Unity Accord, and thus the demise of a formidable 
opposition party (Raftopoulos: 2006). Within the nationalist parties themselves a number of 
violent power struggles occurred in both ZANU and ZAPU during the 1970s that 
consolidated the leadership of the ‘old guard’ (Moore: 1991), setting the precedent for the 
violent marginalisation of dissenting voices within nationalists politics. It is important to note 
that the struggles within ZANU have been well described in Fay Chung’s (2006) 
autobiography, Re-Living the second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe’s Liberation 
Struggle. Chung (2006) maintains that ZANU’s right wing targeted to eliminate members of 
the ‘Nhari’ group because of sharp differences in ideology. ZANU’s left wing was repeatedly 
purged prior to independence. 
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However, a standard and authorised version of ZANU-PF version has emerged. In this 
version Nhari was a ‘sell-out’ suborned by Rhodesian Intelligence to betray the revolution. 
This is the ‘patriotic history’ version taught in Zimbabwe today. 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2004:103) describes the effects of these legacies on post-colonial politics 
as follows: 
 
The new Zimbabwean state under ZANU-PF failed miserably to make a break with the tradition of 
nationalist authoritarianism and guerrilla violence as well as colonial settler oppression. The ruling 
party itself failed to de-militarise itself as a militarised liberation movement, not only in practise, but 
also in attitude and style of management of civil institutions and the state at large. The new ZANU-PF 
government readily assumed the resilient colonial and equally military oriented structures left by the 
retreating settler state, with serious implications for democracy, human rights and human security. 
 
Raftopoulos (2006) reckons that for most of the 1980s the political milieu was characterised 
by a combination of repression, in particular the brutal state response to opposition in 
Matabeleland, and a general deference to the authority and liberation legitimacy of the new 
state. By 1987 the ruling party had disposed of two opposition groups, the first in 1986, by 
constitutionally removing the entrenched white seats in parliament agreed to the Lancaster 
House Constitution, and the second through the brutal Matabeleland disturbances campaign 
against ZAPU in the mid-1980s and the pursuant 1987 Unity Accord between the two major 
nationalist parties which effectively incapacitated ZAPU. Through these measures, the 
introduction of an executive president in 1987 with the immense power, with ready access to 
the repressive legacies of the settler state, the outlook for opposition politics appeared dismal 
(Moyo: 1992). 
 
According to Raftopoulos: (2006:3) “Building opposition politics on the African continent 
has proven immensely difficult largely because of the oppressive nature of most post-colonial 
states and the extremely difficulty condition under which opposition forces have to mobilise 
and reproduce their support.” In this regard, in countries which have undergone an extensive 
liberation struggle, such as Zimbabwe in Southern Africa, the development of the opposition 
politics present specific challenges. In particular, the strong legacy of legitimacy enjoyed by 
former liberation movements and their capacity for revived nationalist mobilisation have 
presented opposition forces with immense obstacles in developing alternative programmatic 
positions. Moreover, the often-repressive nature of post-colonial states, compounding the 
longer repressive histories of colonial politics has presented democratic forces with few 
precursors of alternative democratic forms. 
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It is therefore not surprising that civil and opposition forces on the continent generally, and 
in Zimbabwe, in particular have struggled to locate themselves firmly within the historical 
legacies and contemporary demands of their particular national context (Raftopoulos 2006). 
 
However, the combination of a contracting economy, the erosion of state legitimacy through 
the exposure of corruption in the ruling party, and the emergence of critical social forces such 
as the labour and student movement, along with critical intellectual and media responses, led 
to the emergence of another opposition party in 1989. Led by former ZANU-PF stalwart, 
Edgar Tekere, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) fought the ruling party’s attempts to 
impose a one party state in Zimbabwe, and performed favourably in the 1990 presidential 
election despite violence and intimidation on opposition leadership and electorate. Though 
the party did not survive for long in the 1990s, and was largely confined in terms of its 
support base to a small urban and student base, particularly in Tekere’s home area in Mutare, 
ZUM both fractured the seeming Unity of ZANU-PF and fought for the necessity of multi-
party politics (Raftopoulos 2006). 
 
The various attempts at opposition that followed in the 1990s, such as the ZANU Ndonga, 
the Democratic Party, the Forum Party and the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats were largely 
unsuccessful in constructing national constituencies and in providing popular alternatives to 
ZANU-PF. In the face of determined state repression and an electoral system that provided 
little space for them to score electoral victories, these parties, with limited capacity to 
develop viable structures and organisational networks, remained little more than political 
amusement for the ruling party. By the mid-1990s opposition politics were largely built 
around individuals, prone to fractious outbreaks, and unable to develop both a popular 
message and a national reach. As Masunungure (2004:165) notes, these parties ‘appeared to 
be more aggressive in attacking each other than in directing their fire power at ZANU-PF’. 
By the latter half of the 1990s the fortunes of the opposition politics look a different turn. The 
most formidable opposition party of the post-colonial period emerged into an apparent barren 
field of dissent. In 1999 the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was born, the product 
of a combination of labour struggles, constitutional politics and a generation of human rights 
struggles, and built on the memory of failures of previous attempts at opposition politics. The 
new movement also attracted the support of the mainly white large scale commercial farming 
sector. 
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Constructed in the era of the debilitating Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the MDC 
drew on and fed into a growing wave of political and economic disenchantment provided 
some new hope by its message of ‘change’ which found resonance through national 
structures. Using the language of political rights, constitutionalism and economic reform, the 
MDC and its social partners confronted ZANU-PF with its first mass opposition party, and 
threatened to defeat the ruling party (Masunungure: 2004:165; Raftopoulos 2006:8). 
 
Carried on the wave of the constitution movement’s referendum victory against a ZANU-PF 
imposed constitution of 2000, and backed by the promise of popular mobilisation, the MDC 
gained nearly 50% of the parliamentary vote in 2000 in the face of enormous electoral 
obstacles and state violence. Moreover as Laakso (2004:13) points out, the organisational 
base of the MDC “was not merely one of popular discontent with the executive, but an 
explicit agenda to democratise the state through a peaceful transition.” Raftopoulos (2006) 
argues that since its dynamic ascension onto the Zimbabwean political stage in the 1990s the 
MDC has had to face the difficult task of building accountable party structures, 
organisational patterns, developing policy positions and peaceful political strategies, and 
projecting a regional and international profile against an authoritarian state that has 
consistently closed down the spaces for opposition politics in the country. Moreover, the 
MDC has had to confront the effects of the country’s authoritarian political legacies on its 
attempt to develop an alternative political culture. 
 
It is imperative to examine the challenges of opposition politics in an authoritarian state 
which subsequently culminated to factional battles. Raftopoulos (2006) contends that soon 
after its launch in September 1999 the MDC had to confront a number of organisational and 
structural problems. The problems of organisation, responsibility and accountability in party 
structure later led to internal conflict due to creation of a parallel structure within the party. 
As LeBas (2005:187) notes: 
 
…the activities of this structure not only resulted in major problems of accountability and 
violence within the party structure, but became a central site of struggle for the control of 
the party between the president and the secretary general: one of the first major sign of the 
problems that was being caused by this parallel structure was the violence that occurred at 
the party headquarters in 2004, specifically the beating up of party officials. According to 
the commission of the inquiry into disturbances of party headquarters (draft report), 
December 2004: 4-5, the report implied that there were conflicts between the 
‘professionals’ in the secretary general’s department and the ‘quasi-professionals’ in the 
president’s office who believed that the secretary general was ‘insubordinate’ to the 
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President and was working to launch a new party. One of the major findings of the report 
was the view that there was a ‘strong anti-Ndebele sentiment that had been propagated, 
orchestrated and instilled into the innocent party members’ minds by senior party leaders 
under the guise of sheer hatred for the secretary general at a personal level. 
 
The issues of tribalism pointed to a new factionalism that was emerging in the party. In May 
2005 there were new outbreaks of party violence at the party headquarters in Harare, the 
Bulawayo provincial office and in Gwanda (Raftopoulos: 2006). As with the 2004 report 
there was no action taken on the issues raised in other commissions of inquiry, apart from the 
expulsion of several youth believed to have been responsible for the violence. There was no 
attempt to hold to account the senior party figures alleged to be the handlers of these youths. 
Also significant is that after each general election, such as in April 2005, soon after the MDC 
defeat, MDC leadership met with leaders from the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) 
to discuss the way forward. Raftopoulos (2006:16) points out that “the NCA in particular 
argued that the MDC should not take up its seats in parliament, but instead concentrate on 
extra-parliamentary struggles, and stop sending confused signals to its support base.” 
However, the MDC leadership pointed out that there was a strong lobby within the MDC 
advocating the importance of occupying the democratic space in parliament, notwithstanding 
the limitation of the electoral process. There was no consensus and this led to disputes. 
 
In addition to the strategic and organisational challenges the MDC has faced the problems of 
developing an inclusive, non-tribal and non-racial post nationalists’ ideology. This has 
proved an exceedingly difficult challenge in addressing a non-racial party which has proved 
extremely challenging. Raftopoulos (2006: 16) reckons, the presumed ‘white face’ of the 
MDC has been heavily exploited by ZANU-PF in a country and region where the memories 
of a settler colonial rule are still fresh. This factor has also been an impediment in the 
mobilisation and the media strategies of the MDC. In a post elections campaign report in 
2000, one party secretary made the following observation on the role of white members in 
MDC campaigns: 
 
They must not involve themselves physically on the ground as had been the case. They should occupy 
the back seats so that ZANU-PF does not see them. ZANU-PF captures seats because it tells the people 
that the MDC is for the white men. Through ignorance the people believe and they vote ZANU-PF 
 
(Raftopoulos (2006:17). 
 
While this problem was certainly not the same in all rural areas of the country, it can be 
assumed that it presented a challenge for the MDC. 
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White political participation in the politics of independent Zimbabwe was for most of this 
period marked by the racist settler politics, and the unofficial pact of the ruling party’s 
reconciliation policy (Raftopoulos: 2006). 
 
Dealing with the weight of racial legacies in MDC structures has been immensely difficult. 
While the MDC has been the party most committed to non-racialism in Zimbabwean politics, 
the deepening crisis within the party has resulted in less inclusive forms of politics, resulting 
in the withdrawal of whites, particularly white farmer involvement in the party following the 
increased violence of the state, and an attempt to deal with the labelling of the MDC as a 
‘white controlled’ party (Raftopoulos: 2006:18). Mugabe’s anti-white message resonates 
with members of the MDC in the context of the legacies of racism in Zimbabwe. Thus in a 
critique of the party structures carried out in 2005, the MDC leadership itself viewed the 
party as having “moved away from its social democratic, all inclusive, tribalism 
foundations”. Thus, it is clear that one of the responses of the MDC to the authoritarian 
nationalism of ZANU-PF has been a more guarded approach towards its public racial profile 
and a greater sensitivity to the ruling party’s accusations that the MDC was foreign 
controlled. One example of this was the assertion made by Job Sikhala, the MDC Member of 
Parliament for St Mary’s. In an interview with government controlled The Herald, Sikhala 
indicated that race was one of the consequences of the MDC’s broad alliance of social forces. 
Referring to one key white figure in the MDC, Sikhala complained that in the MDC alliance 
‘we had people like Eddie Cross, who is a white supremacist, an ardent follower of 
Rhodesian fundamentalism who believes that everything begins and ends with Rhodesia. 
(Kitchen cabinet destroyed MDC: Sikhala. The Herald, 7
th
 January, 2006). 
 
Raftopoulos (2006) argues that as the organisational and strategic problems deepened in the 
MDC, the factional struggles within the party intensified. He further reckons that for those in 
the leadership who were connected to or controlled the parallel structure, became the means 
for isolating members of the leadership opposed to Tsvangirai in the run up to proposed 
national congress in 2006. Most of the energies of these structures have thus been turned on 
perceived enemies within the party, rather than developing a strategy to confront the Mugabe 
regime. 
 
The issue that brought matters to a head in MDC resulting in its decision not to participate in 
the senate elections in late 2005; To be or not to be was the question: as was seen from the 
senate debate which led to the split in MDC. 
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According to Raftopoulos (2006:19), 
 
Mugabe’s major reasons for re-introducing the senate into the political sphere were both to 
accommodate those in the ruling party who had lost in the parliamentary elections and to 
exacerbate divisions within the MDC, divisions that had been actively cultivated by 
ZANU-PF. 
 
To many observers the senate debate first appeared as a fairly innocuous issue that would be 
resolved with the MDC top six and national council. However, given the growing conflict 
and division within the MDC, the senate question became the central battle ground of the 
leadership for the control of the party. What ensued and unfolded reopened tribal sentiments. 
The debate over the senate became an ugly public spectacle carried out in the state controlled 
and private press, and characterised by disturbing levels of character assassination on both 
sides. Accusations and counter accusations of corruption, violence, tribalism and complicity 
with the ruling party were traded. In a further ironic twist the internal battle in the MDC 
ended up in the courts of the Mugabe regime. As the leadership struggle continued 
Tsvangirai expelled the ‘senate rebels’ from the party (The Sunday Mail, 13
th
 November 
2005). Raftopoulos (2006) argues that the response from the major civic groups was to 
support Tsvangirai. The boycott of elections coincided with the long term position of the 
NCA, while the ZCTU denounced the creation of the senate and urged all workers to oppose 
it with all their might. 
 
By February 2006 it was clear that divisions in the MDC had solidified and the split in the 
party was formalised at the congresses of the different factions. The senate issue that 
provided the pretext for the party split was not in itself the fundamental cause of the 
problems in the MDC. It was merely the site on which the different factions fought out long 
standing problems of organisations, structure, accountability and strategy within the party 
(Raftopoulos 2006). In the end, lack of trust within the leadership was all pervasive, and it 
was clear that both sides committed to a split in the party. However, it was clear that neither 
faction had developed effective struggle strategies to confront the Mugabe government and 
that both sides would have to face the difficult task of once again developing the national 
constituencies that the united MDC had once denied. 
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For the anti-senate group, the challenge would be to win over the Matabeleland region, while 
for their opponents the lack of a credible Shona leader would constitute a huge limitation in 
their efforts to develop a national profile hence the election of Arthur Mutambara, a 
candidate from outside of the existing leadership structure. Mutambara became the leader of 
pro-senate faction because of the ethnic dynamic of Zimbabwean politics. 
 
Even as ZANU-PF has faced major challenges around the politics of succession and the 
enormous structure of problems in the economy, it has had space to ponder these obstacles in 
the presence of an opposition politics that faces even more arduous difficulties, and is 
temporarily paralysed by another debilitating split in its ranks (Raftopoulos 2014). Apart 
from the immense challenges of state repression and political obstruction faced by the MDC-
T since its formation and under the Global Political Agreement(GPA), the long standing 
problematic internal dynamics of the party (Raftopoulos 2007; LeBas 2013) combined with a 
weakened electoral strategy in 2013 (Zamuchiya 2013), has induced a further crisis. Indeed, 
the strong and sustainable democracy is dependent on the existence of well-functioning 
political parties. Political parties are crucial actors in bringing together diverse interests, 
recruiting and presenting candidates, and developing competing policy proposals that provide 
people with viable choices (Chege 2007). While crisis and conflict are common features of 
political parties the world over, it appears the MDC-T may have failed to manage and contain 
its internal conflicts resulting in yet another split in 2014 that saw some senior officials 
forming the MDC-Renewal Team. 
 
The post 2013 election period has witnessed several significant developments in 
Zimbabwean politics. While ZANU-PF has presided over the implosion of the MDC-T the 
complete marginalisation of the smaller MDC formation, the ruling party has also been 
marred by renewed internal factional struggles. The constraints of victory have become clear 
as ZANU-PF struggles to find a path through the daunting economic and political challenges 
that confront it in the new era. Raftopoulos (2014:19) argues that a major factor that favours 
the ruling party is the fact that it is attempting to deal with these tasks in the presence of the 
debilitating weakness of the once formidable MDC. In sum, the ruling ZANU-PF and MDC 
formations are confronted with power, succession battles and factionalism. 
 
Given this background government controlled and the privately-owned press have intensively 
represented political conflict in Zimbabwe using different frames and discourse. 
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This research will explore the representation of conflict in the four selected newspapers 
mentioned above. 
 
 
 
 
1.5 Relevance of the topic 
 
Research concerning representation of conflict in the press in Zimbabwe can influence media 
houses to rethink their reportage on issues, particularly their use of language, frames and 
discourse. The print media play the fundamental role of providing information, providing a 
platform for public discussion, reflecting the goals and values of society. This research may 
lead to rethinking the influence of press on the public and being powerful agitators arming 
citizens with information for making decisions about governance. This study may lead to 
rethinking of policy implementation by policy makers on the print media coverage of 
conflict. Newspapers have a chosen agenda which almost inevitably influences news 
selection. This study therefore, seeks to conscientise Zimbabwean citizens to be critical of 
the media. The research can also be important to political parties in many ways, particularly 
on issues of internal democracy and how to manage divergent views. This study can cover a 
historical gap in the academic field in Zimbabwe, especially because this area has not been 
adequately researched. Most of the studies that have analysed conflict have focused more on 
land reform and economic crisis in general. This study may be unique in its approach and 
content. For the general public this study seeks to develop a critical mind-set to understand 
media reportage, equipping the public with critical media literacy skills so that they do not 
become victims of unscrupulous media, particularly in a society where the media are not just 
polarised, but partisan as well. 
 
1.6 Relationship of the topic to the Discipline of Communication 
 
The topic of this research is relevant as it articulates and explores critical press issues which 
influence and shape the interpretation of messages. This research examines representation of 
conflict in the press interrogating the difference of coverage by pro-government and privately 
owned press. The study examines headlines, articles, photographs and captions as well as 
cartoons in representing political conflict in Zimbabwe. It also analyses metaphors and 
intertexts in selected articles to thematically unpack their meanings. The topic is therefore 
related to communication as it deals with messages and their interpretations in political 
conflict through the press as a crucial discursive arena. 
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1.7 Literature Review 
 
A number of scholars have written theses and articles on representation of Zimbabwean 
crisis. Many of these scholars have, however, largely focused on issues of land reform, 
general elections, economic meltdown, among others. Nevertheless, land reform issues were 
part of a much wider economic and political crisis in the country which this study is focusing 
on as political conflict. Willems (2004) argues that the Zimbabwean government became 
increasingly concerned about how the land occupations were covered in the media and 
attributed great importance to media representations of the land question. Willems’ (2004) 
article entitled “Selection and silence: contesting meanings of land in Zimbabwean media” 
analyses how meanings of land were contested in two daily newspapers, the privately owned 
Daily News and the state funded The Herald. It deals with the nature of their reporting, their 
selection of headlines, and their attribution of agency towards certain actors. Her analysis is 
relevant to this study although the current research is broader in its context as it analyses four 
newspapers, The Herald and The Sunday Mail (state-owned daily and weekly respectively) 
and Daily News and The Standard (privately-owned daily and weekly). 
 
Willems (2004) posits that news is always a selection of events that are taking place in the 
real world at a particular moment in time. News is therefore not simply that what happens but 
that which can be presented as newsworthy. She further argues that whereas some events will 
be highlighted, others will be ignored. As Foucault (1978:27) points out, silence is very much 
part of any discourse: 
 
Silence itself- the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required 
between different speakers-is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is 
separated by a strict boundary than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and 
in relation to them within overall strategies. 
 
Applying this to news production, Van Dijk (1991:114) argues that the analysis of the 
“unsaid” is sometimes more revealing than the study of what is actually expressed in text. 
The focus of this analysis will be on how newspapers have both included and excluded 
information in their represented conflict. As Tendi (2010:3) argues: 
 
Zimbabwe’s new history overlooks, or ignores, many important events in the country’s recent past. No 
mention is made of the purge of members of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) from the liberation 
movement in 1977. There is silence on arbitrary violence used against alleged ‘sell-outs’ during the 
liberation war, and on the Gukurahundi, a programme of political repression in the 1980s--- 
contributions to the liberation struggle by critics of ZANU-PF are minimised or denied. 
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As mentioned in the background to the study, ZANU-PF never narrated what happened to 
members of the Nhari group during the liberation struggle in Zambia and how they were 
purged and brutally executed. A ‘patriotic’ version of history, disseminated by public 
intellectuals and state media, has distorted legitimate grievances. Tendi (2010) argues that the 
ruling party conscripted elements of history which it believed would generate support and 
undermine the opposition. Themes and events which did not serve ZANU-PF agenda were 
downplayed or misrepresented. This study argues that both the state controlled and privately-
owned press used selection and silence in their representation of conflict in general, and 
factionalism in particular. In reporting conflict in the context of the new political 
developments in early 2000, the Zimbabwean press clearly took very different positions. 
 
Willems’ (2004) comparison of The Herald and Daily News and her analysis of content, 
headlines, photographs and discourse employed inspire this study. In her conclusion, 
Willems (2004:17) points out: 
 
With clearly separate agendas, the two Zimbabwean daily newspapers, the government- controlled The 
Herald and the privately funded Daily News, have drawn upon different views to represent the land 
question. By selecting to report on a particular issue and silencing another, through the use of pictures, 
choice of certain headlines, and attribution of agency to certain actors, they have produced a 
construction of the events in Zimbabwe that served to satisfy their interests in an increasingly, 
polarised political environment in this tense climate, both papers become easily associated with 
diverging political opinion. 
 
This study argues that the four selected newspapers’ representation of conflict follows the 
same agenda and template employed in reporting the land reform. However, because the 
period covered is long and complex in Zimbabwe political conflict assumed many phases; 
this may account for divergent representation. Willems (2005) explores the various ways in 
which the British media, and the broadsheet the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph in 
particular framed events in Zimbabwe since 2000. Her article, “Remnant of Empire? British 
media reporting on Zimbabwe” (2005), argues that representations of the situation in 
Zimbabwe have been largely struggles over meaning and definitions of ‘crises’ in the 
country. She discusses how Zimbabwe was represented in the British media, why it attracted 
so much attention and what responses British media coverage provoked from the 
Zimbabwean government. Willems argues that the government used its media to counter the 
British press’s images and stereotypes of the crisis. 
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She further contends that the British media helped to create the conditions that allowed the 
Zimbabwean government to define the situation in the country as a struggle against 
imperialism. However, her study was limited to Zimbabwean crisis but this research focuses 
on a broader period of study as well as aspects of political conflict that have not been 
investigated. 
 
This research will benefit from insights by Willems’ (2005) strategies, framing and 
representation. Willems argues that British press, through strategies of simplicity, 
ethnicisation, marginalisation, personification and re-appropriation have framed and 
represented events in Zimbabwe in terms of racial conflict between black and white and more 
importantly, how the Zimbabwean government has successfully managed to exploit these 
discourses on what they termed as “Britain’s kith and kin”. Willems (2005) analyses the 
photographs in order to examine meaning that could be obtained or depicted. The context of 
the photographs pertains the contested land reform which fundamentally constitutes the 
central source of conflict. Willems (2005:2) argues that: 
 
Although news is often portrayed as a reflection of reality, for example through the metaphor of a 
‘mirror’, this paper will depart from the notion that news is always socially constructed, shaped by the 
particular context in which it is produced. It is therefore crucial to analyse the socio-economic 
environment in which news stories are made. 
 
This study assumes that socio-economic imperatives gave birth to political conflict in 
Zimbabwe; it is in this context that the press reports using different frames and discourses. 
Press coverage of the conflict between 2000 and 2016 reveals competing versions of reality 
epitomised by vested group interests in the context of a political economy of the media: 
While reportage is largely event and personality based, scholarly literature on conflict tends 
to be highly opinionated, selective, emotional and personalised. An academic enquiry on how 
conflict has been reported in local press in Zimbabwe is still missing, nor have the 
implications of media reporting of conflict on policy matters and public opinion have been 
adequately interrogated. Identifying the ideological assumptions underpinning the content of 
conflict and its possible impact on readers and the socio-economic and political climate in 
which the content was produced are examined in this study. 
 
Because this study analyses pictures and cartoons in their depiction of political conflict, it 
will utilise Willems’ (2011) article “Comic strips and “the crisis”: Post-colonial laughter and 
coping with everyday life in Zimbabwe”. 
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In African studies, political cartoons and comic strips have frequently been analysed in 
relation to concepts of power and resistance and considered as ways in which those subject to 
power challenge the rulers (Mbembe 2001; Nyamnjoh 2009). 
 
Willems (2011) argues that to a certain extent, these studies have reflected the wider debate 
on the role of humour in the relation between the rulers and ruled in the post-colony. In the 
discipline of media and cultural studies, scholars have analysed comics primarily as 
ideological texts which offer a particular framing of reality. This study will analyse selected 
cartoons which were published in both state-controlled newspapers and privately funded 
press. Most of the cartoons to be examined focus on political figures and personalities as well 
as unfolding events in conflict related situations between 1999 and 2016. Some of the 
cartoons centre on party leaders such as President Mugabe, Joyce Mujuru, Didymus Mutasa, 
Morgan Tsvangirai, and Tendai Biti among others. Willems (2011) maintains that post-
colonial laughter does not always address those in power, but humour may also point fingers 
at those subject to power in an attempt to make readers cope with the tragic events unfolding 
around them. Towards ZANU-PF’s annual congress, one typical cartoon which was 
published in the Zimbabwean privately owned weekly newspaper, The Standard, November 
16 to 22, 2014, depicts President Robert Mugabe driving a commuter omnibus going to 
December Congress, with him menacingly holding a knobkerrie with spikes looking through 
the window while Vice President Joice Mujuru perilously and desperately clinging at the 
back of the same omnibus; seemingly defying her being banned from attending the congress. 
Lying scattered on the ditches are other former ZANU-PF stalwarts who were ousted from 
the party like Rugare Gumbo. This cartoon is one of the many to be analysed in this study, 
with the above described portraying the ugly power succession battles and factionalism in 
ZANU-PF much to the damage of the economy. 
 
Cartoons highlight in some instances, how media discourse reflects the way in which politics 
slowly invades the line of high standing politicians, thereby reinforcing the importance of 
treating media texts as embedded in broader social discourses. Cartoons may also portray 
particular institutional ideology of newspapers. Willems (2011) argues that a number of 
scholars have placed the emergence of comics and cartoons in the broader context of shifts in 
political power in Africa as a result of processes of political liberation and democratisation. 
Focusing on political cartoons in Senegal, Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Kenya, Eko 
(2007:225) for example, analyses cartoons as resistant forms of satirical subversion that 
mock the excesses of Africa’s political leaders: 
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Indeed communication in Africa in the post-cold war era has become a gigantic struggle of images. 
Political leaders who had a monopoly over media content during the 1960s and 1970s now face the 
stiff competition from private independent media outlets. Cartoons are at the forefront of this battle of 
images. They take the animal mascots and other images that African leaders had created for 
themselves, turn them up-side-down and transform them into a caustic critique of the abuse of power. 
 
Cartoons which are going to be analysed in this study reflect unfolding conflicts, be it 
between political parties or conflict within a party centred on power struggles and 
factionalism. Willems (2011) acknowledges that the debate has not only focused on the way 
in which cartoons ridiculed those in power but has also reflected on the implications of 
cartoons for those in power. Eko (2007:235) for instance, has attributed agency to cartoons 
and points out that cartoons and caricature are politically sensitive, even dangerous texts. 
This is because “cartoons are addressed mostly to urban dwellers that were at the forefront of 
agitation for democratisation and liberalisation in the 1990s.” Writing about the role of 
cartooning in South Africa, Mason (2002:388) has argued that while 
 
It would be an exaggeration to claim that it was a major factor in the overthrow of 
apartheid …cartooning in its various forms, nevertheless, played an important role in 
crystallising issues of allegiance and identity, introducing revolutionary concepts into 
public discourse, undermining the ideological hegemony of the state and valorising the 
political struggle. 
 
This research, while agreeing with Mason’s (2002) notions, asserts that the Zimbabwean 
cartoons largely are meant to ridicule, caricaturise and mock political leaders who abuse 
power. Some of the cartoons are meant to unmask hypocrisy- serving as a reminder that 
power and political affiliation is not permanent but in a state of flux because betrayals are 
ever lurking in political parties as can be found out obtaining in both ZANU-PF and MDC. 
Allegiance and loyalty are never permanent features; relationships are ever fluid in nature. 
 
This study discusses how and whether cartoons in Zimbabwe can be positioned in relation to 
the question of power and resistance. Willems (2011:3) points out: 
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, one can question the extent to which cartoons and comics have come to fulfil 
the role of ‘hidden scripts’ i.e. subtle, implicit forms of critique against those in power. It is certainly 
tempting to view them in this light, given the widely reported range of legal and extra-legal restrictions 
which the government imposed on press freedom. Arrests of journalists and acts of intimidation were 
common in Zimbabwe in the 2000s. Pieces of legislation such as the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which were both 
introduced in early 2002, did have a serious impact on journalistic practices. Journalists and editors 
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reported to be cautious in what could be published and what might attract persecution from 
government… 
 
While this research agrees with Willems to a large extent, this study argues that privately 
owned newspapers such as Daily News and The Standard defied state muzzling, particularly 
during and post-Government of National Unity. Cartoons which were published during this 
period had no sacred cows and there was no fear of ‘Big Brother’. There were numerous 
examples of frank reporting on the unfolding conflict in both articles and cartoons. This 
study notes that GNU opened spaces for press freedom which were further strengthened in 
post GNU by the Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services, Professor Jonathan 
Moyo during tour of media houses. While Willems’s (2011) study maintains that cartoonists 
probably did take extra care in the way they represented Robert Mugabe to avoid being 
charged under POSA, this research argues that during and post-GNU, cartoonists seemed to 
be at liberty with cartoons on any political elites including President Robert Mugabe as 
cartoons analysed will testify. 
 
According to Willems (2011), a treatment of media discourse as reflective of social change 
could also contribute to wider debates in the field of media studies. She reiterates that the 
events that a newspaper report do not simply reflect the significance of those events but 
rather reveal the selection criteria of a newspaper. Events are not news worthy in themselves 
but only become ‘news’ when they are selected for inclusion in news reports. This study 
analyses specific news articles selected on the criteria of their ‘headlines’ among other 
narrative and genre texts in terms of conflict slant. Despite the abundance of academic or 
scholarly analyses on the roots and symptoms of the ‘Zimbabwe crisis,’ few studies have 
focused on political conflict and how local press represent it. 
 
1.8 Theoretical Framework 
 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part critically examines scholarly works on 
the Western media’s representation of Africa, focusing primarily on Zimbabwe. The 
argument for this perspective comes from the assumption that the privately-owned press in 
Zimbabwe is influenced by Western values and standards of reporting issues and therefore, 
employ frames meant to promote and/or achieve regime change in local politics. Among the 
scholarly works used in this section are Ndlela’s (2005) “The African paradigm: the coverage 
of the Zimbabwean” crisis” in the Norwegian media and Willems (2005) “Remnants of 
Empire? British Media Reporting on Zimbabwe.” 
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This section also includes the works by Mudimbe (1988; 1994), Mazrui (2005), Nyamnjoh 
(2010) and Allimadi (2002) to examine how Africa has generally been negatively represented 
by the Western media. Willems’ (2005) study has inspired this research in a great way. The 
second section discusses the theoretical framework underpinning the study. These are 
framing, agenda-setting and critical discourse analysis. 
 
Africa has been generally represented negatively by the Western media (Mudimbe 1994; 
Mudimbe 1988; Mazrui 2005; Allimadi 2002; Agutu 2008; Willems 2005; Ndlela 2005). 
Often such representations are characterised by stereotypical frames that journalists use as 
points of references whenever a new event unfolds in Africa. In Zimbabwe, for instance, 
journalists in privately owned media have been criticised for using frames similar to the 
American and Western perspectives, as this study will show. 
 
In Kenya, the criticism seems to be similar as shown by Agutu’s (2008) study, “The impact 
of Ownership on media content: An Exploratory case study of Nation media Group and 
Standard newspaper Group; Kenya.” Media ownership patterns influenced news coverage 
and media content during the 2002 multi-party elections in Kenya. Agutu’s (2008:8) 
indicates how “the emerging winner was also the candidate with the most coverage in the 
two newspapers”. This research, however, does not fully agree with the notion of a candidate 
being covered most as translating to victory. In Zimbabwe there are many factors which 
determine a winner, such as Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) which presides over 
voter registration processes; the nature of election campaigns - whether there is intimidation, 
violence of all sorts; rigging machinery amongst other factors. The liberation struggle ruling 
party may have declared again that the opposition will never rule the country through the 
ballot box. However, this researcher agrees with Agutu (2008:8) when he says “media 
ownership patterns are seen to influence editorial choices, compromising the practise of 
objectivity and consequently influencing representation”. 
 
Agutu (2008:8) utilises critical political-economy of the media as a conceptual framework to 
show how “ownership patterns affect media messages in total disregard to establish 
additional policies and other industry based practices…ownership control and interference 
makes the future of journalists quiet bleak”. However, the study fails to understand media 
under the control of government or ruling party. In Zimbabwe, for example, Zimpapers are 
controlled by the government. This research can argue that, depending on the political 
environment or terrain, particularly when the liberation party movement’s hegemony is under 
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threat, journalists simply toe the line and report news as instructed. The representation of 
issues follows a strict given template from the powers that be in politics. This researcher 
argues that Zimbabwean local journalists’ professional expectations are sometimes “shelved” 
in order to fulfil specific representation frames mandated by owners of the media. There is 
need to critically examine the pressures and challenges editors and journalists face within the 
internal working environment and the consequences of such pressure on representation. 
 
Ndlela (2005:73) argues that: 
 
The very process of selection and construction in representation serves not only to stereotype, but also 
to exclude many features and understanding the issues in Africa. Negativity is one of the main features 
or dimensions of events which are likely to be reported... 
 
What does not come out clearly from Ndlela’s (2005) work and other scholars is how local 
media represent conflict. It would seem many studies focus on how Western media represent 
Africa in general. This study specifically focuses on Zimbabwean press and how it represents 
conflict. It compares the state-owned and the privately-owned press’s representation of 
political conflict between the ruling party and opposition and further explores internal 
conflict within political parties, that is, power struggles, succession battles and factionalism. 
Nevertheless, this research utilises Western media perspectives as alluded to earlier. For 
example, how do ideologies of journalism dictate the criteria by which news is selected? 
 
The events in Zimbabwe since 2000 have been framed negatively to construct a broad 
consensus of the ‘reality’ that Zimbabwe was experiencing a crisis. Ndlela (2005:71) 
indicates that “the disputed parliamentary and presidential elections are events that have 
placed Zimbabwe in the international media limelight”. 
 
Ndlela’s paper analyses the problematic issues associated with the coverage of the 
Zimbabwean crisis in the Norwegian main stream media between 2000 and 2004. The 
analysis is limited to representations of the controversial land reforms and the disputed 
elections in two major newspapers, Aftenpostern, VG and Dagbladet. However, this study is 
much broader because it uses four local newspapers, that is, two pro-government and two 
oppositional. This research is also broader because it deals with conflict which embraces 
socio-economic and political issues extensively, embracing land reform, elections between 
2000 and 2013, and then post 2013 elections conflict. Those events will be analysed from 
local media’s representation but will also draw from the works of Willems (2005) study. 
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Willems (2005:95) argues that “farm occupations enabled journalists to simplify the situation 
in Zimbabwe” since “the more clear and unambiguous the signal... the more probable that it 
will be recorded as worth listening to”. The possibility of reporting Zimbabwe positively was 
denied through signification politics where events were often negatively framed and 
sensationally “to limit the range of possible meanings” (Willems: 2005:95). 
 
Although Willems rightly notes how farm occupations were framed negatively and without 
contextualisation, journalists had a different argument that justified the manner in which they 
covered the occupations. 
 
They claimed that the latter were ‘a big story and you can’t ignore’ it and had higher 
premium in the news value criterion because it involved the issue of race (Willems 2005:96). 
In reporting the racial conflict, for example, the Western press used to portray one side as 
Good and the other as Evil in reporting. Willems’ (2005:97) study shows how some 
newspapers in the British press supported the idea of racial conflict by suggesting incidences 
of ethnic cleansing. Her study further highlights how “British media framing of the situation 
in Zimbabwe as a black versus white conflict ultimately made the much larger number of 
black victims invisible as “it marginalised them” (Willems :2005:98). In other situations 
journalists personalised the situation in Zimbabwe where the blame shifted to personalities. 
The key personality that the weeklies focused on was President Robert Mugabe with 
occasional references to Thabo Mbeki. Willems (2005:100) captures occasions where 
Mugabe was represented as the ‘bad guy’ by the British media noting that: 
 
Journalists often used the metaphor of The Jewel of Africa to describe how wonderful Zimbabwe had 
been before Mugabe turned to it a nightmare. The narrative of the transition from ‘food basket to 
basket case’ was often invoked in order to stress that Zimbabwe was the tale of a success gone bad 
 
(Willems: 2005:100). 
 
Although this study is not primarily on representation of land reform in local press, Willems’ 
(2005) discourse analysis will be utilised. As noted in the background to the study section, 
the problem of developing a non-racial party has proved extremely challenging for 
opposition party. The ‘white face’ of the MDC has been heavily exploited by the ZANU-PF 
in a country and region where the memories of settler colonial rule are still fresh. In this 
research, the local press focuses on personalities too, particularly political party leadership. 
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For instance, pro-government press portray President Robert Mugabe as “father” loosely 
translated in Shona as “baba”. In local Shona culture the ‘father’ is not criticised, he is 
immune to any blame. He (Mugabe) is depicted as infallible like a god. Pro-government 
newspapers never ever find blame or criticise the President. However, opposition leader is 
portrayed as the cause of all problems in Zimbabwe such as violence, sanctions, economic 
meltdown among others. He (Tsvangirai) is represented in derogatory metaphors such as 
“Chematama” [the chubby cheeks person], sell-out, stooge of the West, proxy of the British 
and Americans. In this regard, Willems’ (2005) analysis of good and evil is well exemplified 
in how local press represents conflict and personalities. 
 
Ogenga (2010:115) argues that if any analysis is confined to a single political-economic 
cause, ‘the textual meaning often amounts to reductionism’, which means it uses what is 
already familiar about the situation to the audience to construct meaning. The situation in 
Zimbabwe is therefore, likely to be constructed as another African tragedy. Ogenga (2010) 
further reckons that there is a tragedy of post-colonial African mind set determined to resist 
neo-imperialism, defend liberation solidarity and engage the West with suspicion. This is 
opposed to the determinism approach, whereby certain contextual conditions and broader 
structures can be used to understand and set the limit to the possible determinants of events 
that lead to certain textual discourses and meaning in the first place; like the case of how 
liberal human rights and democracy discourses would influence reporting. This causes for the 
consideration of various competing but determining contextual factors regarding how the 
Zimbabwean conflict is represented. Thus, a complementary approach or framework is the 
one utilised in this study fundamentally because the conflict is complex and the period is 
broad in which diverse press is analysed. 
 
The analytical approach utilised in this study sets the processes of economic determination 
alongside other processes and pressures in culture and analysed their interaction. Other 
important factors in examining political conflict in Zimbabwe are: the role of institutions that 
have been colonially inherited; the forms of discourses such as neo-imperialism, pan-
Africanism, national ‘patriotic history’ versus liberal ideas of human rights and democracy. 
Tendi’s (2010) study “How intellectuals made history in Zimbabwe” will be used to analyse 
state controlled press’ representation of conflict. According to ZANU-PF, ‘Patriotic History’ 
emerged as a response to Western imperialism in 2000. The retort is well captured in ‘Inside 
the third Chimurenga’, which is a collection of speeches and writings by Mugabe. Tendi 
(2010) argues that the production of patriotic history was sparked and accelerated by the rise 
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of a credible opposition party in the shape of MDC in 1999. Journalists in pro-government 
press extensively quote and utilises speeches by ZANU-PF intellectual allies who were co-
opted from the academy who are more prolific and sharper in their formulations. These 
intellectuals’ writing in the national press contributes to the patriotic history’s multi-layered 
nature. These intellectuals have actively collaborated in the development of the themes in 
Mugabe’s speeches and writings- that is, land, race, sovereignty, patriotism which captures 
the dichotomy between ‘patriots’ versus’ sell-outs’ (Tendi:2010:2). On the other hand, the 
privately owned press’ representation of conflict is anchored and buttressed on liberal ideas 
of human rights and democracy- perhaps and arguably coloured with issues of regime 
change. 
 
The approach chosen in this study is sensitive to the factors mentioned above. The study 
strives to be more nuanced in its analysis of the socio-economic and political events in 
Zimbabwe by the local press in order to examine representation of conflict. Before discussing 
theoretical framework of agenda setting and framing, it is imperative to briefly explain media 
representation. 
 
1.8.1 Theories of Media Representation 
 
Gaye Tuchman’s social construction theory (1978) is a useful lens for analysing the way the 
press represents conflict in society. The social construction theory views news as a social 
construct dependent on the ideology of those who produce it, and the framing theory which 
argues that people do not only acquire factual information about events from the news, but 
also how much value to attach to those events. Borrowing from the idea of social 
construction, representation refers to the construction in any medium (especially the mass 
media) of aspect of ‘reality,’ such representations may be in speech or writing as well as still 
or moving pictures. The term refers not only to the process involved in construction, but also 
to the product and its reception by the audience. Representation is an attempt to interpret 
reality in order to make sense and meaning. Therefore, it is not necessarily a reflection of 
reality (Hall 1997). In representation, the term ‘reality’ is problematic. It is difficult to give 
an account of what is actually real because reality can be socially constructed through texts 
(images, photographs, illustrations, words, etc.) in language leading to different kinds of 
meaning (Ogenga 2010). Reality is always represented- what we treat as direct experience is 
mediated by perceptual codes (Ferguson 1998: Manning 2001). There is potential for 
different kinds of meaning in media representation due to the polysemic nature of media 
 
25 
 
texts. Every media form is a representation of someone’s concept of existence using a coded 
language that can be read by an audience. The media do not operate in a social vacuum but 
are part of the society and exist within a certain culture which cannot be divorced from the 
political and economic realities in that society. 
 
 
Hall (1997) has argued that representation does not entail a straight forward presentation of 
the world and the relationship in it. For Hall (1997), representation is not similar to reflection 
but is a deliberate attempt to make things mean through framing them rather than the 
transmission of a pre-existing meaning (Briggs and Cobley 2002). All media texts (including 
news) are re-presentations of reality, meaning that they are intentionally constructed and 
targeted to specific targets. They are entirely artificial versions of what is perceived as real. 
However, the media broadens our perception of reality without which our perceptions will be 
very limited. Therefore, the media plays a critical role in helping individuals come to terms 
with what they would want to consider real. 
 
The press plays a critical role in public opinion formation and representation. There is no 
question that the media form, shape, influence and direct public opinion. Its role in 
representation and meaning interpretation may be more effective in target groups or intended 
audiences in the society and less effective in others. Factors such as age, sex, language, 
religion, intelligence, education, and political affiliation have to be taken into account when 
the target group is receiving messages send by the media and how the meanings of these 
messages are understood. It can be assumed that in political conflict, what journalists write 
and the manner in which they frame issues can have powerful effects on their intended 
readership. In this regard, theories which emphasise the effectiveness of the media in the 
formation of public opinion and representation should be examined. For this study, agenda 
setting and farming and their links to the Critical Discourse Analysis approach used in this 
study are discussed. 
 
1.8.2 Agenda Setting 
 
When the first agenda-setting research was conducted, the researchers were trying to answer 
this research question: How does “news coverage influence our personal perceptions of what 
are the most important issues of the day?” (McCombs & Bell 1996:105). 
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As McCombs and Yuksel (2004:328) argue: “Agenda setting theory basically explains how 
and why the public learn how much importance to attach to a topic from the emphasis placed 
on it in news coverage”. The mass media sets the agenda for public attention and lay the 
groundwork for public opinion. In short, this is “the idea that the media don’t tell people 
what to think, but what to think about” (Baran and Davis 2003:311). As this is an effect of 
the media, the question is: who sets the agenda of the media? McCombs and Yuksel (2004: 
 
383) cite five major categories namely; 
 
1) influence from individual media workers 
 
2) influence of media routines 
 
3) Organisational influence on content 
 
4) Influence on content from outside media organisations, and 
 
5) Ideology. 
 
In the Zimbabwean context political events unfolding in country set and determine the 
agenda in the local press. News stories in both state controlled and privately owned press 
generally follow political agendas rather than develop independently. This is particularly so 
in conflict situations such as the one in Zimbabwe since 2000. The media do this mainly 
through an over-reliance on highly selected quotations that come directly from elites and 
socially privileged sources like politicians. Furthermore, newspapers set their own agendas 
through the selection of quotations and their choices in how to present official sources. 
According to McCombs (2005:164) “…key government officials and institutions can have 
considerable influence on what is covered and how it is covered,” McCombs, however, 
believes that editorials affected by these sources are limited. This study argues that in 
Zimbabwe the situation could be different because government officials and the uniformed 
forces do have so much influence on government controlled press (Zimpapers) while the 
privately-owned press owners also determine agenda setting, especially in the context of 
unfolding conflict. 
 
McQuail (1987) notes that the term ‘agenda setting’ was coined by McCombs and Shaw to 
describe the trend they had noticed in election campaign. The media successfully influenced 
public opinion by the way they covered news stories, consequently determining the outcome 
in elections. 
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McQuail (1994:357) explains the agenda setting hypothesis thus: 
 
Mass media news and information reflect the content and order of priority of issues. This 
representation of issues in the mass media exerts an independent effect on issue content and on relative 
salience in public opinion. 
 
This study argues that political conflict in general and factionalism in particular have been 
influenced by agenda setting. For example, during elections campaigns the press in 
Zimbabwe deliberately and consciously set the agenda on presidential, legislative, senate and 
council candidates. Due to polarisation, pro-government press prominently concentrate on 
positive news stories on ZANU-PF and negative stories on opposition candidates or remain 
silent on them. On the other hand, privately owned press largely cover positive news on 
opposition candidates and negatively report on ruling party. It can be argued that the same 
template may have been used to represent factionalism and succession battles in both parties. 
 
However, the state controlled press vilified and exposed those who were deemed plotting 
President Robert Mugabe’s ouster in post 2013 elections. The agenda was set on ZANU-PF 
‘rebels’ who had to be purged systematically. The privately owned press seemed to have a 
clear agenda to assume a neutral or sympathetic tone to Joyce Mujuru faction in as much as it 
did with supporting MDC-Tsvangirai yet attacking the Renewal Team (those who had split 
from main MDC party). Agenda setting, therefore determines the way the public views 
political figures through the manner of coverage as journalists place emphasis on certain 
issues thereby structuring them as important. Due to emphasis placed readers become aware 
of how much importance to attach to the issues. 
 
In choosing and displaying news, editors, and newsroom staff play an important part in 
shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much 
importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its 
position (placement). For example, stories on power, succession and factionalism dominate 
the press on daily bases. Of course, people’s attention to mass media political information 
varies greatly. Thus, agenda setting theory supports the hypothesis that the media play a key 
role in shaping public agenda. Scholars argue that agenda setting later developed into the 
frame theory which is sometimes referred to as second-level agenda setting. 
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1.8.3 Framing 
 
The theoretical premise of framing posits that media content which is transmitted to media 
audiences is influenced by journalistic norms and the world views of individual journalists. 
In order to understand representation of conflict in the press, it is important that an 
understanding of message presentations be focused on. It is argued in this research that 
message framing influences message receptions which in turn impacts on readers’ attitudes 
or reactions. Entman (1993) uses the term “framing” to refer to the way in which the media 
shape reality through their representation. He defines framing as the selection of 
 
 
….some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to 
 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral education and / or treatment 
recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993:52). 
 
 
Similarly, Melkote (2009: 549) defines framing as “the ways in which news media organise, 
treat and present issues, events and news objects as news makers’. Framing may involve 
ignoring or downplaying certain aspects of an issue, creating an artificial balance in 
coverage, media and journalists, speaking with the voice of the government, exaggeration 
and lack of analysis of events and use of narrow selection of experts (Melkote, ibid: 549). 
Framing influences how audiences think about issues by invoking certain interpretations of 
information. Framing is achieved in the way in which news is packaged, the amount of 
exposure, the tone of the presentation, the accompanying headlines and visual effects, and the 
labelling and vocabulary. Framing provides useful ideas for understanding the interaction 
between media, public agenda and public policy (Chari, 2010). Since this thesis seeks to 
examine the representation of political conflict between the ruling party and the opposition 
parties in newspapers, the concept of framing and social construction help to bring more 
insights on how news on conflict is selected and packaged to achieve a particular political 
agenda. 
 
 
McQuail (2005) explains news framing as a way of presenting interpretations of events and 
items of fact. Through framing, journalists present issues in a predictable manner. They 
arrange the facts and order stories in patterns that are unique to each media house. This 
research concerns itself with the divergent editorial approach which may produce different 
news frames on conflict. 
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Framing differs significantly from priming and agenda setting. The theory is based on the 
assumption that the manner of news packaging or how news is framed has an influence on 
how news is understood by readers. Framing is often traced to news writers, and the different 
media house editorials that determine how news frames are packaged (Scheufele & 
Tewksbury: 2007). Frames are important in this study as they clearly show numerous ways in 
which journalists present their judgement in the news stories. 
 
Because issues are often complicated and require the processing of information from a 
variety of perspectives, frames provide shorthand for understanding the situation by focusing 
only on the features deemed important by the particular individuals involved. This process of 
emphasising certain features of the issue by cropping or downplaying less prominent features 
allows the most important information surrounding a dispute or controversy. However, while 
this theory is valid and crucial for this study, the researcher argues that despite the frames 
used by the media different people see certain dimensions of issues in very different ways. 
What may be of primary importance to one stakeholder may not be important at all to 
another. Though framing provides shorthand filtering of essential information, it can also 
generate conflicts through the differing interpretations of a dispute and disagreements over 
the importance of its component parts. 
 
According to Fairhurst and Sarr (1996) framing consists of three elements: Language, 
Thought and Forethought. Language helps us to remember information and acts to transform 
the way in which we view situations. To use language, people must have thought and 
reflected on their own interpretive frameworks and those of others. In this regard, framing is 
a useful tool for analysing, because it allows us to view the particular frames that journalists 
use when examining a particular issue. Bainbridge, Goc and Tyran (2011:235) point out that 
framing the text involves two considerations: 
 
(a) The frame of the text is the way the text is presented to us. 
 
(b) The context is where it is located and how it is encountered by use. 
 
Bainbridge et al (2011: 235) argue that when looking at the frame of the text we should ask 
why certain elements have been included, but also what has been left out. There is need to 
ask why these elements have been left out and how does that affect the possible meanings the 
text might have. 
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Bainbridge et al (2011) suggest that in thinking what is not included in the frame, look at 
structuring absences (elements in the text that have meaning despite or because of the fact 
they have been left out) : what is missing from the text, and what meaning these omissions 
might connote. Since all media texts are representations which are mediation of the world 
affected by a series of choices and selections, and framed in a certain way, we always must 
be aware of what is not included in the text. For example: 
 
(a) What is missing? 
 
(b) What choices have been made in leaving out this or that element? 
 
(c) What meaning might be elicited from the absences? 
 
(d) What selection of images and information has occurred? 
(Bainbridge, Goc and Tyran: 2011:235). 
 
In this study the framing theory will be used as a conceptual tool for analysing how the state-
owned and the privately-owned press selected news articles, headlines, photographs, cartoons 
and language in their representation of conflict. Framing is a useful tool for analysis 
particularly where newspapers are compared in how they represent conflict. 
 
1.8.4 Discourse and Ideology 
 
As one of the most important sites in which and through which national agenda is articulated 
and disseminated, national newspapers play particularly important roles in representing and 
interpreting news stories (Li: 2009:85). This study examines representation of conflict in 
local newspapers therefore it is vital to explore discourse and language in analysing press 
texts. In order to examine the articles in the newspapers, as well as photographs and cartoons 
in this study, Critical Discourse Analysis approach will be utilised. Ndlela (2005:72) posts 
that CDA is “a particular type of qualitative methodology that tries to understand the 
processes through which reality comes into being”. This research argues that CDA offers 
insights into the way in which newspaper articles become meaningful to their readers by 
examining the textual patterns that serve as the vehicle for communication. Media sources 
may influence the public not only by choosing the slant of a particular report, but also merely 
by choosing what to report. The news media, however, is widely viewed as biased. But the 
question is that: where can the bias in reporting be detected and what is the tool for it? 
Answering to this question, (Richardson: 2007:13) introduces “language as the medium to do 
so”. He examines the language use (discourse) of newspapers and identifies language as a 
“non-neutral element”. 
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Language is social. It is through the use of language that we grant meaning to our actions; 
equally, it is through our use of language that we can attempt to remove meaning from our 
actions (Richardson 2007:10). Given all the above mentioned ideas, this study tries to 
investigate the ways language is used by the public media in general and printed news media 
in particular to represent and interpret some news stories of conflicting ideas between state 
controlled and privately owned press in Zimbabwe. 
 
Li (2009:91) believes that there is no creation of language in the discourse that is not 
influenced by certain social groups, classes, discourses, conditions or relationships; we thus 
consider language to be “both constitutive of the social world as well as constituted by other 
social practices”. Investigating the relationship between media and language choice is of 
prime importance in critical and analytical studies and that is the reason why Popp (2006:6) 
expresses that “media language choice is an institutionalised means of framing reality”. 
Therefore, framing social, political, cultural, economic and ideological realities highly 
depends on the language use of the printed news media. Bloor and Bloor (2007:10) argue that 
most discourse used by members of a group tends to be ideologically based. However, the 
belief or attitudes that stern from ideology may not always be held consciously by 
individuals; they can be so deeply ingrained in our thought patterns and language that we 
take them for granted as self-evident. While numerous theoretical definitions of ideology 
exist, it is believed that Van Dijk’s (1998) definition is particularly well suited to the study of 
ideology through a CDA approach which is the framework of this research. Van Dijk 
(1998:69) argues: “ideologies are representations of who we are, what we stand for, what our 
values are, and what our relationships are with other groups, in particular our enemies or 
opponents, that is those who oppose what we stand for, threaten our interest and prevent us 
from equal access to social resources and human rights.” In other words, an ideology is a 
self-serving schema for the representation of Us and Them as social groups. Van Dijk 
(1998:33) maintains that many group ideologies involve the representation of Self and 
Others, Us and Them. Many therefore seem to be polarised – we are Good and They are Bad, 
‘We’ group is presented in a favourable light and the ‘They’ group unfavourably. This 
ideological polarisation consists of ‘emphasising our good properties/ actions; emphasising 
their bad properties/actions, mitigating our bad properties/actions; and mitigating their good 
properties/ actions” (Kuo & Nakamura 2005: 410). This study will utilise these concepts in 
order to examine and compare representation of conflict in local press. 
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Kuo and Nakamura (2005:395) believe that language is a reality-creating social practise, and 
anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological 
position. CDA emphasises the need to critically examine the role of newspaper language, 
which is the focus of this study. The ideology of the news writers, according to CDA, is not 
always apparent but is hidden in the subtle choice of linguistic forms, and only by examining 
linguistic structures in a ‘critical’ way can the ideological underpinnings of news discourse 
be unpacked. In this regard, CDA emphasises the importance of not accepting a presented 
reality at its face value but reading it critically instead. CDA therefore provides the means to 
investigate the means and ways in which language operates in social life. In the analysis of 
newspapers selected, this study employs CDA from the perspective of the cited scholars. 
However, this study will also utilise Fairclough’s (1995) framework of discourse analysis 
which has three components. The first dimension is textual analysis, the second is analysis of 
discourse practise through which texts are produced and received. It is concerned with how 
people interpret and reproduce or transform texts. The third dimension is analysis of social 
practices, focusing in particular on the relation of discourse to power and ideology; this 
practise is concerned with issues of power-power being a construct that is realised through 
inter-discursivity and hegemony. Analysis of this dimension includes exploration of the ways 
in which discourses operate in various dimensions of society (Shojaei, Yousseffi & Hosseini 
2013: 860). Both Van Dijk’s and Fairclough’s versions of CDA focus on media text and 
content which this study is concerned about also. 
 
 
 
 
1.9 Goals and objectives of the study 
 
The goals of this study are: 
 
• To examine representation of conflict in the selected newspapers in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
• To compare pro-government and privately owned press’ reportage of power, 
succession struggles and factionalism. 
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1.9.1 Objectives of the study 
 
The objectives of this study are exploratory and descriptive. 
 
The objectives of this research are to: 
 
• Investigate how conflict is represented in the Zimbabwean press. 
 
• Compare pro-government and privately owned newspapers’ reportage on, and 
representation of power, succession struggle and factionalism. 
 
1.10 Formulation of the research problems 
 
1.10.1 Formulation of the research questions 
 
• In what ways have the press represented political conflict in Zimbabwe? 
 
• How have state-controlled and privately owned press reported power, succession 
battles and factionalism? 
 
1.10.2 Formulation of the key assumptions 
 
• State-controlled newspapers do not hide their allegiance to ruling party and are used 
as mouth pieces of ZANU-PF. 
 
• Privately owned press are largely pro-opposition. 
 
• The media has influence on society such as political conflict. 
 
• Zimbabwean society is polarised and the media is also polarised. 
 
1.11 Methodology 
 
O’Leary (2005:85) states that research methodology is the framework associated with a 
particular set of assumptions that can be used to conduct research. This study employs 
qualitative research since it explores and examines representation of conflict in Zimbabwean 
politics. It will be basic research as it will be based on content analysis that will be carried 
out in the newspapers that were selected for the purpose of their research. Therefore, this 
study is exploratory and is guided by interpretive paradigm of critical discourse analysis. 
 
1.11.1 The research method 
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The research method is qualitative content analysis. This will use critical discourse analysis. 
Qualitative content analysis was predominantly used because research in representation of 
reality by the media is usually qualitative by nature. 
 
A research design is a plan of procedures for data collection and analysis that is undertaken 
to evaluate a particular theoretical perspective’ (Guy 1987:92). The research design therefore 
involves the process of planning what and how data will be collected. It is the strategy and 
design used in choosing the selected methods which link them to desire results in a study. 
The main focus of this research was to analyse representation of political conflict in 
Zimbabwe in state-owned The Herald and The Sunday Mail; and privately- owned, Daily 
News and The Standard. This research analysed articles, headlines, photographs and captions 
and cartoons in order to examine framing or representation of conflict. By utilising CDA, the 
study also analysed linguistic aspects such as metaphors, analogies and inter-texts and 
selected stories to thematically unpack their meanings. Journalists usually create conceptual 
frameworks in news articles and columns in order to draw attention to issues which they feel 
are important. In the print media selected it is typical for a perceived ‘other’ to be 
constructed, either intentionally or unintentionally in presenting a conflict perspective. 
Archival selected newspapers will be the main source of data accessed from The Herald 
library which stores all main stream newspapers, both Zimpapers and privately owned 
newspapers. 
 
1.11.2 Population 
 
Du-Plooy (2002:100) describes population as all possible units of analysis. Welman, Kruger 
and Mitchell (1994) describe population as the study of objects and consist of individuals, 
groups, organisations, human products and events or conditions to which they are exposed. 
Du-Plooy (2002:53) defines target population as the entire class or group of units, objects or 
subjects to which they want to generalise findings. She further describes accessible 
population as the units of analysis in the target population to which the researchers have 
access. Therefore, a research problem relates to a specific population which encompasses the 
total collection of all units to be analysed in which the researcher hopes to draw conclusions 
from. For this research the target population are all newspapers in Zimbabwe, while the 
accessible population are the four newspapers that will be analysed by the researcher. The 
selected newspapers analysed are The Herald, The Sunday Mail, Daily News and The 
Standard. 
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1.11. 3 Unit of Analysis 
 
Du-Plooy (2002:53) defines unit of analysis as “the smallest elements” investigated. Royce 
and Singleton (1988:67) define unit of analysis as “the entities (object or event) under study” 
in social research. Units of analysis for this research will include whole articles on political 
conflict, paragraphs, sentences, headlines, photographs, captions and cartoons. Under 
political conflict, the sub-themes analysed, from qualitative perspective were elections, draft 
constitution/referendum, power, succession struggles, factionalism, economic and land 
reform issues. These were chosen because of the controversies and challenges of violence, 
intimidation and rigging, particularly concerning elections. 
 
1.11.4 Sample 
 
Du-Plooy (2002:100) posits that sampling involves following a rigorous procedure when 
selecting units of analysis from a larger population. It is a sub-set of a population or a set of 
some of the measurements about which the researcher intends to draw a conclusion. This 
research uses purposive sampling in which the researcher selected the period 1999 to 2016, 
and newspapers relevant to the study. The selected newspapers are: 
 
The Herald –a daily newspaper which is state-funded and therefore government controlled 
and falls under Zimpapers stable. Its duty is to serve the public in a democracy. The Herald is 
guided by the Social Responsibility theory. This theory demands a commitment to serve the 
public interest. The content that is produced in state-controlled media is mostly shaped by 
government ideology. Mushore (2010) asserts that state-controlled newspapers at times 
follow Development Media theory which seeks to provide positive views, social harmony 
and preservations of indigenous cultural identity of heritage and encourages support of state 
development efforts. The Herald is guided by its parent company editorial policy which is 
that of its sister weekly paper The Sunday Mail as outlined below. 
 
• The Sunday Mail - is a weekly government controlled newspaper which also falls 
under Zimpapers stable. It is owned and published by Zimbabwe Newspapers (1980 
Pvt Ltd), a state-owned profit-making company. Formerly owned by the Argus 
Printing and Publishing Company, the paper has been in existence since 1935. The 
newspaper is guided by its parent company’s editorial policy, which among other 
things states that; 
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(a) Newspapers must be credible, giving readers information that is as accurate as 
possible. 
 
(b) Newspapers must be as complete as possible, publishing reports of the major 
national, regional and international events, whether news, sport or cultural. 
 
(c) Newspapers will be supportive of Zimbabwe and its goals and generally 
supportive of the elected government of the day. 
 
(d) Newspapers must be fit to read for all, requiring sensitivity in the handling of 
sensational and lurid stories. 
 
The Sunday Mail is the most widely read newspaper in the country and has a 
circulation figure of 90 000 (Chaguta, 2006:25). 
 
• Daily News – is the first independent Zimbabwean daily newspaper. It is a private, 
oppositional newspaper formed by private business people and former journalists 
with a history of confrontation with President Mugabe’s government. The owners and 
senior journalists of the newspaper, due to their history had scores to settle with the 
government. Through its alternative journalism, in the sense of giving oppressed 
voices and ordinary people a platform from which to articulate their issues and 
challenge abuse of power, especially ordinary victims, civic and opposition political 
activists who were not necessarily experts and intellectuals, The Daily News 
positioned itself as alternative leader, organiser and mobiliser against state forces, 
with the intention of rejuvenating the emerging democracy. It should be pointed out 
that Daily News was not the only privately owned newspaper in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
What was unprecedented is its sustained alternative journalism approach in relying 
not only on experts as sources in its news coverage, but in systematically and 
deliberately focussing on, and telling the stories of the ordinary victims of political 
repression, in their own lived circumstances and voices. The Daily News was also the 
only private and daily run newspaper in a country where the government had a firm 
grip on the public media, with two major daily newspapers, The Herald and The 
Chronicle, published in Harare and Bulawayo, the country’s largest and second 
largest cities (Ruhanya, 2014). The Daily News was not merely an opposite of the 
mainstream and government controlled news media, but it sought to challenge and 
change the balance of power in the country. 
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The Daily News was launched in March 1999 but quickly became the medium of 
choice for pro-democracy forces to spread their messages of reform to the 
Zimbabwean population. The Daily News became the mouthpiece for the opposition 
and for civic actors opposed to Mugabe’s dictatorship (Ruhanya, 2014). Data on 
circulation and readership shows that after only a short period of existence the Daily 
News successfully overtook and broke the monopoly of state-controlled newspapers 
in the dissemination of news, and it became the leading alternative to government 
newspapers. The arrival of the Daily News captured the issues of the moment in that 
context of an enormous governance crisis marked by authoritarian tendencies against 
opponents of the government. The newspaper set the agenda during the four main 
elections held during its life, the referendum of February, 2000, the June, 2000 
elections, the 2002 presidential elections and 2013 harmonised elections. 
 
• The Standard - is a privately-owned weekly newspaper published on Sunday. This 
newspaper is owned by Zimind Publishers (Pvt Ltd), which is owned by businessman 
Trevor Ncube, owner of the Mail and Guardian (South Africa). The paper was 
launched in 1997. The paper is guided by its parent company’s Mission Statement 
which states that: ‘’Our duty is to serve and inform the public, which we strive to do 
professionally, courageously and responsibly while enhancing stakeholder value and 
upholding press freedom, human rights and cultivating democratic values’’ (Pindayi, 
 
2010:14). At its initial formation the paper was targeted at the business community 
and high or middle-income Zimbabweans. It gradually became more of a political 
tabloid with almost leading with a political story of the sort or the other. Like the 
Sunday Mail, the paper carries different sections mixing hard and soft news. Although 
The Standard has a national outlook its news coverage and distribution is largely 
urban, particularly the main cities and towns around the country. The circulation is 
believed to be around 40 000, although this figure could not be confirmed (Chari, 
2010). The newspaper is increasingly critical of the achievements of government and 
plays an important role of exposing corruption, government mismanagement and the 
deepening economic and social crisis in Zimbabwe. 
 
The study benefited from the inclusion of both left-leaning and oppositional press because of 
their divergent points of view due to different ideologies. However, one main limitation was 
that there was a vacuum of nearly seven (7) years when Daily News stopped publishing 
between 2003 and part of 2010. This meant no news articles were analysed for the 
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privately-owned daily newspaper thereby giving state-controlled Herald the monopoly of 
daily news to the citizens. Another limitation was that although newspaper editions were 
selected, the same story was likely to be used for the main theme and sub-themes mentioned 
above under 1.11.3 ‘Unit of analysis’. This resulted, more or less, in repetition when 
explaining the factors that influence news construction in different chapters, especially 
considering that the study was dealing with complexly interlinked theme and sub-themes. It 
is important to state that this was not a case study. Therefore, the findings of this research are 
limited to the four newspapers that were selected for analysis during the given period and 
thus cannot be used as a basis for broad generalisation. 
 
1.11. 5 Sampling techniques 
 
Welman et al (1994) describes a sampling technique as the miniature image or likeness of the 
population. It is a subset of a population or a set of some of the measurements about which 
the researcher intents to draw a conclusion. Sampling is a way of selecting smaller units from 
a population of interest in order to generalise the outcome and results from the selected 
population, this used the purposive sampling to select textual material that helped to address 
the objectives of the study. 
 
1.11.6 Purposive sampling 
 
Royce et al (1998) argue that in this form of sampling, the researcher relies on his or her 
expert judgement to select units that are ‘representative’ or ‘typical’ of the population. This 
method is convenient when the researcher’s is judgement is required urgently. Purposive 
sampling is a technique that allows the researcher to select objects of research that are 
relevant in answering research questions, as providing a particular hypothesis, concept, 
preposition or theory (Denzin cited in Ogenga, 2010). Purposive sampling technique, used in 
this study, demanded that only four newspapers be selected because they were the major 
press in Zimbabwe. Purposive sampling has an advantage of saving time, money and effort 
and overcoming the restriction on accessing the entire population by the researcher. 
Purposive sampling technique gave room for flexibility when selecting articles for analysis in 
the four selected newspapers. It also extended the chances of inclusion of articles to be 
analysed given the limitation faced regarding consistency of articles selected in some 
newspapers like the Daily News which had no stories appearing between 2003 and 2010. 
However, this newspaper resumed publication in late 2010 and articles were available from 
2010 to 2016. Therefore, there was a void and The Herald had monopoly of daily coverage 
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of news. However, purposive sampling’s disadvantage may be that subject to the knowledge 
used by the researcher, the result may be flawed or incorrect. Although the ideal way of 
sampling is by random selection of targets (probability sampling), random sampling was not 
applicable considering the nature of the study. The study was concerned with representation 
of political conflict in the Zimbabwean press – focusing on four newspapers. Purposive 
sampling was therefore the most suitable sampling technique because it enabled the 
researcher to select information rich newspaper articles on political conflict. 
 
1.12 Feasibility of the study 
 
This research is quite feasible since it is based on a carefully thought out plan and will suit 
available time, financial and theoretical resources. 
 
1.12. 1 Anticipated findings 
 
One of the most commonly accepted norms to the success of democracy is the system’s 
inseparable relationship to a free press. The media provides citizens with information 
essential for decision-making, especially when choosing the country’s political leaders. The 
media is a source of power that influences, controls, and promotes new standards in society 
and reinforces existing ones. The press is supposed to report truthfully and objectively but in 
a polarised country such as Zimbabwe, the press reportage is also polarised. In representing 
political conflict in which the ruling party’s hegemony and legitimacy to power is waning, 
state controlled newspapers maintain an unwavering nationalistic pro-ZANU-PF agenda in 
order to maintain grip of power by demonising opposition. Zimpapers show uncompromising 
patriotism, loyalty and allegiance through ‘patriotic history’ reportage on conflict. 
 
The content is likely to be one sided whereby reports may be manipulative propaganda. 
Zimpapers’ pro-state/ruling party stance may show their fronting of ZANU-PF political 
ideologies and their unbending support for government politics. In the unfolding conflict, 
state-controlled press toe the President’s perspective as other ZANU-PF officials are subject 
to criticism by the same newspapers as is evident in their vitriol on ousted party members due 
to factionalism. On the other hand, the privately owned press report conflict with sympathy 
to opposition but criticising the ruling party for its misrule. Nevertheless, these print media 
are very critical of the opposition also as they pursue ‘middle of the road’ editorial policy. 
Privately owned press are largely sympathetic to victims of factionalism in ZANU-PF. 
Therefore, representation of conflict is likely to be polarised. 
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1.12.2 . Anticipated contributions of the study to the Discipline of Communication. 
 
This research advances critical investigation of representation of conflict in local print media 
and interrogates frames employed in the reportage of political issues and events. It challenges 
the editorial policies and journalistic practices which may be traced to ownership and control 
patterns. Such research has a huge potential to influence media policy, regulation and 
training. Media houses will be challenged to revisit their editorial policies to adjust theories 
of news production in an effort to adopt professional media practice. There has been a gap in 
academic research in Zimbabwe on this topic. 
 
Very few scholars have written on representation of conflict in Zimbabwe in the local press. 
Although there have been a number of media researches on related topic, how conflict has 
been reported by domestic print media has not been adequately investigated. The current 
study makes a significant contribution to the literature as it takes a comparative approach to 
analysing the political conflict representation in pro-government and privately owned press. 
This study will focus on discourse employed by print media to represent broader conflict 
between ruling party and opposition as well as investigate frames utilised in power, 
succession and factionalism in both parties. It demonstrates how journalists have employed 
partisan reportage based on their individual media houses editorial policy templates to the 
sacrifice of professionalism. 
 
1.13 Ethical considerations 
 
This research adhered to ethics of research in different ways. In the process of gathering 
information from the selected media houses the researcher indicated to the editors or 
responsible management that the information required would be used for academic purposes 
only and would not be divulged to other parties. 
 
1.14 Chapter organisation 
 
This research is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. It contextualises 
the study by providing information on the various aspects of the research and highlights the 
purpose of the study, the background of the study, and explores the importance of the 
research. The chapter also includes the research problem, the research goals, objectives, 
questions, key assumptions and justification of the study. It also explores literature review 
and the theoretical framework, methodology and chapter organisation. Chapter Two situates 
the study within the context of the other scholarly voices on the issues being investigated. 
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The literature review identifies and explores existing literature sources and theories on 
representation of conflict related issues. The nature of this conflict demands literature review 
which traces the history of political conflict in Zimbabwe from armed struggle, to 
independence and how ZANU-PF has maintained its dominance. This chapter explores 
conflict in the 1980s, 1990s, post 2000, Government of National Unity and post 2013 period. 
The literature review ends on how ZANU-PF has continued to rule the country, examining 
print media discourses employed in framing the obtaining conflict between the ruling party 
and conflict within political parties. This section will examine how reportage has changed 
over time. Chapter Three analyses the representation of political conflicts by the state-owned 
and the privately-press during the Government of National Unity (GNU) which was formed 
between the ruling party ZANU PF and the opposition MDC. The analyses is based on 
archival textual material from four newspapers, namely The Herald, The Sunday Mail, Daily 
News and The Standard. 
 
Chapter Four examines the representation of ZANU PF succession battles, factionalism and 
power struggles in the state-owned and the privately-owned press with a view to gain insights 
into the way in which the press is deeply implicated in politics. The chapter begins with some 
reflections on the concept of power, succession and factionalism and how these are mediated 
in the state-owned and the privately-owned newspapers. A comparative analysis of privately-
owned and government-owned press representation of ZANU PF succession and factionalism 
is also made. Further, the chapter also analyses the representation of ZANU PF succession 
and factionalism in press cartoons. 
 
Chapter Five analyses power struggles and factionalism in the opposition political party, the 
MDC. An attempt is made to explore causes of splits in the main MDC that led to multiple 
splits and formation of new parties. Newspaper representation of these will be examined. The 
approach adopted in this chapter is to follow five steps, namely: defining political parties, 
factions, stages of splinter party formation, representation of succession struggles and 
factionalism in both the state-owned and private-owned press; and finally way forward for 
the opposition parties for 2018 elections and future. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the betrayal of liberation movements in Africa in general, and 
Zimbabwe in particular, which gave rise to opposition forces, thereby culminating in political 
conflict. The chapter draws parallels between colonial rulers and liberation-movements. 
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Further, the chapter discuses decolonisation as a method of consolidating rule that is 
maintained through processes of rhetoric and national unification. This is followed by press 
representation of political parties in Zimbabwe. 
 
Chapter seven presents the overall findings of the research and offers recommendations for 
future research in the area of news frames, language and discourse in print media. 
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Chapter 2: Press and Political Conflict in Zimbabwe 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This study is about newspaper representation of political conflict in Zimbabwe, with 
particular focus on how the state-owned and the privately-owned newspapers framed 
political party power, succession politics and factionalism. The aim of this chapter is to 
review literature linked to the study in order to situate the study in its proper context and also 
to identify any existing knowledge gaps in the body of knowledge. The chapter will begin by 
providing a background of the Zimbabwean political and economic crises, beginning at the 
turn of the century. An analysis of the genesis of the Zimbabwean political conflict will entail 
reviewing events around the constitutional referendum in 2000, the election campaigns 
between 2000 and 2008, the Government of National Unity between 2009 and 2013 and the 
2013 harmonised elections. 
 
 
2.2 Political Conflict and the Media in Zimbabwe 
 
Conflict has been part and parcel of the making of the Zimbabwean nation, beginning with 
the first Chimurenga in the 19
th
 century, the second Chimurenga beginning in the 1960s, the 
Gukurahundi genocide of the early 80s and the land reform programme of the 2000s (coined 
as the Third Chimurenga by ZANU PF), among many other conflicts. In fact Zimbabwe and 
conflict are inseparable. 
 
 
The year 2000 is very significant in Zimbabwe as it marked the genesis of the current 
Zimbabwean political and economic crisis. Faced with a plethora of problems including the 
erosion of their hegemony, economic and social crises President Robert Mugabe and his 
ZANU PF party started repackaging history. Faced with waning electoral support, brought on 
by economic decline and popular disenchantment with the party’s authoritarian politics, 
ZANU-PF turned to Zimbabwe’s liberation story and other strategies to maintain its hold on 
power. This chapter argues that there was descent into violence in Zimbabwean society. The 
millennium marked the onset of Zimbabwe’s descent into political terror and economic 
collapse. 
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The events of the year 2000 signalled that Zimbabwe’s citizens were realigning politically. 
Bratton and Masunungure (2011) observe that the ruling coalition, which represented the 
declining relevance of the politics of national liberation, was losing mass support to an 
emergent opposition that promoted a liberal discourse embedded in the advocacy for peace, 
economic opportunity and human rights. The year 2000 also marked an intensification of the 
ruling elite’s strategy: finally abandoning any pretence of political toleration, ZANU-PF 
leaders endeavoured to crush any opposition movement that threatened its permanent hold on 
power. They embarked on a no-holds-barred effort to retain office regardless of the costs to 
the country’s legal and administrative institutions or to the development of the economy and 
society. For its part, the untested MDC struggled to make good on stated democratic 
principles amidst a pervasive political culture of predation, militarisation and terror (Bratton 
& Masunungure, 2011, 15). 
 
 
The turning point was the referendum on a new constitution. The government’s official draft 
of the constitution ignored popular views – voiced more accurately by the National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) – for a reduction in presidential powers. In a vote in 
February 2000, a 55 percent majority voted ‘NO’ on a 20 percent turnout. It was the ruling 
party’s first defeat at the polls. It was after suffering the body blow that ZANU PF started 
promoting confrontational discourses through the state-owned media to denigrate the 
opposition MDC by labelling it ‘puppets’ of the West, ‘stooges’, ‘sell-outs’, “unpatriotic” 
and “enemies of the state”. Since the MDC victory in the 2000 referendum, ZANU-PF 
embarked on new propaganda tool as a way to regain back its hegemony. Name calling was 
one of the propaganda techniques ZANU PF unleashed. The ruling party has allegedly called 
MDC names such as puppets, stooges and sell-outs (Gatsheni-Ndlovu 2009; Chuma 2008; 
Mazango 2005; Moyo 2005; Waldahl 2005). In the privately-owned media MDC was thus 
constructed as “a victim of a rogue state” (Chuma 2005). 
 
 
The Mugabe led government was shocked by the referendum defeat and its response was 
swift and brutal. The President and his party blamed their loss of the referendum to the newly 
formed opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which they sought to 
portray as a front for the white settler minority and western imperial powers in the state-
owned media. Henceforth, these “enemies of the state” could not expect protection from the 
rule of law. 
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Fearing another defeat in the upcoming parliamentary elections of June 2000, the ruling party 
turned to its tried and tested tactics of regaining lost power by whipping up emotions up 
grievances over the sensitive land issue. War veterans and unemployed youth were 
manipulated into synchronising a campaign of farm ‘invasions’, which was proclaimed as a 
third phase of Chimurenga [liberation war]. Since white commercial farmers had often 
openly supported MDC, they became targets of ‘jambanja’ [chaos] by which ‘unruly gangs’ 
occupied white-owned farms, destroyed crops, livestock and equipment, and harassed 
landowners and farm workers alike, forcing them to flee (Bratton & Masunungure, 2011). 
Party leaders ordered the previously neutral police not to intervene. 
 
 
The ruling party strategy for subsequent elections – in June 2000 (parliamentary), March 
2002 (presidential) and March 2005 (parliamentary) – was to create ‘no-go’ zones in the 
countryside that were closed to opposition campaigns. Under the direction of the party 
hierarchy, local ZANU-PF officials and members ignored constitutional guarantees of free 
association and assembly by effectively banning MDC from entering certain areas. State-
sponsored militias harassed, intimidated, raped and murdered MDC candidates and 
supporters. At the same time, the ruling party employed mass media – especially government 
controlled television and radio stations and daily and weekly newspapers to restrict coverage 
of MDC, except to depict them as pawns of neo-colonialism. For its part, the opposition used 
ZCTU and NCA structures to build a rival network of activists among public service workers 
like teachers, nurses and agricultural extension workers, including in the ruling party’s rural 
strongholds. The MDC slogan – ‘Chinja maitiro’ [change your ways] – had a stronger appeal 
to the long suffering urban youth, workers, professionals and the residents of politically 
disaffected regions such as Matabeleland, Midlands and Manicaland. It was a new party with 
a ‘fresh’ agenda whose coalition of supporters included the privately-owned media, 
particularly the Daily News. 
 
 
After the formation of the MDC in 1999, the referendum, and the fast track land 
redistribution programme in 2000 with its attendant political conflicts, the press in Zimbabwe 
were divided along political affiliation (see Willems, 2004; Chari, 2010). As a consequence, 
the Zimbabwean society became polarised. The government press unreservedly supports the 
ZANU-PF government and always portrays the opposition in bad light. On the other hand, 
the private press which is stridently anti-government maintains a “hear no evil, see no evil, 
speak no evil” stance towards MDC and its society allies (Chari, 2009: 55). 
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Inevitably politics in Zimbabwe is viewed in binary terms, what Chuma (2005) refers to as 
“the good and the evil”. According to Chuma (2005) the state-owned media has always 
viewed the MDC as the evil and ZANU PF as the good. For the-state-owned media, ZANU 
PF is the good because it ‘represents’ the interests of the Zimbabweans while MDC 
‘represents’ the interests of the British. Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2009:140) supports this view when 
he argues that Zimbabwean politics is divided into “traitors, puppets, sell-outs enemies of the 
nation versus patriots and authentic national subjects”. Whether the press in Zimbabwe has 
the potential to engender conflict or promote peace through their representation is the focus 
of this thesis. In particular, it interrogates how political conflicts within the ruling party, 
ZANU PF and the opposition MDC are framed in the press. It is important to note that the 
two political parties have different ideologies because of their historical backgrounds. It is 
generally believed that the state-owned press always sympathises with the ZANU PF 
government while the privately-owned press unapologetically supports the opposition MDC. 
However, evidence to support these views is largely anecdotal as there are no conclusive 
academic studies on this. This thesis seeks to contribute towards building a body of 
knowledge in this regard. Given this scenario it will be significant to analyse how both the 
parties and their leaders are represented in the newspapers. Whether the state-owned and the 
privately-owned press always differ in their representation of political issues or not is 
therefore a central question. Media representation of political conflict could be a very useful 
lens for gaining insights into this issue because political conflicts are emotive and polarising, 
meaning that it would be difficult for the press to disguise their sympathies on political issues 
than any other issues. It is important to briefly examine the emotive issue of land reform in 
Zimbabwe so as to appreciate media representation on it. 
 
 
2.2.1 Media Representation of Land Reform 
 
 
There are scholars who have examined how newspapers in Zimbabwe report on controversial 
issues like land reform. These scholars include Willems, Chari and Mushore though the first 
two will be given more emphasis. These scholars made some important contribution to this 
study by providing the general picture of the representation tendencies of the public and 
private media in Zimbabwe. Although land reform is not the main focus of this study, it is 
important to state that it is one of the sub-themes and therefore how newspapers reported on 
it is helpful as it contributed to the broader political conflict in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe few 
scholars have studied media representation of land reform which was carried out post 2000. 
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These scholars include Willems (2004), Chari (2010) and Mushore (2012). This section focus 
on what these scholars examine on Zimbabwe’s media representation of Land Reform 
programme. Willems (2004) in her article Selection and silence: contesting meanings of land 
in Zimbabwean media compares and examines how the Daily News and The Herald 
newspapers have represented the land reform programme which gained momentum in 2000. 
Willems (ibid) argued that Daily News published on criticism of farm occupations. Various 
groups such as the international community, opposition parties, human rights organisations, 
labour unions, business community, and farm worker representatives were quoted as 
expressing their disapproval of farm occupations although they supported the principle of 
land reform as long as it would be conducted in a transparent manner. By contrast, The 
Herald carried articles in which other, mainly political actors declared their support for the 
land reform such as foreign governments, churches, labour unions and most importantly 
ruling and oppositional parties from neighbouring countries. However, while supporting land 
reform if it would be conducted in a transparent and orderly manner, some actors were 
reported to be concerned about the farm occupations. 
 
 
Willems (2004: 7) argued that: 
 
Media representations of the land question in the run up to the June 2000 
parliamentary elections came to parallel the political polarisation 
environment, thereby missing chances for a serious and more subtle debate on 
the land issue in the Zimbabwean media. 
 
 
Mushore (2010) also argues that media parallelism was notably demonstrated after a 
constitutional amendment on compulsory acquisition of land by the government which was 
pushed through Parliament in April 2000. He argues further that before this constitution 
amendment Bill was passed in Parliament, the citizens of Zimbabwe had already rejected it 
through the referendum which had taken place in February 2000. 
 
 
Despite this background, The Herald, according to Willems (2004): 
 
Constructed the amendment as a historical occasion concluding the ‘’struggle for 
land’’ in Zimbabwe which had started during the first uprising against the British 
in the late 19
th
 century [‘’First Chimurenga’’] and had continued during the 
liberation war in the 1970s [‘’Second Chimurenga’’]. 
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It described the amendment 
 
as a means to overcome past impediments to land reform, giving rise to a ‘’Third 
Chimurenga’’, thereby suggesting that legal restrictions had been the main 
reason for the previously limited extent of resentment (Willems, 2004: 8). 
 
 
Willems concluded that The Herald failed to denigrate the Bill because it was and is still 
sponsored by the state. This can be a clear fact that state-controlled media support 
government projects as contained in Zimpapers’ editorial policy. 
 
 
The Daily News, on the other hand, commented negatively about the Bill through a cartoon 
which portrayed ZANU PF MPs dancing to the tune of “ZANU ndeyeropa’’ which Namate 
the cartoonist, literally translated as ‘’ZANU is ‘’bloody’’ (Willems, ibid, 8). While The 
Herald quickly focused on the historical background of the land issue that had necessitated 
the passing of the Bill by Parliament [government of ZANU PF], the Daily News was 
forward looking, focusing instead on the “violence that would be a likely accompaniment of 
the [ZANU PF] strategies to remain in power’’. It should be noted that cartoons in both the 
public and private media created contestable categories of public issues and individuals that 
reflected particular conceptual ways of depicting divergent ideologies. Mushore (2012) states 
that visuals placed in a story can add, accentuate the message and even contradict what the 
verbal words are suggesting. The analysis in this study partly focuses on visuals such as 
photographs, and cartoons and how these complement texts in the construction of meaning 
about political conflict. 
 
 
Willems (ibid) argues that the state-controlled The Herald blamed the rejection of the 
referendum on “the massive turnout of whites’’. The state media explained the rejection of 
the constitution by whites as motivated by the clause that would allow the government to 
compulsorily acquire land without compensation for the landless masses. Willems further 
argues that whites could not really have had a significant impact on the final results since 
they constitute a small percentage of Zimbabwe’s population. But with the establishment of 
the MDC, whites did come to play a more public role in political activities and some held 
positions in the party. This was quickly taken up by ZANU PF and the state media who 
portrayed the MDC as a party ‘funded by white farmers’ and dominated by ‘Rhodesian 
interests’ (Willems, 2004:11). 
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Whereas commercial farmers did not have positions in government, farmers had political 
power as a result of their strong economic position (Von Blanckenburg, 1994 cited in 
Willems 2004). As a consequence of their increasing presence in party politics and because 
of the scale of the farm occupations, white commercial farmers frequently became the target 
of violence. 
 
 
The Daily News paid significantly more attention to violence associated with farm 
occupations whereas The Herald generally described the farm occupations as peaceful. 
According to the Daily News, farmers were assaulted, harassed, held hostage, abducted, 
taken for ‘re-education’ sessions and intimidated. The paper described it as follows: “Police 
offered no comfort as they watched helpless, mainly middle-aged whites struggling to brace 
themselves in the face of angry mobs of men, women and children chanting war slogans and 
nationalistic songs’’ (Willems, ibid, 11). In a number of occasions, the Daily News illustrated 
its reports with pictures of assaulted farmers and affected farm widows. 
 
 
Both newspapers reported on the murder of five white farmers although agency was 
attributed to different actors. In its reports of the killings, the Daily News portrayed the 
farmers as passive victims of violent war veterans. The Herald reported emphasised that the 
white commercial farmers were provoking war veterans, thus attributing a more active role to 
the white farmers. 
 
 
The discussion above therefore demonstrates how the two dailies became poles apart in terms 
of the way they interpreted the new developments concerning the land issue as they took 
place in 2000. In view of the above, Willems’ article discussed the way The Herald and the 
Daily News represented issues of land in the period between the rejection of the referendum 
in February 2000 and the parliamentary elections in June 2000. In her article, she focused on 
three main themes of land and these were: representation of the land reform and resettlement 
programme, portrayal of farmers and farm workers and reporting on the causes of farm 
occupations (Mushore, 2010). 
 
 
In terms of methodology, Willems (ibid) looked at how the two dailies selected their 
headlines. Secondly, she looked at the stories that were included and those that were 
excluded (omitted) the choice of vocabulary and their attribution of roles to various agents. 
In a nutshell, Willems looked at how news was ‘selected and silenced’ in these two dailies. 
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Applying silence to news production, van Dijk (1991:114) in Willems (2004:6) argued that 
the analysis of the ‘unsaid’ is sometimes more revealing than the study of what is actually 
expressed in text. By choice, information is both included and excluded. Owing to the above 
background, Willems (ibid) therefore argued that headlines are usually read more frequently 
than the articles themselves and so ‘are powerful way(s) to convey a particular ideological 
view’. Furthermore, the choice of vocabulary also constructs particular ideological 
representations of events. 
 
 
Willems argues that the roles or subject positions which grammar constructs for the 
participants have ideological meanings. She states that ‘participants can be grammatically 
constructed either as direct agents of processes such as violence and repression or as affected 
participants, frequently as victims’ (Willems, 2004:12). In terms of her findings, Willems 
stated that: 
 
 
With clearly separate agendas, two Zimbabwean daily newspapers, the government-
controlled The Herald and the privately-funded Daily News, have drawn upon 
different means to represent issues of land. Through use of specific vocabulary, 
pictures, choice of particular headlines, omission or inclusion of information and 
attribution of agents to certain actors, they produced a construction of events in 
Zimbabwe that served to satisfy their interest in an increasingly polarised political 
environment. In this tense climate, both papers became 
 
associated with diverging opinions 
 
 
According to Willems (ibid), The Herald clearly attempted to provide a positive image of 
ZANU PF main campaign issue: its radical land reform programme. In the representations of 
the land occupations and land questions in general, The Herald frequently drew upon anti-
colonial discourse in which the past played a dominant role. In drawing extensively upon the 
past Willems (ibid: 13) highlighted that: 
 
 
The Herald neglected to assess critically how the present land occupations would 
affect the land reform exercise. By ignoring or downplaying the more negative 
aspects of the occupations such as the violence, the newspaper failed to speculate 
on how the future of Zimbabwe would look like under ‘’fast track land reform’’. 
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 (Willems, 2004:12). 
 
On the other hand, 
concerned with the 
commented that: 
 
Willems (ibid) saw the Daily News as a paper which was very much 
present,  thereby  missing  its  chance  to  reflect  upon  the  past.  She 
 
 
Focusing on the negative economic effects of what the paper describes as ‘’land 
invasions,’’ it failed to get into serious debate on land reform. By discrediting 
the land as party politics, the newspaper ignored that there certainly is a clear 
desire for land among Zimbabweans. 
 
 
From the two findings above, Willems (2004:14) arrived at the conclusion that: 
 
 
        Readers of the papers were confronted with very different positions which 
 
clearly made dialogue or compromise more difficult. By supporting the side 
 
of commercial farmers and farm workers on the one hand, and war veterans 
 
and ZANU PF supporters on the other hand, newspapers reinforced 
 
stereotypes of the ‘’good’’ and the ‘’evil’’. In portraying the agenda of certain 
 
stakeholders as credible and others as illegitimate, both newspapers ignored 
 
that ‘’the other side’’ might also have a valid point to make and failed to take 
 
up a more subtle position toward the land question. Concerning the further 
 
course of events in Zimbabwe, this polarisation of attitudes might lead to more 
 
divisions on the issue within society whereas a lively public dialogue could 
 
potentially contribute to a final solution. 
 
 
Willems’ (2004) study is therefore significant to this study in that she introduced an 
important concept of ‘polarisation’ which characterised the two dailies in Zimbabwe in the 
year 2000. In addition to that, the methodology employed by Willems (ibid) in her study 
which looked at how language was used to mediate or frame land reform is critical in my 
study. The study will adopt the method in that it will also focus on how headlines or words 
were utilised in the four selected newspapers. 
 
 
However, unlike Willems who focused on two dailies The Herald and the Daily News, on 
land reform, this study will focus on two more newspapers in addition to the two she focused 
on. This study will bring to the fore The Sunday Mail and The Standard, weekly newspapers, 
the former government-owned while the latter is privately-owned. 
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This study will focus on a broader aspect, which is the representation of political conflict in 
Zimbabwean press, in which land reform is one of the sub-themes. In addition to that, this 
study differs with Willems in terms of period covered. Willems only focused on the 
representation of land during the referendum and parliamentary elections period in 2000 
while the present study focuses on the representation of political conflict in the Zimbabwe 
press (in the above mentioned four newspapers) in the period 1999-2016. 
 
 
In terms of conclusions arrived by Willems (2004) that readers of the two papers were 
confronted with very different positions which clearly made dialogue or compromise more 
difficult, this study agrees with her views concerning land reform, however, the period post 
2013 witnessed a significant shift in state-controlled newspapers’ reportage in that they 
supported one particular faction within ZANU PF and vilified the other faction. 
 
 
Chari (2010) has looked at the representation of land in newspapers in his published article 
titled: Salience and silence: representation of Zimbabwean crisis in the local press. Chari 
(ibid) envisaged the press as having the power to shape public opinion by providing a cue to 
news readers on ‘how much salience to attach to an issue’. The press are therefore ‘primary 
sources of ‘’the pictures in people’s heads’’ and they furnish them with interpretative 
frameworks for understanding public affairs’ (Chari, ibid: 131). 
 
 
In his article, Chari (ibid) imagined land issue as a crisis and as such he sought to examine 
how the land issue was represented by the local press between 2000 and 2008. He argued 
that, ‘representation of the Zimbabwean crisis [land issue] mirrors the contours chalked by 
the polarised media environment’ (Chari, 2010:131). To support his argument he quoted 
Raftopoulos (2005:1) who accordingly commented that: 
 
 
In the journalistic world the Zimbabwean crisis since 2000 has been 
constructed through the dichotomy of either a radical nationalistic redistributive 
project carried out as historical redress in the face of neo-liberal orthodoxy, or a 
breakdown of the horns of liberal governance through the machinations of an 
authoritarian figure (Chari, 2010:131). 
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Chari (2010) used textual analysis which was informed by Maxwell McCombs’ agenda 
setting theory in his study of the representation of land in the state and privately-owned press 
between 2000 and 2008. News articles were selected on the basis of accessibility and 
potential to furnish relevant data which my study also adopted. He looked, first, at how the 
press (The Herald, The Chronicle and the Daily News and The Zimbabwean Standard 
newspapers) in Zimbabwe represented land issue; secondly, he looked at the aspects of land 
that have been accorded salience or have been downplayed. Lastly, focus was on how the 
newspapers’ attempt to manufacture public opinion about the land issue. In terms of the 
justification of the demarcation of the period (2000-2008) of the study and classification of 
elements of the crisis, Chari (ibid) argued first that the choices have been necessitated by 
space constraints as well as access of data and second, that, there was a general assumption 
that the Zimbabwean crisis [land issue] gained unprecedented media attention after the 
constitutional referendum in 2000. 
 
 
Chari (2010:133) further argued in his article that, in terms of reporting, the media became 
more polarised after the formation of the Daily News and the opposition party MDC (both in 
1999), often holding entrenched positions on social, economic and political issues’. 
According to Chari (ibid), the state-owned newspaper – The Herald rallied behind the ZANU 
PF government while the Daily News vigorously and unapologetically backed the MDC’. 
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ) in Chari (2010:134) commented that: 
 
 
The polarisation in our society today is best depicted in the press. Basically, the 
press is either pro-government or anti-government. Sometimes objectivity is 
sacrificed in order to be true to their chosen position... If you buy newspapers 
from one divide you will get half the story. 
 
 
Chari (ibid) looked at how land was reported by focusing on three aspects of the land issue 
during the period 2000-2008. These three aspects were: land as either ‘political gimmick or 
correction of historical injustices; hyperbole and ‘feel-good journalism’ and humanism and 
‘worthy victims’. On the issue of whether land issue is a potential gimmick or correction of 
historical injustices Chari (ibid) argued that, ‘media representations of land reform reflected 
deep-seated and irreconcilable ideological differences between the state and the privately 
owned media, with which state media advocating land reform on the grounds of correcting 
‘historical injustices’ while the private press opposed it as a political gimmick by the ZANU 
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PF government’. In order to show that privately owned newspapers did not support 
redistribution of land, Chari (ibid: 135) pointed out that: 
 
 
The private press characterised the programme as ‘’violent farm occupation’’, 
and war veterans and peasants who occupied farms were labelled ‘thugs, 
squatters, ‘goons’ ‘hoodlums’, Mugabe cronies... in contrast the public press 
referred to the land redistribution exercise as meant to ‘correct historical 
imbalances’ while land occupiers were constructed as ‘peaceful 
demonstrators,’ thus downplaying violence on the farms. 
 
 
In addition to the above strategies, the state-owned newspapers, also included numerous 
opinion pieces which showed that the land issue was not a political gimmick but an 
unfinished item on the country’s decolonisation agenda coupled with the ‘historicising of the 
issue’ by the state owned journalists and the blaming of Britain for renegading on promises 
to fund the land reform in Zimbabwe (Chari, ibid: 135). Chari further pointed out that: 
 
 
Voices opposed to land reform were organised, resulting in a narrower debate it could 
possibly have been. The public press therefore fell short in terms of giving a holistic 
picture of the land issue... and the relationship between the state and privately owned 
newspapers in relation to land issue became a struggle over meaning and the ability to 
win the hearts and minds of people. The social responsibility role of the press was thus 
shunted to the margins with the consequence that discourse on land reform became 
selective, simplistic and self-serving’ (Chari, 
 
ibid: 136). 
 
 
In contrast to the positive presentation of land reform by the state media through historicising 
and selecting and publishing opinion pieces which supported the programme, Chari revealed 
that privately owned newspapers delegitimized the land reform programme. The private press 
attempted to delegitimize the programme by employing ‘hyperbole and apocalyptic 
prophesies particularly with regard to the food security situation in the country’ Chari, 2010: 
136). 
 
 
Chari (ibid) also noted that the public media ignored or gave attention to violence on the 
farms and the temporary dislocation that could result from the land reform. Chari (ibid: 137) 
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further states that the public media referred to violence on farms as peaceful demonstrations 
and in most cases this violence was ‘sanitised through silence’. White farmers who were the 
victims of these violent demonstrations were ‘constructed as villains rather than victims’ 
(ibid). The private press, on the other hand, blamed war veterans for the ‘orgy violence’ 
(Chari, ibid) while downplaying the killing of black Zimbabwean citizens by some white 
framers. The scenario above led Chari to arrive at the conclusions that, ‘the press reporting 
and meaning construction around the land issue was a battle for hegemony between two 
media camps. Their ability to report truthfully and responsibly was thoroughly compromised 
(Chari, ibid). 
 
 
Chari’s (2010) views and conclusions are therefore important to this study in that they 
provide some valuable information regarding the way the public and private media have been 
reporting the land reform programme in the period 2000-2008. Chari’s study focused on four 
newspapers namely The Herald, The Chronicle, The Zimbabwean Standard and the Daily 
News. The point of departure is on the period and focus of study. While Chari only looked at 
land reform in the period 2000-20008, my study has a much broader focus of political 
conflict in the period 1999-2016, of which land issue is just but one of the sub-themes in my 
study whose other sub-themes include, referendum, elections, power, succession struggles 
and factionalism. Like Chari and Willems, the point of departure for the present study is that 
land reform contributed to the broader political conflict in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
It is also important to briefly examine other authors’ views on the land issue though not from 
press representation perspective but from historical point of view. Richardson (2004) 
questions why Zimbabwe is lagging behind in Africa in his thesis on ‘’The Collapse of 
Zimbabwe’’. He introduces the idea of property rights, with a special emphasis on how land 
rights were violated in Zimbabwe. However, he does not thoroughly explore the genesis of 
such violations in Zimbabwe. The interesting idea out of Richardson’s argument is that 
violations of property rights suddenly becomes an issue only when the ‘rights’ of white 
Zimbabwean farmers are in danger. Richardson (2004) thus omits the discourse of colonial 
invasion and how black Zimbabweans suffered under the hands of Ian Smith’s regime 
through evictions and marginalisation from the productive land. On such a note, he cannot 
escape accusation of employing selective memory and history (Ogenga, 2010). 
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 This thesis argues that white minority rule in Zimbabwe (Ian Smith regime) is equally 
responsible for the anarchy experienced in the country because it set precedence for the 
marginalisation and domination of the poor by those in power. Moore (2001:913) adds that 
the fact that settlers took land from Africans was a form of primitive accumulation that 
undermined their property rights, “Africans were removed from productive land and restricted 
to poor reserves’’. In fact, Richardson (2004:17) rightly notes that “reforms that only 
guarantee property rights to privileged elite, while excluding a great majority of citizens, are 
retrogressive’’. However, his theoretical framework of questioning immorality in Zimbabwe 
leaves a lot to be desired. It appears as if he refuses to go beyond a certain historical moment 
(pre-Lancaster house Agreement) when the white minority leadership of Ian Smith 
perpetrated injustices that he is criticising the black majority government of Robert Mugabe 
for. However, actions by the Mugabe government must be scrutinised if Zimbabwe is to 
overcome the current socio-economic and political difficulties. Comparing immorality in both 
regimes does not help the situation and does not equally mean this thesis wants to overlook 
the salience and selection memory regarding Zimbabwe’s history. It is through past mistakes 
that societies learn to be more cautious about where they would want to see themselves in the 
future and selective history plays a refreshing role in this regard (Ogenga, 2010). He argues 
that the only problem is that once selective history is employed, it hides very contentious 
issues within competing discourses. 
It is ‘unfortunate’ that lands belonging to white minority farmers were taken ‘’illegitimately’’. 
However, that may depend on which side of the fence one sits regarding the historical 
injustices experienced in Zimbabwe. The sensible argument in such a scenario is that 
questions of legitimacy and land ownership rights in Zimbabwe are contestable and should be 
approached with flexibility. Land was acquired illegally by British settlers through military 
conquest. Herbst (1990) presents an interesting thesis titled: ‘Conflict over Land: White 
farmers and the Black Government’ that argues that: 
Land was the central issue during liberation struggle for Zimbabwe and continues to 
be the most important domestic issue in the post-independence period. The 
appropriation of African land by European settlers guaranteed white economic 
dominance and Black poverty during the colonial period and the inequitable 
distribution of land in Zimbabwe today is the most dramatic symbol of the enduring 
structures of an unequal society (Herbst, 1990:37). 
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Based on the foregoing discussion, the Zimbabwean government has the moral obligation to 
provide equal opportunities for citizens and avoid confrontational politics of anarchy. 
 
 
This highlights the competing discourses of pan-Africanism and human rights and 
democracy, but in the end takes a ‘centre’ approach regarding the crises in Zimbabwe. The 
conviction is that if a closer and objective inspection of human rights and democracy 
discourses is done and weighed against those of pan-Africanism, patriotic history, liberation 
solidarity and neo-imperialism, then the contention is that they both punch heavily. It is in 
this regard that both state controlled media and private media offer contrasting views and 
positions regarding representation of land reform due to their ideological orientations as 
highlighted above. 
 
 
2.2.2 Political situation-Elections and violence in Zimbabwe since 2000 
 
Ogenga (2010) argues that many scholars have tried to justify what Zimbabwe has become in 
light of the crises facing the country. However, there seem not to be a clear consensus 
(Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004; Muzondidya, 2009; Ndlela, 2005; Willems, 2005; Mlambo, 
2005; Herbst, 2004; Gevisser, 2007). The prominent discourse emerging is the relationship 
between the Lancaster House Agreement and current socio-economic and political problems 
in Zimbabwe. The question that one would likely raise regarding such reasoning is why the 
Lancaster House Agreement was celebrated then, as African leaders rushed for power, but 
now seems to be the biggest mistake ever made (See Goebel, 2005). The other one would 
concern why Zimbabwe experienced relative buoyancy and stability a few years after 
liberation and only descended into crisis in the late 90’s and in the 2000’s. Why would a 
country suddenly ‘collapse’ more than a decade after Lancaster House Agreement? 
 
 
Mlambo (2005) extends the ‘rush to power’ argument by indicating how political leaders 
failed to focus on the promise of liberation for the sake of their own interests ultimately 
creating tensions and polarisation amongst various stakeholders. The tensions culminated in 
political violence fuelled by politicians and the media. Among many stakeholders, Mlambo 
(2005) cites political parties and the media as the most notorious ones. 
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Even though much of the problems in Zimbabwe stem from leadership failures, it suffices to 
say that the black majority rule was haunted by colonially inherited institutions that were 
traditionally in the service of the interest of the white minority. The political process thus 
became a hot-house of competing discourses. 
 
... a major cause of bitterness among Zimbabweans is the history of violence 
associated with political processes. Political violence in Zimbabwe is historically 
rooted in the brutality of the struggle for liberation. After independence in 1980, 
there was no social or legal process to deal with the trauma suffered during the 
struggle and, therefore, the bitterness and mutual suspicion continued 
 
(Mlambo, 2005:16). 
 
 
The discussion above attempts to highlight some of the factors that led to violence in 
Zimbabwe and the media exacerbated the conflict. 
 
 
Moore, in Vambe (2008:25) argues that the emergency of MDC as a powerful opposition 
has acted as a real threat, similar to ZAPU in the 80’s, forcing ZANU PF to devise various 
strategies to neutralise the threat, one of which has been the use of “violence and intimidation 
tactics’’. Mlambo (2005:6) further argues that ‘’the MDC is the most successful 
opposition...so far. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, it gained 57 seats compared to 
ZANU PF’s 62, putting them on an almost 50/50 situation with ZANU PF’’. The MDC has 
been largely viewed as a Western puppet due to its ideological position that leans towards 
white farmers. Solidarity Peace Trust, in Ranger (2004:219) points out how President Robert 
Mugabe, in a speech after the 2000 election results, claimed that “the MDC is driven by the 
repulsive ideology of the return of white settler rule’’ since the West has been seen as the 
source of its campaign funds. In this regard the media in Zimbabwe widely reported 
elections, again projecting diametrically opposed views. 
 
 
The media in Zimbabwe has been dominated by the state. Mlambo (2005) talks of media 
polarisation in Zimbabwe and his argument focus on two ideas. Firstly, that the 
‘independent’ or private media has been most critical of Robert Mugabe and secondly, that 
the state controlled media has acted as a mouth piece of ZANU PF. I have earlier argued that 
post 2013 the state-controlled media became identified with particular factions in the ruling 
party, no longer necessarily for ZANU PF in general. However, when it comes to reporting 
on the opposition the government owned media does not reflect its factional lens. 
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Mlambo (2005) explains that out of many reasons, journalists change employers to change 
the “shackles of partisan editorial policies’’. One respondent in his study argues that: 
 
 
It is common knowledge that papers under the Zimpapers stable are government 
mouth pieces. It is also common cause that you hardly find a code, which state 
 
that journalists should be propaganda agents for the government, but this is achieved 
through a process of socialisation in the newsroom. The way one’s stories are treated 
help a reporter, especially new ones, form an impression of the editorial position or 
 
course of a publication 
 
 
As opposed to state-owned media, the private media has been more critical of the 
government. Conflicting political interests between the private and government owned media 
have created a lot of pressure when reporting Zimbabwe and there is no occasion when they 
shared the same view regarding local politics. Such polarisation calls for journalistic 
objectivity even though it is quite known that journalistic objectivity is a myth (Bignell, 
1977). The latter means journalists strive to be ‘objective ‘when covering events in order for 
them not to be accused of bias. This is important when considering that journalists reporting 
for the private media would naturally be subjective when it comes to reporting events in 
Zimbabwe that deviate from the ideology of democracy and human rights while those 
emerging from government owned media would traditionally support the state’s position on 
contentions issues such as the main theme and sub-themes in this thesis as indicated in 
chapter one. 
 
 
Following the fore-going discussion, there is a particular way of news construction and 
representation in Zimbabwean media. News is constructed through a routine process of 
selection, presentation and emphasis which influences the way in which particular issues, 
events, individuals or groups are represented. Manning (2001) indicates how journalism is a 
practice that involves a process of manufacture/fabrication or construction which culminates 
in representation. Gitlin (1980) argues that news frames are replicated across the journalistic 
profession where they assume a natural process of selection and omission leading to form 
stereotypes. Journalists rely on sources to write their stories. Ogenga (2010) asserts that 
sources have the power to decide what information they withhold or give out to journalists 
depending on their interest on a particular issue. 
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 in Mano, 2005:64). 
 
Journalists tend to form symbiotic relationships with sources with authority and credibility 
and those who are readily available. In this symbiotic relationship, some sources become 
more utilised than others (McGregor, 1997). The sources mainly utilised are usually 
government and officials since they are recognisable and credible owing to their status of 
prestige which makes the audiences easily trust them (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The 
symbiotic relationship between journalists and sources, where journalists constantly use 
some and not others creates a powerful frame within which news is constructed. The more 
powerful the source, the more likely he or she will be used in the news production process 
(Ndlela, 2001; Schudson, 2003). In this thesis the selected newspapers used different sources 
to create specific representations. 
 
 
2.2.3 The 2000 Referendum 
 
It is important to examine how one of the sub-themes under political conflict is represented 
by the media. The constitutional referendum marked a watershed in the Zimbabwean and 
political landscape. The ruling party, ZANU PF had enjoyed considerable support between 
1980 and 1990 when a break-away party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement led by former 
ZANU PF secretary general Edgar Tekere was formed. However, the situation changed when 
disillusionment with the party that brought independence started growing as a result of 
economic stagnation, unemployment, increasing corruption in government. 
 
The introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESA) in 1990, at the 
instigation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank led to austerity 
measures, resulting in job cuts in the civil service, removal of subsidies on basic 
commodities, and income inequalities between the rich and the poor. This disillusionment 
started manifesting itself through strikes by civil servants, university students and labour 
organizations under the umbrella of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union which led by 
Morgan Tsvangirai. However, ZANU PF remained strong electorally, at least up to 1996 
when President Mugabe was the only presidential candidate. Elections between 1990 were 
more of a formality as ZANU PF did not face any stiff competition. 
 
Meanwhile a groundswell of opposition which crystallised around campaigns for a new 
constitution (as a result of the uneven electoral field) were largely ignored by the government 
until when the government relented and set up a Constitutional Commission to lead the 
writing of a new constitution. 
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However, civil society organisations, under the banner of the newly formed National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a coalition of civil society bodies, churches, students and 
labour organisations boycotted the process arguing that a government led process was 
inherently flawed and therefore not genuine. The NCA campaigned for the rejection of the 
draft constitution and in a referendum held in February 2000 the ‘No’ vote prevailed with a 
55% in a vote where only 20 percent of eligible voters participated. The rejection of the 
constitution marked the beginning of a protracted economic, social and political crises 
characterised by multifaceted conflicts. As expected media reporting of the referendum was 
characterised by intense polarisation, with the state-owned media supporting the ‘YES’ vote 
while the privately-owned media rooted for a ‘No’ vote. 
 
For instance, The Sunday Mail, January 30, 2000 had a commentary ‘NCA must not detract 
people’. The newspaper attacked civil society organisations and the NCA, which was the 
leading voice in the campaign for the ‘No’ vote was portrayed as misleading citizens. The 
NCA claimed that it would release its own draft constitution which it purported was better 
than the government’s. The newspaper predicted that the “no vote” campaign would result in 
a huge embarrassment at the polls.... In its editorial, the newspaper argued that: 
 
 
As the Constitutional Commission has so often said, the current constitution-making process is not 
about principals but principles. Let’s see the NCA releasing its document and engaging the nation in 
debate on the principles of governance. Let’s see its constitution speak for the people on matters 
regarding land alleviation and national sovereignty, the very issues that were the back–borne of the 
liberation struggle (The Sunday Mail, 30
th
 January 2000). 
 
In a commentary titled, ‘Referendum: No violence please: use the ballot box!’, The Herald, 
February 11, encouraged parties campaigning for the referendum to preach peace and desist 
from violence. Although the article urged police force to ensure that public political meetings 
will go ahead without fear of disturbances and that those arrested for violent behaviour 
should be made to pay for their crimes, the law favoured the ruling party. MDC rallies were 
often either banned on flimsy pretexts or disrupted by ZANU PF supporters. It can be argued 
that largely, MDC perpetrators of violence faced the brutal wrath of the law while ZANU-PF 
was spared. Such a context in which the law seemed to favour the ruling party supports the 
view that the army, the police, central intelligence department and youth militia had been 
actively co-opted into ZANU-PF to ensure that the ruling party remained in power. 
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The commentary referred to above accused ‘the political new comers as the cause of 
violence’- referring to MDC whose members were arrested and being tried in courts. Because 
editorial decisions on selection reflect the influence of ownership, news selection plays an 
important role in shaping political reality. The agenda of newspapers is also reflected through 
headlines. 
 
In the Daily News of 15 February 2000, ‘No’ vote leading’ reported that Zimbabwe’s first 
post-independence national referendum appeared headed for a ‘NO’ verdict on the draft 
constitution. The Constitutional Commission (CC) has been urging people to vote in favour 
of the draft constitution while the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a grouping of 
human rights and civic groups, churches and groups, advocated for a ‘ No’ vote, resulting in 
some of its members being arrested. The newspapers critiqued claims that the draft 
constitution, written by a 400 member commission selected by Mugabe and dominated by 
ZANU-PF members, does not take into account demands made by Zimbabweans during a 
consultation programme. 
 
As a claw back and desperate bid to regain lost authority, the ZANU-PF elite drastically 
curtailed the residual independence still enjoyed by institutions of the Zimbabwean state. The 
main victim was the rule of law. Until then, the judiciary had retained a good measure of 
professionalism and autonomy, often issuing verdicts against the government in 
constitutional test cases (Bratton & Masunungure, 2011). But the anarchic events of 2000-2, 
whether referendum on national constitution, land invasions (redistribution), political 
intimidation, or election tampering- along with an amnesty cynically granted for perpetration 
of violence- were all clearly illegal. 
 
A further strategy to retain power by the ZANU PF government and was to have a tight 
control of the state-owned media and muzzling of the privately-owned media. Mukasa (2000) 
argues that ZANU-PF media control was tested in the 1990s with the rise of weekly 
newspapers such as The Zimbabwean Independent, The Standard and the Daily News. The 
Standard, as with other private press is largely anti- government and sympathetic to the 
opposition parties as is evidenced by headlines, tone of text and content of articles. 
Polarisation of the media due to political conflict is once again demonstrated in the two 
dailies, that is the Daily News and The Herald. The Daily News of January 14, 2000’s 
headline: ‘ZANU-PF loses in poll survey’ has a clear agenda in opinion formation on 
Zimbabwean citizens who long for a change in government. 
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Although the Daily News claimed that the respondents in the poll survey were fairly 
distributed across the provinces, The Herald of January 21, 2000 dismissed the Daily News 
poll survey, referring to it as ‘trash’ and ‘... a terrible example of misinformation.’ 
 
In their attempt to explain ZANU PF’s prolonged stay in power, most analysts have argued 
that the party’s hold on power, especially from 2000 onwards, has been achieved simply 
through coercion and not consent because ZANU-PF had completely lost all forms of 
popular support (Blair, 2000; Meredith, 2002, Makumbe, 2009). According to these critics of 
ZANU PF’s populist politics, the party’s violence against the population, especially after its 
near electoral defeat of 2000, demonstrates this lack of popular support for ZANU PF and its 
exhausted racial nationalism which, according to these accounts, has lost both popular 
legitimacy and appeal in contemporary Zimbabwe (Bond: 2001, Bond & Manyanya, 2000, 
Campbell 2003 & 2008). Despite the ruling party preaching against violence both in press 
and campaign rallies, violence remained a key feature of Zimbabwean society. 
 
The emergence of a strong opposition party at the turn of the century in the name of the 
MDC therefore shaped the political events in the country and in many ways influenced the 
nature of political conflicts that are the focus of this thesis. The emergence of a major 
political opposition heralded a new phase in Zimbabwean politics. As Raftopoulos (2005: 12) 
reckons “The movement drew its ideological strength from an emphasis on political, civic 
and human rights, pointing to the democratic deficit of the incumbent ruling party and 
building on the cumulative popular frustration with ZANU- PF after nearly two decades of 
one party dominance”. The desire to be the only dominant party in the country has been a 
constant feature of ZANU PF rule since independence. Over the decades ZANU PF has not 
hesitated to eliminate anyone who is a threat to their political advancement. However, the 
ruling party faced its first humiliating defeat at the polls. 
 
Although President Mugabe appealed to accept the verdict of the plebiscite and commended 
them for exercising their rights in a peaceful and orderly manner, very few people believed 
him given ZANU PF’s history of double talk. As events turned out subsequent elections were 
characterised by state sponsored violence. The large turnout in the referendum by the white 
community caused suspicion in ZANU PF and served as confirmation that the MDC was a 
party of whites, a proxy party hiding behind a black face. This suspicion later invoked wrath 
from war veterans and ZANU PF supporters, particularly during land redistribution or 
invasions. 
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It is imperative to highlight that the country was going through an unprecedented economic 
crisis with unemployment, inflation, interest rates, foreign investments and poverty at their 
highest ever. There was shortage of fuel and foreign currency. The “no” vote meant the 
country would continue to be run under the old Lancaster House Constitution which had been 
amended nineteen times. 
 
2.2.4 ZANU PF Succession Issue 
 
Although Mugabe and senior party officials had repeatedly denied reports that he was under 
pressure to resign before the 2002 presidential elections, Focus Magazine quoted Professor 
Jonathan Moyo who had been appointed head of the government Constitutional Commission 
saying that Mugabe had already indicated that he would not stand in the 2002 presidential 
elections. Moyo further said that the need to prepare a careful transition without encouraging 
factionalism within ZANU PF meant that any announcement had to be made in a manner 
protective of the party’s interest. Important to note is the sensitive issue of ‘transition’ and 
‘factionalism’. The President and the party have not openly debated on this matter despite the 
fact that President Mugabe had already served more than two terms – an issue raised by 
opposition parties and pressure group affiliated to the NCA. ZANU PF officials have also 
perpetually denied existence of factionalism in the party. When ZANU-PF was losing 
popular support in each election, the leadership developed authoritarian strategies to thwart 
any dissent voice or opinion from both within the party and opposition. The result was the 
formation of factions within the ruling party with members who did not toe the line being 
either suspended or purged from the party. Similarly, opposition parties have shown lack of 
internal democracy resulting in splits and serious divisions. 
 
Chimbganda (2014:3) argues that this is more evident where there is a canonised ‘big 
brother’ who leads the party. He is so hero-worshipped that he is seen as some kind of a 
‘demi-god,’ a ‘messiah,’ a ‘liberator’ or a ‘father.’ This was the case with Lenin, Mao 
TseTung, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Kenneth Kaunda, Joshua 
Nkomo, Nelson Mandela and now Robert Mugabe. He further reiterates that these leaders 
were given praise names by their mesmerised followers, including ridiculous title of ‘doctor.’ 
In doing so, an impression was created that they had a divine right to rule and could not be 
questioned. But, as posterity shows, such glorification was unwarranted because these were 
ordinary human beings, some of whom made monumental and unpardonable mistakes that 
ruined the countries they led. 
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ZANU-PF supporters particularly officials who long and crave for positions become 
bootlickers and hero worship the President and the First Lady. President Robert Mugabe is 
given titles such as ‘baba’ (father), ‘son of man’ (which is blasphemous), while the First lady, 
Mai Grace Mugabe is referred to as ‘Queen Mother.’ 
 
Chimbganda (2014) further reckons that the culture of benevolent dictatorship, unfortunately, 
has cascaded down to the current crop of leaders, some of whom cannot tolerate constructive 
criticism. They only want to hear vainglorious praises about their achievements even if it is 
abundantly clear that they have lost the soul of the people they claim to lead. 
 
A typical example is ZANU-PF whose internal divisions undermines the smooth running of 
the party and, in turn, fails to offer an effective government which is able to fulfil its election 
promises. Cases in point are events which happened and continue to happen from 2013. Due 
to never ending infighting, the economy has been sacrificed. 
 
I conclude this section by observing that the draft constitution was rejected by people of 
Zimbabwe because the extensive executive powers of the President were not reduced 
considerably; the legislature was not strengthened significantly, the size of the cabinet was 
not reduced to between 12 and 15 posts, and that an independent electoral commission was 
not appointed among other things. People felt it was the ‘Mugabe Way’ and the ‘Zvobgo 
Way.’ Nevertheless, the draft constitution was key to land issue according to President 
Mugabe. Therefore, the rejection of the draft constitution in the referendum sparked land 
invasions and galvanised ZANU-PF to devise strategies for the June elections which were 
characterised by violence. 
 
2.3 Elections as a Source of Conflict 
 
Elections received the most coverage by the four selected newspapers largely because they 
were perceived to be neither free nor fair, particularly by the privately owned press. 
Moreover, the political crisis surrounding the elections was viewed as the main reason behind 
the ‘’economic collapse’’ and political conflict. The selected privately owned newspapers 
used certain textual devices and narrative genres to represent the situation. However, state-
controlled press projected the view that elections were always free and fair evidenced by 
discourse of patriotism and liberation struggle. Government controlled newspapers and 
ZANU PF officials resorted to land reform as an agenda for elections. 
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The Zimbabwean electoral system and process experienced extreme forms of strain and 
stress in the 2000 and 2002 elections. Their weaknesses became clearer with exposure to 
both domestic and international observers. There were unresolved conflicts over electoral 
procedures between the main contending parties, namely ZANU –PF and MDC yet there 
were no tried mechanisms for resolving these conflicts. The Electoral Supervisory 
Commission (ESC) the precursor to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) noted that: 
 
There are presently no conflict-resolution structures on election-related issues at the Electoral 
Supervisory Commission (ESC), Election Directorate and Registrar of Election Office. Election 
petitions and grievances are made to the High Court (ESC 1996). 
 
Sachikonye (2004) argues that a petition could be made to the High Court on matters such as 
undue election of a Member of Parliament (MP) on grounds of corrupt practice; illegal 
practice, disqualification, irregularity or ‘any other clause’ by another candidate or registered 
voter in a particular constituency. Prior to 2000, the major landmark case of a successful 
election petition was the one by the then Harare South Independent candidate, Margaret 
Dongo, against Vivian Mwashita who had stood on a ZANU-PF ticket during the 1995 
elections. The election was won by Margaret Dongo. This was the first time in Zimbabwe’s 
electoral history that a successful challenge had been through on election petition. This 1995 
case was a harbinger of a spate of election petitions made following the 2000 parliamentary 
election. There were so many conflicts arising from petitions. 
 
The Sunday Mail, 12 March, 2000 highlighted the need for ZANU-PF task force to work out 
strategies to rejuvenate the ruling party ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 
April. The task force recommended an overhaul of ZANU-PF by weeding out incompetent 
and corrupt people from the party echelons and to resolve land imbalance. 
 
ZANU-PF’s National Chairman, Cde John Nkomo, who chaired the task force, reiterated that 
the problems facing the country could only be addressed if their root cause- the land 
imbalance had been resolved. The ruling party’s rhetoric about land was a strategy to whip 
people’s emotions so that its waning and dwindling support base would improve. The Herald 
and The Sunday Mail did not hide their allegiance to ZANU-PF and bias in favour of ZANU 
PF and its programmes while the local private media sought to delegitimise Mugabe’s rule 
because of the perceived injustices in the land reform and allegations of elections rigging. 
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They often echoed the government in blaming Zimbabwe’s woes on a coalition of local and 
international foes including white farmers, the British government and the opposition MDC 
party. 
 
A government task force noted that although the people had rejected the draft constitution 
there was need to look into the problems of and land recommended the transfer of the clause 
empowering the government to acquire derelict land without paying compensation to the 
Lancaster House constitution. The calls by liberation war veterans that excess land should be 
recovered from commercial farmers were due to frustration arising from defeat at the 
referendum. The result was violence against the population. Although there was genuine 
hunger for land by masses the method used by the government to redress land ownership 
imbalances was questionable. 
 
The violence which ensued after the rejection of the draft constitution is testimony of the 
chaotic nature of the land reform programme. Such violence was extensively covered in the 
privately-owned newspapers, particularly the Daily News. For instance, The Daily News, 6 
March, 2000 had an article titled ‘Political violence flames in Hatcliffe’. The article depicts 
the land reform programme as a calculated move by ZANU-PF to intimidate, coerce and beat 
their perceived enemies. This study argues that because of the polysemic nature of media 
texts different readings could be expected. 
 
The foregoing discussion confirms Hall’s (1997) assertion that representation is not 
necessarily a reflection of reality because the term ‘reality’ is problematic. One event is 
subject to different interpretations. With reference to the land issue the state-controlled press 
projects ruling party actions as justified while privately owned newspapers which emphasises 
democracy and human rights represented the land reform programme as chaotic. 
 
2.4 Politics, Violence and Conflict: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe 
 
Onslow (2011:7) argues that the continuation of ZANU- PF as a dominant one- party state 
has been intimately connected to the reorganisation of state structures, and the role of 
violence and intimidation. When ZANU PF came to power in 1980 it did not just inherit the 
political economy of the white settler state, but also the power of the colonial state: its 
monopoly of the use of force, and so its security executive and legislative capacity. 
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It also inherited well-established and particularly effective organisational structures of 
surveillance and control: the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police (ZRP). Furthermore, there was the legacy of the colonial state wing’s 
asymmetric and disproportionate force when dealing with opposition and dissent. Such force 
was consistently deployed against the MDC since its formation in 1999. ZANU- PF has 
applied all forms of violence to repress and totally silence the opposition. The idea of holding 
on to power became an obsession of the ruling party. However, MDC supporters were not to 
be out done, in extreme cases they would fight back to avoid continued bullying. 
 
Violence is part of the political culture of ZANU -PF, dating back to the liberation war era. 
There is the place of violence in Mugabe’s own thinking: he has ghoulishly joked that he had 
degrees in violence (Meredith: 2007:241). 
 
Faced with the social and political consequences of the accelerating economic decline 
resulting from a sharp contraction of agricultural and industrial productivity, the progressive 
formalisation of labour …, and massive internal displacement and economic and political 
migration, the state responded with proven techniques to quell open and suspected dissent 
(Onslow, 2011). Nathan Shamuyarira, the former ZANU PF cabinet minister and party 
secretary for information once stated “The area of violence is an area where ZANU- PF has 
history’ (Meredith, 2007:214). Important to note again is that ZANU PF would roar into song 
each time it attacked MDC. For instance, the late ZANU PF political commissar, Eliot 
Manyika’s songs were replete with violent messages which had become acceptable to the 
party. The sources of violence varied with the structure and organisation of ZANU- PF as a 
political movement; one of the key players is ZANU Youth militia, derogatively dubbed 
‘Green Bombers’ because of the green, military-like attire. Other organs of violence were the 
war veterans – the vanguards, campaign tools for the party, ordinary ZANU- PF supporters 
and other groups. During election campaigns, and post-election periods, from 2000 to 2013, 
Zimbabwe experienced all forms of violence which were documented in the press and NGO 
reports. 
 
The privately-owned press was unrelenting in its exposure of violence. For instance, a news 
article in The Standard (9-15 April 2000) pointed to the continued use of violence against 
MDC, was a reflection of the fact that some members of society do not really understand the 
principles of tolerance and democracy which allow individuals freedom of political 
affiliation and participation. 
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However, the state-owned press downplayed election violence, if anything tacitly supported 
it. For example, The Herald March 28, 2000 the story ‘President Mugabe won’t sell the 
country.’ The newspaper highlighted ZANU PF’s achievements such as independence, 
access to education, accommodation, health but singled out land as the top most priority for 
the government. 
 
In order to understand why state owned newspapers were silent on violence perpetrated on 
opposition supporters and leadership, it is important to reflect on what media theorists 
postulate. Willems (2004) posits that news is always a selection of events that are taking 
place in the real world at a particular moment in time. News is therefore not simply what 
happens but that which can be presented as newsworthy. She further argues that whereas 
some events will be highlighted, others will be ignored. As Foucault (1978:27) has pointed 
out, silence is very much part of any discourse: 
 
Silence itself- the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required 
between different speakers-is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is 
separated by a strict boundary than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and 
in relation to them within overall strategies. 
 
Applying this to news production, Van Dijk (1991:114) argues that the analysis of the 
“unsaid” is sometimes more revealing than the study of what is actually expressed in text. 
 
Bainbridge et al (2011: 235) argue that when looking at the frame of the text ask why certain 
elements have been included, but also what has been left out. There is need to ask why these 
elements have been left out and how does that affect the possible meanings the text might 
have. Bainbridge et al (2011) suggest that in thinking what is not included in the frame, look 
at structuring absences (elements in the text that have meaning despite or because of the fact 
they have been left out) : what is missing from the text, and what meaning these omissions 
might connote. Since all media texts are representations which are mediation of the world 
affected by a series of choices and selections, and framed in a certain way, we always must 
be aware of what is not included in the text. 
 
I can argue that press coverage of political conflict, with land issue as a central aspect, 
reveals competing versions of reality epitomised by vested group interests in the context of a 
bifurcated political economy of the media. While reportage is largely event based, scholarly 
literature on the subject tends to be highly opinionated, selective, emotional and personalized 
(see Curtin, 2008; Blair, 2002: Meredith, 2002; Bond & Manyanya 2002). 
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Besides state sponsored violence and electoral irregularities, MDC made significant electoral 
gains in June 2000, managing to win almost half the elected seats in parliament: 57, to 
ZANU PF’s 62. The opposition challenged the election results in 39 constituencies and won 
four court cases. According to Bratton and Masunungure (2011; 24): 
 
Zanu PF appealed to the Supreme Court, which compliantly delayed deciding on the cases until after 
the next general elections in 2005. Eventually Tsvangirai grudgingly accepted the outcome and 
promised that the MDC’s inexperienced parliamentary caucus would work constructively with the 
government. For the first time, Zimbabwe had a fully-fledged opposition party with a large enough 
block of legislative to prevent further constitutional amendments. 
 
With parliamentary elections over, the next struggle was for presidential elections which 
were held in 2002. The press was the battle ground for contest of power, so the next section 
will focus on the representation of political conflict in the press. MDC was however, less 
successful in the March 2002 presidential elections, however, when President Mugabe 
reportedly won 56% of the valid votes to Tsvangirai’s 42 %. The campaign was again marred 
with violence and the application of new legislation such as the Public Order and Security 
Act (POSA) which outlawed meetings of five or more people without police permission and 
the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which required the 
registration of journalists and banned foreign correspondents. Together, these instruments 
amounted to the suspension of constitutional protections and the re-imposition of a state of 
emergency. 
 
According to Bratton and Masunungure (2011) working outside the law, Mugabe used 
presidential decrees to manipulate electoral rules and to limit availability of polling stations, 
thus disenfranchising many of the urban voters. As a result, observers from the 
Commonwealth, European Union and SADC Parliamentary Forum declined to endorse the 
2002 elections as free and fair. Bratton and Masunungure (2011) argue that Tsvangirai 
contested the presidential election with a trumped up treason charge hanging over his head 
for allegedly plotting to assassinate Mugabe; another treason charge was added in 2003. 
After a drawn out trial that stalled the opposition politically, the MDC leader was acquitted 
of all charges. The March 2005 elections were relatively more peaceful. But fewer than half 
of the fatigued and battered electorate turned out to vote: of the contested 120 seats ZANU 
PF won 78 to MDC’s 41, with the expanded ruling party majority a testament to the effects 
of violence, prosecution, hate speech and fear (Bratton and Masunungure 2011). 
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However, the MDC was also in disarray; flip flopping on whether to participate, thus 
confusing the electorate and later splitting over the issue of whether to take part in elections 
or not. 
 
It is however, worth noting that the Daily News was forced to close in September 2003, 
thereby creating a huge void in Zimbabwean media space. This left The Herald with no other 
daily newspaper to compete both commercially and in terms of views. 
 
According to Mazango (2005), there is discursive demolition of ‘enemies of the state;’ who 
are said to be opposed to the nation’s collective history which was borne out of 1970s armed 
struggle for independence whereby enemies were constantly labelled and vilified. For 
instance, the state controlled media consistently lampoons prominent political opponents 
such as Tsvangirai, foreign funded civil society organizations and the independent or non-
governmental media as ‘instruments of neo colonialism’ and ‘shameless surrogates of 
western interests’, particularly of Britain and the United States. It is conflated that by 
contesting the legitimacy of government and its policies these entities are opposed to the 
country’s history and independence (Mazango 2005:43). They (MDC) is also accused of 
being a front of the West bent on effecting regime change in the country. 
 
Accordingly, the state-owned press quotes President Mugabe saying ‘Zimbabwe will never 
be a colony again’. For opposing the ZANU PF government and inviting the imposition of 
sanctions on the government blame has masterfully been apportioned on the opposition that 
they are negating national identity and are fomenting social strife and instability in a once 
peaceful and prosperous country. Through editorials, headlines and news articles in The 
Herald and The Sunday Mail, a complex mixture of vitriol and intellectual discourse on pan-
Africanism tries to unpack, expose, discredit and smear the opposition, labelling them 
variously as ‘misguided’, ‘stooges’, ‘terrorists’, ‘puppets’ and ‘sell-outs’. 
 
Mazango (2005) explores binary viewpoints and media polarity. He argues that another view 
in the coverage of Zimbabwe is found in what the government terms ‘oppositional’ media. 
These include the remaining local independent, the hostile ‘white South African press’, and 
the western media. At best they criticize the government for abrogating the constitution and 
inculcating a culture of violence as an essential component of the political landscape of 
Zimbabwe. At worst they portray Mugabe as some freak tyrant in spite of the fact that he is 
quite a rational-maximizing tactician. 
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Despite being curtailed by harsh media laws, what remains of Zimbabwe’s private press 
continues to be vigorous and outspoken as demonstrated by constant denunciations of the 
government. Activist journalism still exists and in similar hard hitting editorials, columns 
such as ‘woodpecker’ in The Standard, headlines and news articles, voices and opinions that, 
to various degrees, are alternative to that of the government, still enjoy space with 
widespread name calling of government and public officials expressly indulged in. 
 
However, it is undeniable that what remains of the independent press in Zimbabwe exists 
under an increasingly trying environment governed by harsh media legislation such as 
AIPPA and POSA as mentioned earlier, that makes the practice of journalism a minefield. 
The result has been a contraposition of two conflicting viewpoints on the country, binary 
positions that have spurred rigidly contrasting coverage (Mazango 2005). The implication is 
that one story on Zimbabwe today is never the whole story. The reader has to read a story in 
private press and state owned press in order to decipher or interpret the meaning. Put 
differently, depending on who you listen to, Robert Mugabe is the worst African tyrant after 
Idi Amin or the most fearless surviving African nationalist. The rift in media coverage of the 
country has taken on a heightened importance because these two camps, the Zimbabwe 
government and its antagonists, employ a concerted, strategic mass media discourse to 
demolish the other. There has been much polarisation and crosstalk between the government-
aligned media and the independent media and a barely concealed hostility can be noticed in 
pro-government denunciations, of ‘enemies of the state’ as in international news depictions 
of Mugabe’s mayhem (Mazango, 2005:44). In a way the result has been a suppression of the 
true significance of events that are unfolding in the country. 
 
2.5 The 2008 Elections 
 
The elections of 29 March, 2008 in Zimbabwe attracted phenomenal media attention 
surpassing previous elections since the country gained independence from Britain in 1980. 
Chari (2010:1) argues thus: 
 
Having widely conceived as a conflict resolution mechanism which would end the country’s 
debilitating economic and political crisis of eight years the electoral outcome failed to produce a clear 
winner necessitating second round of voting, between the incumbent, Robert Gabriel Mugabe and his 
arch-rival Morgan Tsvangirai, thus exacerbating the political uncertainty. 
 
I concur with Chari’s observation because the ruling party had to fight it out in its many 
strategies and tactics to defend the threatened hegemony and maintain sovereignty of the 
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country. Although the incumbent, Robert Mugabe lost to his main challenger Morgan 
Tsvangirai of MDC with 47.9% of the ballot against Mugabe’s 42%, Tsvangirai failed to 
garner the constitutionally mandatory 51% thus, necessitating a runoff between Mugabe and 
Tsvangirai. Mugabe’s party, ZANU PF also lost its parliamentary majority for the first time 
managing only 99 seats against the MDC Tsvangirai faction with 100 seats while the smaller 
MDC faction led by robotics professor Arthur Mutambara had 10 seats and independent 
candidate, Professor Jonathan Moyo, with one seat (Human Sciences Research Council, 
2008). Because of the high stakes and expectations in the election, the press took centre stage 
as a terrain for hegemonic and counter hegemonic discoursers (Chari 2010). 
 
In The Herald of 3 May, 2008, the editorial comment titled “Poll results, Zimbabweans the 
winners” reported ‘the long awaited results of the presidential elections are out and no 
candidate managed an outright majority, that is 50 plus 1 percent of the votes cast’. The 
comment further highlight that the two top candidates must now gird their loins for a runoff 
on a date to be announced. 
 
Chari (2010) notes how weekly newspapers such as The Sunday Mail and the Zimbabwe 
Independent resorted to “dirty campaigning and labelling” during the March 2008 elections. 
He argues that it would be an understatement to say that the March 29, 2008 election was the 
most closely contested election in the history of Zimbabwean elections. 
 
The festering economic crisis meant that the ruling ZANU PF party’s support was being 
eroded and the prospects of losing power were highest since year 2000 when the party won 
63 seats against the newly formed MDC’s 47. Chari (2010:11) further asserts: “Although the 
MDC was the major beneficiary of the economic crisis in terms of support it had not made 
significant in-roads into rural areas, perceived to be the traditional ZANU PF stronghold”. 
Consequently, the MDC was not guaranteed of an outright victory to avoid second round of 
voting. Against this backdrop the canvassing for votes was fiercest in the history of 
Zimbabwean elections and campaign tactics became dirtier as the election day approached. 
The media therefore became critical conduits of dirty campaign tactics, meaning that they 
were deeply implicated in the conflict. 
 
Chari further notes how in The Sunday Mail Tsvangirai was portrayed as a puppet of the 
West, particularly Britain and United States of America while Simba Makoni, the leader of 
the newly formed Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn was depicted as a sell-out, suggesting that he was 
not his own man. 
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Makoni’s movement ‘Mavambo/ Kusile/ Dawn’ project was described as futile and declared 
dead before it was born. Former ZANU PF politburo member, Dumiso Dabengwa, an ally of 
Simba Makoni who had recently defected from ZANU PF was described as a ‘tribalist’. 
President Mugabe described Makoni as ‘worse than a prostitute from ‘Mbare’ (an old high 
density suburb in the capital, Harare). Mugabe mocked Makoni saying Makoni was fooling 
himself thinking that he had a magnetic power to attract ZANU PF but failed dismally, thus 
projecting Simba Makoni as a person suffering from delusion of grandeur and therefore 
doomed. Chari (2010:12) argues thus: 
 
By focusing on the personalities and mudslinging tactics of contestants the newspapers failed to create 
space for sober analysis of the manifestos and policies of political protagonists thereby undermining 
their responsibility to act as spaces for ventilating the political agora… 
 
This shows that the press is deeply implicated in political conflicts and that sometimes it may 
exacerbate conflicts rather than resolve them because of its reportage. 
 
The extent to which private media have given voice to the opposition has been questioned, 
particularly by Waldahl (2005) who argues that while the private media have criticised the 
ruling ZANU PF party and its policies, they have not particularly been a voice for the 
opposition as they fear losing credibility. However, Chuma (2008) disputes this on the 
grounds that during elections editorial pages of the private press have implored readers to 
vote for the opposition MDC, although in news pages they concentrate on the shortcomings 
of ZANU PF. 
 
While it is true that the opposition in Zimbabwe has been aided by private media, I agree 
with Chuma (2006) that news pages of the private press try not to be too explicit in 
expressing their support for the opposition, but editorial pages are sometimes explicit. I also 
argue that the media environment prevailing in Zimbabwe makes the private press take a 
cautious approach for fear of being gagged. Chari (2010:205) argues that the after the 
formation of the MDC in 1999, the press in Zimbabwe became divided along political 
affiliation with the state controlled press ‘unreservedly’ in support of ZANU PF while the 
private press adopted a ‘hear-no-evil, see-no-evil, speak-no-evil’ approach in relation to the 
MDC. 
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While opposition parties and civil society organisations are systematically denied access to 
state controlled media (Moyo 2007), the private media provide the opposition the much 
needed space while framing ZANU PF as an incompetent party (Chuma 2010) that is leading 
the country to economic ruin. Waldahl (2005:64) notes that in the 2000 elections private 
media portrayed ZANU PF as economically reckless, with emphasis on farm invasions 
“consequences for further agricultural development, for banks with large outstanding loans to 
farmers and for the balance of trade”. I agree with Waldahl on his observation about the 
privately-owned press in the sense that the ruling ZANU PF party spent all its energies in 
protecting its hegemony at the expense of the economy. 
 
In the lead up to 2000 elections the privately owned Daily News “urged the opposition to 
mobilise effectively for total victory, which would ensure an abrupt discontinuation of 
twenty years of ZANU PF corruption, cronyism and arrogant mis-governance” (Chuma 
2008:33). Perhaps to emphasise their disgust in the way ZANU PF has been running the 
country, the private media have consistently sought to expose the ruling party’s shortcomings 
such as the use of violence during elections (Chuma, 2008; Waldahl, 2005). This led to 
ZANU PF officials to label the private press ‘Morgan Tsvangirai press’. The opposition 
stance taken by the private press (Chuma 2008) has led to some viewing them as permanent 
adversaries of the government (Ndlela 2005). 
 
Mazango (2005) argues that the state can enter the media market to shape the kind of 
messages and content that has bearing on political and social life. In such a scenario “the 
media become both a crucial setting and a tool of power struggle, with the boundaries of 
freedom expression coming under stress as vulnerable governments attempt to influence 
public opinion in their favour” (Mazango 2005:34). I agree with Mazango (2005) and this 
thesis argues that ZANU PF has never faced a formidable opposition party like the MDC. 
The ruling party has employed every tactic to remain in power despite losing at the ballot 
box. ZANU PF officials have declared that they will not allow any opposition party to take 
over power even through the ballot box or else they will go back to war. 
 
Mazango (2005) notes that the state controlled media in Zimbabwe constantly attack the 
private media as instruments of neo-colonialism and Western imperialism. This is because 
the private media carry reports that portray ZANU PF as an enemy of democracy and human 
rights (Mazango 2005). 
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Considering the level of political violence by ZANU PF to opposition parties’ supporters 
which include among others intimidation, harassment, torture, rape, murder, disappearances, 
the ruling party abuses its power through use of military, police, youth militia and CIO. 
 
The narrative of human rights was invoked in private media particularly when reporting on 
land reform, elections and referendum. Such narratives appeared to be the driving factor 
behind the nature of representation regarding the political situation in Zimbabwe. It is 
difficult to say discourses of human rights were used selfishly by the privately owned media 
to achieve their interests. On the other hand, state controlled newspapers projected that the 
fight for liberation was a reaction to the injustices and human rights abuses committed by Ian 
Smith’s regime. Therefore, one would argue that the struggle against colonialism is actually 
responsible for the deconstruction of imperialism and construction of liberty and democracy 
in Africa and elsewhere in the world. 
 
The discourse of state owned media fights the neo-imperialism discourse in Zimbabwe. Neo-
imperialism discourse in Africa plays an important role of preserving the memory of the 
colonial past and raises a red flag regarding the possibilities of the reincarnation of this ugly 
past (Ogenga, 2010). This is why it has continuously been upheld to date and some African 
leaders like Mugabe are very robust about it. However, this does not mean that such leaders 
are immune to criticism regarding human rights abuses by virtue of their liberation history. 
The reality is that human rights records for many African leaders like Mugabe are also 
questionable and that is why civil society is increasingly visible in many countries in Africa. 
 
The repeated representation of violence in Zimbabwean elections by private media was 
meant to highlight human rights abuses in the country. To argue that such kind of 
representation was biased is to overlook the real challenges facing the people in Zimbabwe. 
The private media argued that the elections were characterised by violence leading to the 
massive migration of Zimbabweans into other countries due to a crumbling economy, torture 
and intimidation of the opposition supporters. It can be argued that state controlled 
newspapers dominated election coverage and overwhelmed private press because the Daily 
News had ceased publication. 
 
With ZANU PF and the two MDCs in government it is necessary to examine whether 
representation of political parties changed, if so, what discourses and framing were employed 
by both state controlled and privately owned press. The next chapter attempts to interrogate 
press representation of Government of National Unity till 2013 harmonised elections. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed previous literature on the topic under investigation, which is press 
and conflict. An overview of the Zimbabwean political crises, beginning the year 2000 when 
the ZANU PF led government lost a crucial referendum, through the various elections, the 
Government of National Unity and the post-2013 harmonised elections has been explored. 
Considerable attention was given to reviewing literature on how the Zimbabwean press has 
represented conflicts. It was noted that the media in Zimbabwe was polarised along political 
lines and this influenced their framing of conflicts. A salient feature of media framing which 
had potential to fuel conflicts was that of “othering”, whereby negative labels are given or 
derogatory labels. The chapter also noted that a number of political events such as the 
constitutional referendum, the land reform and elections helped polarised society and the 
media. 
 
A key observation made in this chapter is that framing of issues and contestants in 
Zimbabwe’s elections runs contrary to the view that the media are mere observers who 
faithfully and innocently record events. It is testimony of the fact that journalists do not 
always work autonomously as servants of the truth and public interest but may operate as 
hired guns of certain political and commercial interests (Street, 2001:145). Chari’s (2010) 
article entitled “Issue framing in Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections: An analysis of two weekly 
newspapers...” is relevant to this study. He argues that the manner in which the two 
newspapers framed electoral and contestants demonstrates that “the press is deeply 
implicated in power politics. As a consequence framing of issues reflects competing 
interpretations of reality whereby the state owned Sunday Mail projected ZANU PF as the 
better party while the privately owned Zimbabwe Independent became a megaphone of the 
opposition MDC” (Chari, 2010:19). 
 
 
Further, economic collapse and social anarchy and violence are represented in the privately-
owned press as consequences of the ruling party’s sponsored electoral malpractices and 
politics of disorder. The discourse advanced by the privately owned press was that human 
rights and democracy are under threat in Zimbabwe due to the iron fisted rule of Robert 
Mugabe. The election is represented in a manner biased against the ruling party. These 
newspapers seem to support the regime change agenda of the West who have arguably over 
the past thirty years invented and magnified Mugabe as the epicentre of Zimbabwe’s political 
conflict and hyped the flawed elections, allegedly attributed to Mugabe’s self-rule agenda. 
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The privately owned press personalised and simplified the crisis situation in Zimbabwe. In 
many instances, they downplayed the neo-imperialism discourses championed by pan-
Africanists and advocates of national liberation in Zimbabwe. However, neo-imperialism was 
countered as re-appropriated by crusaders of human rights and democracy who were given 
generous coverage by privately owned press’ representations. On the other hand, state 
controlled press defended the status quo. 
 
 
Whilst privately owned press discourse was lack of democracy and human rights abuses, 
state controlled press countered that by extensively quoting Mugabe emphatically saying the 
West should not teach Zimbabweans on democracy and human rights because the country 
was won through the barrel of the gun. The sharp contrasts, in representation of issues and 
political contests underscores the fact that the press do not merely reflect reality but actively 
manufacture, fashion and sustain reality according to their ideological positions. As observed 
by Starc cited in Chari (2010: 224) journalists are crucial actors in the struggle for the truth 
and in our understanding of social reality. This thesis argues that the polarised political 
environment obtaining in Zimbabwe is also reflected by the polarised press which ultimately 
influences representation of political conflict. 
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 Chapter 3 Press Representation of the Government of National Unity (2009-2013) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the representation of political conflicts by the state-owned and the 
privately-press during the Government of National Unity (GNU) which was formed between 
the ruling party ZANU PF and the opposition MDC formations. The analysis is based on 
archival textual material from four newspapers selected for this study. The coalition 
government followed gruelling and protracted negotiations after the violent and disputed 
2008 27 June presidential run-off. Opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai had narrowly won 
the election but did not get sufficient votes to avoid a run-off. The negotiations for the 
coalition government, under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and facilitated by Thabo Mbeki, the then South African president were not easy as 
there were many thorny issues and points of contention. Like in all other Zimbabwean 
political conflicts the media became a key arena upon which these political disputes were 
ventilated. 
 
3.2 GNU Negotiations in the State-Owned Press 
 
Press reportage on the negotiations for a Government of National Unity did not differ 
significantly from other contentious issues as the polarisation between the state-owned and 
the privately - owned press continued unabated. There was no improvement in the 
government media’s reportage of the negotiations for a coalition government between the 
two MDC factions and ZANU PF. Rather than providing incisive information on the fate of 
the dialogue, including Mbeki’s planned visit to Harare to revive the talks, the state 
controlled media continued to blame Tsvangirai for the impasse while suffocating growing 
regional and international disquiet over President Mugabe’s role in the stalemate. Instead, 
they cited Mugabe’s invitation to Swaziland by King Mswati III to celebrate his 40th 
birthday and the kingdom’s 40 years from British rule as evidence of the Zimbabwean 
leader’s legitimacy and popularity despite efforts by some countries to isolate him. These 
efforts to reinforce Mugabe’s legitimacy as President were reflected in many stories in the 
state - owned media featured on the topic. For instance, The Herald 4 September 2008, failed 
to critically assess the implications of Mugabe’s threat that he would form a new government 
without the MDC if its leaders refused to sign the agreement. The Herald uncritically quoted 
Mugabe telling journalists in Zambia after the funeral of the late Zambia President, Levy 
Mwanawasa, that “if…Tsvangirai does not sign” the deal “today” he would “proceed to 
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appoint a Cabinet as the country cannot be frozen forever’. No attempt was made to question 
the basis on which he intended to do this apart from reporting him saying “we are a 
government, and we are a government that is empowered by elections. So we should form a 
cabinet...” The Herald also made no attempt to reconcile Mugabe’s claim to legitimacy with 
the universally condemned June 27th presidential run-off election upon which he based his 
claim to legitimacy. The Herald representation was that Mugabe was a legitimate president. 
 
There was little information in The Herald about the state of the negotiations, apart from The 
Herald of 4 September 2008 speculating that Mbeki was expected in Zimbabwe the 
following day to try “for the last time” to persuade Tsvangirai to sign the agreement. The 
next day, 5 September 2008, The Herald simply announced that Mbeki had postponed his 
visit to next week. The rest of the official media’s stories on the matter either maliciously 
accused the MDC-T formations of not having the national interest at heart for refusing to 
sign the document, or reinforced Mugabe’s allegations that the West was behind Tsvangirai’s 
reluctance to sign. The argument which should have been represented by the state controlled 
press is that for the document to be signed, the three political parties should first agree on 
conditions on the table for negotiation. 
 
The Herald of 1 September 2008 accused the MDC-T party of “living true to its chameleon 
like politics” and described Tsvangirai as a British puppet who would not sign the deal 
without Britain’s approval. The Sunday Mail of 7 September 2008 accused Tsvangirai of 
“holding the talks hostage” and “throwing spanners at every turn” without clearly explaining 
how he was doing this. 
 
This contrasted sharply with the favourable coverage the state-owned media accorded to 
Mugabe and ZANU PF, exonerating him from any role in the stalemate and reporting 
portraying him as still commanding unwavering support from the region despite Western 
criticism.. The Sunday Mail, for example editorised its news story entitled “Khama eats 
humble pie” by representing Mugabe as having been given “a hero’s welcome from a packed 
Somhlolo Stadium in Swaziland “with people waving and cheering at the Zimbabwean 
leader”. It claimed that this left Botswana president Ian Khama who had refused to recognise 
the results of the June 27 presidential election runoff “with no option but to shake the 
veteran’s leader’s hands.” 
 
The Herald of 20 November 2008 depicts Morgan Tsvangirai as a puppet of the West in a 
cartoon. 
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The newspaper caricatured Tsvangirai, who was portrayed in the cartoon saying “I can’t go 
to Swaziland on an ETD…even aboard Mswati’s private jet…But I’ll go to France, even 
without a passport or ETD.” The cartoon was reference to The Herald 19 November 2008 
story titled “France sponsored Tsvangirai’s trip.” The newspaper reported that France 
President, Nicolas Sarkozy had financed the MDC-T leader who was to “consult” the West 
on the government of national unity. Previously, Tsvangirai refused to travel to Swaziland 
for a meeting of the SADC organ Troika because he did not want to use an emergency travel 
document. 
 
The Herald’s representation of Tsvangirai in cartoons also echoed that in the news whereby 
Tsvangirai was constructed as a ‘proxy’ of the West where he would constantly fly to seek 
second opinion. A cartoon in The Herald of 8 September 2008 depicted Tsvangirai as 
anxious and unsure if he should sign the pact. The cartoon seemed to be an allusion to the 
story published in The Herald of 6 September 2008 titled “hidden hand behind MDC-T’s 
intransigence”. These were a series of articles written by Tafataona Mahoso who allegedly 
was co-opted by ZANU-PF in the propaganda war against the opposition and the West. In the 
article, Mahoso claimed that there is “a direct link between the external manoeuvres of the 
regime change forces led by US and UK and the manoeuvres of their internal proxies in the 
form of MDC-T and its NGO cohorts here in Zimbabwe”.(p13). Mahoso blamed 
Condoleezza Rice, Gordon Brown, Jendayi Frazer and Walter Kansteiner who represents 
America, Britain, Europe and the proxy groups they chose to sponsor regime change in 
Zimbabwe. Representation of the white racist powers forms Mahoso’s predictable rhetoric 
and discourse. 
 
Blessing- Miles Tendi (2010) argues that when ZANU PF and President Mugabe were faced 
with waning electoral support, they began to repackage history; a ‘patriotic’ version of 
history, disseminated by public intellectuals and state media. In this scenario, Mahoso 
became a columnist in both The Herald and The Sunday Mail where he would vent his vitriol 
against Europe and America. 
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The Herald 17 September 2008 (p.8) published a cartoon which seemed to suggest that the 
three leaders in the negotiations for a Government of National Unity had finally resolved to 
work together. The comments in the cartoon read: “…THAT WHICH ZIMBABWEANS 
HAVE PUT TOGETHER…LET NO ONE PUT ASUNDER”. The cartoon by Mpofu, made 
a biblical allusion representing the ruling ZANU PF’s ideology which suggests that 
Zimbabweans should have a home-grown agreement without external influence. This has 
been the discourse depicted throughout the long complex negotiations and talks. 
 
The Herald of 11 November, 2008 had a story headlined “New Cabinet Imminent”. In the 
story, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai reportedly had been invited by President Mugabe to 
submit a list of ministers from his party. The newspaper reported that Mugabe expressed 
optimism that a Cabinet would be in place soon following recommendations by the 
Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government in Sandton, South Africa, 
that the inclusive government be established urgently. 
 
The summit reportedly endorsed the earlier position of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence 
and Security, calling for co-management of the contentious ministry of Home Affairs by 
ZANU-PF and MDC-T. MDC-T demanded sole control of the ministry with ZANU PF 
insisting the portfolio should be shared for national security reasons. ZANU PF was 
uncomfortable with Tsvangirai getting sole control of the ministry because of the alleged 
training of militias by MDC-T. The Herald’s representation on the issue was that the ministry 
of Home Affairs was the only outstanding sticking point. The newspaper did not attempt to 
explain to the readers that there were other outstanding issues in order to create the 
impression that the MDC was being unreasonable. 
 
In the same Herald of 11 November 2008, there was a photograph in which Tsvangirai was 
lampooned, in the background there is Christopher Dell and James McGee (former and then 
US ambassador to Zimbabwe). Tsvangirai is saying: “BECAUSE THIS IS A POWER 
SHARING DEAL I’M NOT SHARING HOME AFFAIRS WITH ZANU-PF”. The message 
seems to be that Tsvangirai was not his own men because he was being influenced by 
Western diplomats like Dell and McGee. ZANU-PF’s relentless attack on the MDC and its 
portrayal of the party as a western-sponsored party was meant to justify Mugabe’s vow not to 
allow power sharing. 
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It is imperative to note that ZANU PF’s major condition and demand for the inclusive 
government was the total removal/ lifting of sanctions on Zimbabwe. It is therefore 
interesting to see The Herald of 12 November 2008 captured MDC-T’s perception on the 
issue of sanctions. In the cartoon we have a banner reading “PAN-AFRICAN MPs 
DEMAND SANCTIONS REMOVAL”, while three MDC-T MPs are depicted not to “see, 
hear and talk” about it. The last cartoon discussed in this chapter appeared in The Herald of 
13 November 2008 which portrayed the ‘swearing-in ceremony’ of partners in the inclusive 
government symbolized by joining hands. What is striking is the representation of 
Tsvangirai’s party labelled as a proxy of the west again. In the cartoon Tsvangirai is depicted 
as saying “AURGH!! …NO TO MINISTERIAL POSTS!!... SO HELP ME UNITED 
NATIONS (US/UK)…JUST SWEARING FOR OTHERS!” The other hand, arguably 
representing ZANU-PF says “SO HELP ME GOD...SWEARING IN FOR SOME!” 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that only The Herald has been analysed in this section 
because the Daily News had been banned in 2003. In this regard, the state controlled daily 
newspaper had the monopoly to make representations which were pro-government while 
negatively representing the opposition parties. 
 
In her article titled “Comic strips and “the crisis”: post-colonial laughter and coping with 
everyday life in Zimbabwe” Willems (2011) asserts that in African Studies, political cartoons 
and comic strips have frequently been analysed in relation to concepts of power and 
resistance and considered as ways in which those subject to power challenge the rulers 
(Mason, 2002; Mbembe, 2001; Nyamnjoh, 2009). She further argues, “To a certain extent, 
these studies have reflected the wider debate on the role of humour in the relationship 
between ruler and the ruled in a post colony’’. 
 
In media and cultural studies, scholars have analysed comics primarily as ideological texts 
which offer a particular framing of reality. The debate has not only focused on the way in 
which cartoons ridiculed those in power but has also reflected on the implications of cartoons 
for those in power. EKO (2007:235) for instance, has attributed agency to cartoons and 
points out that “cartoons and caricature are politically sensitive, even dangerous texts…” In 
his analysis of political cartoons in Cameroon, Mbembe (2001) is less convinced about the 
effectiveness of political cartoons as forms of resistance. He argues that the very act of 
making the autocrat visible in cartoons in fact reproduces its power. 
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However, Nyamnjoh (2009:107) disagrees with Mbembe’s analysis and argues that 
“Mbembe seems to imply that (the autocrat’s) power diminishes if the public were less 
preoccupied with him in this way. But I think it is important to see in what light he is 
represented: he is generally talked of in negative terms, which obviously has a greater effect 
than if the press were simply to ignore him as if he did not exist”. Nyamnjoh (2009; 97) 
encourages us to be critical of any suggestion that such cartooning has little impact simply 
because it has failed to bring about a revolution or revolt against the status quo” and he 
proposes instead to analyse “...Effects that maybe gradual, cumulative and in the long term, 
than on effectiveness that stresses immediate outcomes to the detriment of that which takes 
time to unfold”. 
 
Willems (2011:2) argues that “these scholars have thus focused on the role of cartoons in 
offering spaces for resistance-whether effective or not- and the way in which they have 
functioned as what Scott (1990) would call ‘hidden scripts’. I agree with Nyamnjoh (2009) in 
that those in power or ‘to be in power’ in the case of opposition leaders such as Tsvangirai, 
may reflect on how they are depicted so that they may reconsider their perceptions, positions 
and attitudes. However, in a polarised media environment, the cartoonists become conduits 
of official voices that may merely reflect or represent the ruling elite’s propaganda based on 
skewed and biased views on opposition parties. In the case of Zimbabwe one can question 
the extent to which cartoons have come to fulfil the role of ‘hidden scripts’, that is, subtle, 
implicit forms of critique against those in power. 
 
Given the above background therefore, while political cartoons in Zimbabwe certainly could 
be seen as forms of political resistance and opened up alternative communicative spaces, as 
Arntsen (2010) has argued, it remains questionable to what extent cartoons were unique in 
offering opportunities for political dissent. Like news articles, columns and editorials, 
cartoonists openly criticised politicians, ministers and even the President and (Prime 
Minister) (Willems, 2011). Cartoonists, like news reporters and editors, were polarised, 
therefore, they took the ideology of their newspapers. In fact, cartoonists “eavesdrop” or 
closely followed events obtaining in society and the agenda setting of their newspapers so 
that they could create their cartoons in order to represent specific discourses and rhetoric. 
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In terms of content, The Herald cartoons relied to a large extent on the official voice of 
government elites and represented the spectacle of the state. Mpofu’s (2008) cartoons could 
be classified as anti-opposition because of their disparaging depictions of the MDC-T 
officials, particularly its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. I agree with Willems (2011:4) when she 
argues that, ‘in the case of Zimbabwe’ treating cartoons as a form of resistance primarily 
would perhaps attribute too much weight to them, given the role of other forms of dissent in 
newspapers…” 
 
Partly responding to Mbembe’s argument, Schneider (2004:79) has argued that “the value of 
comics may not so much lie in its potential to provoke (instant) political change, but in the 
way comics keep track and record actual and historical reality. As such, they form an 
important part of the public memory”. I argue that The Herald cartoons by Mpofu (2008) 
were part of a larger hegemonic effort to represent MDC-T as a western puppet and 
therefore, must be rejected by citizens in order to maintain the status quo in which President 
Mugabe and his ZANU PF remain in power. Therefore, Mpofu’s cartoons were meant to 
appease the ruling elites through echoing their voices and political ideology which was anti-
imperialism/ anti-West; therefore anti-MDC-T. 
 
Politicians are not portrayed in a very favourable light (but instead as hypocrites and corrupt 
officials). It is interesting to point out that Mpofu’s (2008) cartoons did not attract any fear of 
any potential charges against him from opposition party because he enjoyed the “immunity” 
provided by the state since he was writing for the government. While previous literature has 
revealed cartoons “as forms of political resistance and opened up alternative communicative 
spaces” (Willems, 2011:3), this study argues that cartoons in both state owned media and 
privately owned press played the role of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses. They 
reflect the polarised media environment that is obtaining and unfolding in the Zimbabwean 
society which is saturated with political conflict. 
 
3.3 The Inclusive Government and the Press 
 
There was a considerable shift in the representation of the opposition MDC after the party 
had agreed to be part of the Government of National Unity. The Media Monitoring Project 
Zimbabwe (MMPZ, 2009) contends that while news and analysis of Zimbabwe’s most recent 
political developments in the Zimpapers’ publications (and on ZBC) remained superficial 
and biased in favour of the politicians who control their output, the days following the MDC 
National Executive Council’s decision to endorse Tsvangirai’s recommendation for the party 
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to form a coalition government with ZANU PF witnessed an abrupt change in the 
government media’s relentless propaganda campaign to malign and discredit the main MDC 
and its leader. 
 
The Global Political Agreement signed by the country’s three main parties on September 
15th, urges all the media to “refrain from using abusive language that could incite hostility, 
political intolerance and ethnic hatred, or that unfairly undermines political parties and other 
organization” (Article 19 (c) (d) & (e) of the GPA). MMPZ (2009) argues that instead of 
adhering to these conditions and facilitating an atmosphere of co-operation and tolerance to 
encourage constructive dialogue between Zimbabwe’s rival parties, the official media 
pursued their election campaign by vilifying Tsvangirai and his party by attempting to 
portray them as incompetent, cowardly puppets of the west’s “illegal” regime change agenda. 
The news analysis pages of state controlled media were arguably replete with news of 
political developments, exclusively blaming the MDC-T party for the delays in the formation 
of a new government in addition to the economic and humanitarian crisis afflicting the 
country. 
 
As noted earlier, the government press even reinforced their disdain for professional 
journalistic practice by employing disparaging cartoons and letter – to –the editor columns to 
drive home their abusive messages. Press representation before and during negotiations was 
antagonistic but media reportage changed for the better during the first phase of the inclusive 
government. Nevertheless, journalists in both pro-government and privately - owned press 
faced a challenge on how to cope with change of framing and discourses, now that the rivals 
were in government together. 
 
It remained to be seen whether these so called news institutions were capable of performing 
their duties as fairly, in a balanced and accurate manner and as messengers of the news in the 
service of the public. 
 
However, it is worth noting that despite the drastic shift in the state-owned press 
representation of issues relating to the activities of the coalition government was arguably 
still polarised, although the intensity of polarity had changed. Although the inclusive 
government was established there were many outstanding issues which were sticky and 
controversial. Among the sensitive and complex issues was the sharing of cabinet portfolios, 
media reforms, ambassadors, provincial governors, constitution making process. It is against 
this background that the press was used as a battlefield for competing perspectives. 
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The government controlled public media allegedly failed to give a fair and accurate picture of 
the activities of the inclusive government. They continued to feed their audiences with 
ZANU PF perspective of the progress the coalition had made. These media proved to be 
unreliable messengers of government in implementation of the GPA, their unequal coverage 
of the coalition partners’ operations meant they continued to violate provisions of the 
political agreement (Article XIX(d) obliging them to accord “balanced and fair coverage ‘to 
the parties’ legitimate political activities”. For example, The Sunday Mail of 21 March 2010, 
which carried the news headline, “One step at a time Mr. Prime Minister”, resorted to 
editorialising and cited unnamed sources claiming that Tsvangirai “got more than he had 
bargained for” when he was allegedly, “ told that the registration of other newspapers will 
not be a hurried process”. 
 
The newspaper represents Tsvangirai desperate to have the Daily News registered. On the 
contrary, The Standard 21 March 2010 gave a different report on media reforms. The report, 
was accompanied by a picture of the Prime Minister surrounded by beaming members of the 
Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC), quoted Tsvangirai advising the commission to 
“ignore opponents of media reforms in the inclusive government” who were trying to 
frustrate the licensing of new media products. 
 
It is imperative to highlight the fact that ‘media reforms’ were a thorny issue but the fact that 
the Daily News, which had been forced to close in 2003 bounced back in April 2010 meant 
that an alternative and dissenting voice would be disseminated to citizens yet ZANU PF had 
the monopoly enjoyed by The Herald for seven years. 
 
On the one hand, the state- owned press downplayed the violence that rocked the 
Constitutional Parliamentary Select Commitment (COPAC) outreach consultations. The 
Herald of 21 September 2010 attributed the occurrence of violence to parties’ entrenched 
positions on ‘certain key positions’ and reduced the incidents to “mere skirmishes”. The 
private media, carried editorials, quoted analysts, MDC-T, civil society and human rights 
organisations doubting the constitutional reform exercise’s ability to truly reflect people’s 
views and aspirations in light of the violence, which they argued was because of the 
ineffectiveness of the coalition’s Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration. 
The private press depicted the violence as a fore runner to bloody polls. 
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They reported many incidents of rights violations related to the constitution making process. 
These largely identified ZANU PF supporters, war veterans and state security agents as 
perpetrators of violence against a cross section of Zimbabweans. The violations published in 
the private press included assaults, intimidation and the suppression of freedom of 
expression. The Daily News of 23 September 2010 quoted Prime Minister Tsvangirai 
condemning the exercise as a “messy” process that had “failed” the test of legitimacy, 
credibility and people driveness”. 
 
The Sunday Mail of 14 November 2010 quoted Vice President John Nkomo telling a ZANU 
PF provincial committee meeting in Matabeleland that ZANU PF made the mistake of 
entering “the inclusive government, thinking this was the best way forward”. He added: “we 
can’t sit at the same table with the enemy and pretend to be friends when we are not. We are 
strange bedfellows and the earlier we separate the better”. The newspaper representation of 
“marriage of convenience” was clear amidst election threats following calls by senior 
officials from Zimbabwe’s two coalition parties for holding of fresh elections as a way of 
resolving their protracted power sharing disputes. 
 
The remarks appeared to have been sparked by President Mugabe’s disdain for the coalition 
and his alleged unilateralism. Mugabe made attempts to call for early national elections 
throughout the inclusive government. While the state controlled media promoted Mugabe’s 
intentions to hold early polls, they ignored the fact that the coalition had not fulfilled many of 
the preconditions governing the holding of elections outlined in the GPA. Such concerns 
were discredited as having been prompted by the MDC-T’s alleged fear of electoral defeat. 
Most of the comments made in the state-owned press, mostly by ZANU PF and its 
sympathisers and senior officials of Zimbabwe’s state security organs amounted to politically 
intolerant language and bordered on hate speech. 
 
The Herald 16 November 2010 quoted Chinamasa who described and castigated MDC-T 
senators as “rowdy”, equivalent to “hooliganism”, sure evidence that the MDC-T was “unfit 
to govern” and a justification for the need to dissolve Parliament to pave way for fresh 
elections. Chinamasa said: “they are precipitating a crisis that will bring elections much 
earlier than the president has indicated. By rendering the senate dysfunctional, they are 
cutting off their noses to spite their faces…” 
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Wiki leaks disclosures threatened to torpedo the coalition. The state media selectively 
reported on the diplomatic correspondence, highlighting only those points that portrayed 
Prime Minister and MDC-T President Morgan Tsvangirai in bad light. The Herald of 11 
December 2010 for example, quoted professor Jonathan Moyo, among others, advising 
Tsvangirai to “…resign not just from government but public life altogether”, adding: “He 
must be prosecuted for a litany of treasonous acts against the state”. The private media 
viewed the Wiki leaks revelations as likely to increase tensions within the coalition, as 
evidenced by ZANU PF calls for Tsvangirai to be arrested although analysts and legal 
experts argued that such charges would not “stand in any court of law” (The Standard 19 
December 2010). The Daily News of 31 March 2011 published a story titled: “Zimbabwe’s 
killing fields: Mass grave of over 600 bodies found in mine shaft”. The fallen Heroes of 
Zimbabwe Trust, a group of Mugabe party loyalists said the remains had been discovered in 
the disused Chibondo gold mine in Mount Darwin. 
 
While Mugabe loyalists said the bodies are those of victims of colonial atrocities committed 
under the former leader Ian Smith, pathologists said visual evidence may point to more 
recent killings in a nation plagued by election violence and politically motivated murders. 
The story was accompanied by disturbing photographs with captions which read: “Grimy 
discovery: Hundreds of skeletons found in a disused mine shaft have brought a macabre 
thrust to election campaigning in Zimbabwe”. 
 
Many photographs were shown in both state owned and privately owned press. Pro-
government press’s agenda was to whip people’s emotions to loath whites and opposition 
parties. State controlled media’s representation of the controversial issue was to discredit 
rivals and Western critics of President Robert Mugabe who was calling for elections to end 
the coalition government. The Sunday Mail of 5 December 2010 had quoted Mugabe saying 
he “feels awkward” being part of the inclusive government because it allegedly drew 
authority from a “semi-legal” and “makeshift” political agreement. 
 
As the GPA staggered to an end, continued violations of the agreement, reform deficits, 
limited institutional credibility and the rejection of a UN election needs assessment mission 
underscored the absence of conditions for peaceful and credible elections, despite the new 
constitution adopted in March 2013. 
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3.4 Internal Political Party Dynamics in ZANU PF 
 
Machinations, suspicions and shenanigans within the coalition parties would have a direct 
bearing on the elections. All the parties were deeply divided, and rifts grew as politicians 
competed for nomination in the primaries. 
 
ZANU PF’s centralisation of power triggered factionalism and succession battles. Struggles 
over who would succeed the president previously surfaced in 1998 and at 2004 party 
congress, when Joice Mujuru was elected Vice President ahead of Emmerson Mnangagwa 
(Matyszak, 2012). Mugabe’s endorsement of Mujuru was interpreted as disapproval of 
Mnangagwa who was arguably demoted both in the party and the executive. But his star was 
to rise in 2008, when he was rewarded with the defence ministry for his central role in 
Mugabe’s victory in the presidential run-off. 
 
The Crisis Group Report (CGR 2013) reckon that at the beginning of 2012, ZANU PF 
witnessed preparations for national elections, which involved restructuring the grassroots 
support base, but for the party’s District Coordinating Committee (DCCs) were bedevilled by 
tensions and clashes between those perceived as Mnangagwa supporters and those perceived 
as Mujuru loyalists. Several ZANU PF leaders, including Mugabe, have become more 
critical of factionalism and succession battles, stressing the importance of unity at this critical 
time. The Herald, 30 June 2012 had a story titled “Zanu PF DDCs disbanded”. 
 
While some considered the dissolution as favouring Mujuru’ s succession bid, others 
presumed it was Mugabe’s strategy for consolidating his power in the party. The official 
position was that Mugabe remains the party’s leader and presidential candidate, that he is not 
considering stepping down and even if he was, the party would observe its official hierarchy. 
 
Despite DDCs banning, the move was seen as part of a broader effort to contain factionalism 
and assert Mugabe’s leadership. This meant addressing allegations of corruption and the 
leakage of sensitive party documents. But succession and factionalism concerns, influenced 
by an array of fixed and evolving variables, including ethnic, economic, and political and 
security interests, will not disappear (CGR, 2013, Matyszak, 2012, Onslow, 2011). These 
dynamics had a direct import for 2013 elections, possibly influencing who would lead the 
country, as well as the party’s approach to the polls. Mugabe was seen as the only 
presidential candidate able to unite ZANU PF’s emerging factions. This may explain why 
some elements, worried by his declining health, were pushing for early elections. 
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While some say Mugabe’s failure to quell these power struggles showed that his grip on the 
party was waning, others saw it in his political interest to maintain uncertainty around his 
succession (CGR, 2013, Matyszak, 2012). 
 
3.5 Factionalism and infighting in The MDC-T 
 
Whilst MDC-T had tried to largely portray itself as party of excellence capable of delivering 
the much needed democratic reform, its role in the GNU exposed its bureaucratic ineptness. 
MDC-T was viewed by the urban populace as having neglected their promises by engaging 
in wealth accumulation. The corrupt MDC councillors angered the urban voters and 
Tsvangirai himself was seriously soiled by his promiscuity. The waning popularity and 
inability to develop sound development policies and the threats of factionalism and infighting 
severely weakened the MDC-T. The 2011 MDC-T congress, for example, exposed clear 
internal divisions and resulted in violence over leadership positions in all provinces. It is a 
controversial issue that intraparty inconsistencies that recently rocked the MDC-T party and 
the subsequent split has implications that this has on the party support base ahead of the 2018 
election. Strong and sustainable democracy is based on well-functioning political parties. 
Chege (2007) argues that political parties are crucial actors in bringing together diverse 
interests, recruiting and presenting candidates, and developing competing policy proposals 
that provide people with viable choices. 
 
While crisis and conflict are common features of political parties the world over, it appears 
the MDC T may have failed to manage and contain its internal conflicts resulting in yet 
another split that saw some senior officials forming the MDC Renewal Team. The Zimbabwe 
Democracy Institute (ZDI) (2014) report titled “Political Parties Split in Zimbabwe: the case 
of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T)” reckon that in April 2014, the MDC-T 
suffered yet another major split following the 2005 split over disagreement on whether to 
participate in the country’s senatorial elections. 
 
To distinguish between the two splinter parties the MDC led by Morgan Tsvangirai was 
named MDC-T while the other formation was dubbed MDC-N. The MDC has been slowly 
losing support because of this split despite the 2008 election result where it almost dislodged 
ZANU PF from power. Some scholars noted that during the inclusive government (February 
2009 to July 2013), there was a gradual shift of public opinion and political affiliation. 
Masunungure (2013) also argues that after the 2008 elections, the MDC-T lost many of its 
supporters and not a few of its core supporters. 
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However, it must be borne in mind that the ruling party’s election machinery was still strong 
and this might have contributed to the MDC’s defeat in the 31 July 2013 elections. Elections 
in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2013 have always been controversial with ZANU PF’s desire to 
continue holding on to power. Following the disputed 31 July 2013 elections, ZANU PF 
effectively retained its hegemony, leaving the opposition political parties severely weakened 
and disoriented. After the MDC-T failed in its legal and diplomatic manoeuvres to ensure the 
conduct of fresh elections, it started to battle strong internal conflicts. 
 
Disgruntled with the party’s loss, some high ranking members began to call for leadership 
renewal, especially regarding the party presidency, calling for an early congress to elect a 
successor to Tsvangirai in order to ‘renew’ the party and the leadership (ZDI, 2014). As the 
then party treasurer Roy Bennett put it: 
 
Mr. Tsvangirai has served two terms and is nearly completing a third. Deep introspection needs to be 
undertaken by our collective national leadership, not for the purposes of looking for scapegoats, but for 
our party to reinvigorate leadership, with a leadership which reflects the will of the people. 
Regrettably, some within our leadership as the case with many political parties do not wish the 
grassroots democratic will of the people to prevail. 
 
After this statement by Roy Bennett, a number of MDC-T leaders expressed the same 
sentiment. Ian Kay, for example, a former member of parliament for Marondera Central said 
that the “MDC-T as a party is like “a soccer team” and that “if the coach continues losing, 
there is need for the technical board to sit down and deal with the issue”. The leadership 
agenda came to a head when the then deputy treasurer Elton Mangoma wrote a letter to 
Tsvangirai in which he urged him to step down from party leadership. The contentious letter 
was fully published in The Herald of January 27, 2014. However, the private press was silent 
on this letter until much later. 
 
In a letter titled “Restoration of Hope and Confidence: A case for Leadership Renewal”, 
Mangoma stated that: 
 
The aftermath of the election has been a state of confusion, consternation and apprehension on the part 
of the movement. The party is grieving from a crisis of leadership legitimacy, crisis of expectation and 
above all crisis of confidence, externally and internally. Leadership renewal is an inexorable truth that 
the party will have to confront lest it is plagued by some succession conundrum affecting ZANU PF. 
Since the outcome of the election calls for leadership renewal have been made in different quarters and 
at different platforms. It is my unbending resolve that leadership renewal, at this juncture, could be the 
only avenue to restoring the credibility of the party lest it risks being confined to history. 
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The tension within the party fuelled violence, suspensions and counter suspensions which 
finally culminated in a split, with the pro-renewal team lead by Sekai Holland and the then 
secretary general, Tendai Biti and the other formation remaining loyal to Morgan Tsvangirai 
(ZDI, 2014). 
 
Although the MDC-T was faced with significant internal challenges, especially after the 
2013 election, a split was neither necessary nor strategic. A split would only give the ruling 
ZANU PF party continued domination and hegemony. I agree with ZDI (2014) observation 
that with the 2005 party split and the recent 2014 split, there are concerns that divided 
opposition political parties can only serve to ensure ZANU PF’s continued stay in power. 
While the MDC –T once proved to be a viable opposition capable of articulating problems of 
the day and presenting voters with coherent electoral alternatives, the splits might weary the 
electorate and wane the party’s support. 
 
ZDI (2014) further argues that naturally after an election, all political parties are expected to 
look into their internal issues to see where they went wrong and map a way forward. Instead, 
MDC-T’s self-introspection resulted in a split that counters party development, which is 
detrimental to democracy. The split, as viewed by some, drives the party into a political cul 
de sac that neither helps it to move forward nor strengthens it. Instead, the split scatters the 
party’s energy and even resources. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the representation of political conflicts by the state-owned and the 
privately-owned press during negotiations and after the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) which was formed between the ruling party ZANU PF and the opposition MDC 
formations. The analyses is based on archival textual material from four newspapers, namely 
The Herald, The Sunday Mail, Daily News and The Standard. The chapter argues that, 
although there was a significant change in the state-owned media’s representation of the 
opposition MDC, the press remained polarised along political lines. The state-owned press 
toned down its vitriol against MDC but continued depicting the party in negative light. At the 
same time, the privately-owned media maintained its negative stance against ZANU PF 
while it represented the MDC in positive light. 
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This trend continued until the harmonised election of 31 July 2013 and beyond. In the next 
chapter I will discuss press representation of ZANU PF power, succession struggles and 
factionalism. 
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Chapter 4: Press, ZANU PF Succession and Factionalism 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the representation of ZANU PF succession battles, factionalism and 
power struggles in the state-owned and the privately-owned press with a view to gain insights 
into the way in which the press is deeply implicated in politics. The chapter begins with some 
reflections on the concept of power, succession and factionalism and how these are mediated 
in the state-owned and the privately-owned newspapers. A comparative analysis of privately-
owned and government-owned press representation of ZANU PF succession and factionalism 
is also made. The chapter also analyses the representation of ZANU PF succession and 
factionalism in press cartoons. 
 
The Herald of 2 June, 2012 published a newspaper article by Lovemore Ranga Mataire titled: 
‘Locating the Genesis of Factionalism in ZANU PF’ which offers some interesting insights 
on power and succession struggles in the ruling party. Mataire (2012] argues that what is new 
is the physical confrontation that has characterised the holding of district coordinating 
committee (DCC) elections in some provinces … which have caused concern for the 
leadership. President Robert Mugabe has in the past bemoaned the continued clashes of 
ZANU PF members on many occasions and urged members to revisit the founding principles 
of the revolutionary party that have sustained it during and after the liberation struggle. 
Mataire (2012) further notes that ZANU PF has historically managed to deal decisively with 
factional problems that have manifested in the pre- and post-liberation era by constantly 
referring to its ideological foundational principles of selfless service to the people. 
 
It can be argued that apart from the absence of ideological orientation on the party new 
members of the revolutionary party in the post liberation era, other factors fuelling 
factionalism include the lack of ideological guiding principles, tribalism, personality 
differences, the succession issue, corruption, the generational gap of old and emerging 
leadership and the various social interest groups and the scramble for control of the 
revolutionary party. 
 
The liberation movement’s membership has ballooned over the years, accepting within its 
ranks people who simply identify with the party’s pro-majority policies; some do not have a 
clear understanding of its ideological foundational principles. 
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Some of the essential elements of that foundation include discipline, pursuance at all times 
pro-majority polices, selfless dedication to serve the masses, anti-imperialistic, nationalistic 
and total respect of the hierarchical order. 
 
To a great extent, ZANU PF has failed to offer young members strategic ministerial posts 
despite their educational achievements. President Mugabe has retained the old guard, even 
some incompetent cadres at the detriment, not only of the party, but also of the country as a 
whole, especially the economy. If the President had consistently disciplined errant members, 
be it in relation to corruption, incompetence, fuelling divisions in the ruling party among 
other ills, ZANU PF could have been saved from factional fights. 
 
According to Mataire (2012), another factor that has contributed towards factionalism is 
tribalism. Tribal profiling is so rampant in some provinces that some members had to 
relocate to their provinces of birth in order to be elected into positions. An example is in 
Mazowe, a district in Mashonaland Central, where there is an unwritten code that anyone 
who is not from the Chiweshe area must not be voted into any position. Those fuelling this 
tribal profiling conveniently disregard the fact that Mazowe is surrounded by farms occupied 
by new farmers from other provinces. Tribalism breeds decadent leadership, which is bent on 
protecting its own selfish interest instead of being at the service of the people (Mataire, 
2012). 
 
Mataire (2012) observes that the succession issue has had an effect in the cohesion of the 
party. There seems to be a tendency in the revolutionary movement for people to align 
themselves with a faction deemed to have leverage of power in the event of change of 
leadership at the top. Change in leadership comes in various forms; it could be death (which 
is inevitable), incapacitation, voluntary retirement or end of term in cases where the party and 
the state constitutions are clear on limits of term of office. In revolutionary parties and states 
such as ZANU PF where the constitution is silent on term limits people are bound to align 
themselves with factions. 
 
In bridging the generational gap, the ruling party must as a matter of survival adapt itself to 
the dynamic changes within the social-political fabric so as to enhance a healthy osmosis of 
ideas between the old and youthful members of the party (Mataire, 2012). Mataire further 
argues that the youthful members must as a matter of necessity realise that nothing beats 
experience and equally important is for the old to harness and not antagonise the exuberance 
of the youth to ensure that their energy is channelled towards the articulation and execution 
of 
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the party policies. The youth should be treated as an integral part of the main body and 
avenues must be created for their entry into key decision-making positions within the 
structures of the party. For instance, for 15 years Absalom Sikhosana was the leader of the 
ZANU PF youth league in spite of the fact that he was no longer a youth, yet there were 
many younger youths with huge potential to succeed him. 
 
It is also important to highlight the fact that varying social classes or constituencies that make 
up the membership of the revolutionary party have been the source of conflicts and 
contradictions (Mataire 2012). War veterans, ex-detainees, the academia and business people 
must find common ground and not fuel divisions in electing leadership at cell, ward, district 
or provincial levels. Mataire (2012) argues that it is not good for war veterans, for example, 
to field their own candidate as being separate from the generality of the membership. Such 
stratification creates the impression of special treatment, ultimately leading into conflicts. 
 
Corruption is another scourge that has entrenched itself in the revolutionary movement 
whereby those with financial muscle resort to vote-buying to position themselves in strategic 
structures of the party. ZANU PF allowed corruption to spread like a cancer which has totally 
permeated into every fabric of its structures and levels. Bad precedence has been set by the 
President by failing to severely punish corrupt ministers and other officials, to an extent that 
it has become a ‘culture’ to be corrupt and get away with it. Mataire (2012) cites the ZANU-
PF election manifesto of 1990 as an example of a case that illustrates the party’s position on 
corruption. The manifesto stated that leaders who took part in any form of corruption or 
irregular practices, or those who deviate from the leadership code, would no longer be 
accepted or allowed to continue holding positions of leadership…” If ZANU PF had 
preserved its liberation ethos as espoused in the popular liberation song from Mao TseTung 
“KuneNziraDzemagamba” (Code of Soldiers), it would have succeeded in rooting out 
corrupt tendencies. 
 
 
President Mugabe should be consistent in punishing or disciplining corrupt leaders instead of 
applying the law selectively. 
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4.2 Press Representation of ZANU PF Succession Battles 
 
The stated controlled media represented ZANU PF succession battles through a ‘selection 
and silence’ lens, whereby some issues are given the status of “sacred cows” while others are 
excluded from “scrutiny” through control of the means of communication (Nyamufukudza 
2005: 20). Nyamufukudza (2005) argues that insisting particular issues are out of bounds is a 
“means and method of oppression, of silencing certain imaginaries that could better heal 
society. It ensures that legitimate concerns of society remain unattended” (Moyo, 2014: 5). 
This suggests that the state-owned media’s attempt to exclude certain voices from the 
marketplace of ideas is a form of silencing those voices. Thus, in the state-owned press, there 
is no room for non-partisan discussions. This situation creates an environment whereby 
society is “able to live comfortably with contradictions, lies and even deliberate mystification 
of perfectly explainable social phenomena” (Nyamufukudza, 2005: 21). 
 
The state-owned press in Zimbabwe focuses more on denying obvious political problems, 
thus leading to the conclusion that rulers are less preoccupied with the idea of attempting to 
solve social, economic and political problems and more worried by denying the existence of 
such issues. Hence, in the state-owned newspapers, openly encouraging the succession 
debate in ZANU PF was regarded as taboo. Hence possible contenders like Vice President 
Joice Mujuru were not given a platform to express their views, but instead were accused of 
plotting to assassinate President Mugabe. 
 
However, the privately-owned press, which is critical of the government was more daring in 
reporting on ZANU PF’s succession battles and factionalism, and would quote anonymous 
ZANU PF officials’ views on the sensitive and emotive subject. As the fourth estate, the 
privately-owned press plays a critical role “informing the public about what happens in the 
world, particularly in those areas in which audiences do not possess direct knowledge or 
experience” (Harper 2013). 
 
In order to consider how the succession within ZANU PF could unfold, it is instructive to 
look at past succession to positions within the Presidium and factional battles (Matyszak, 
2014). Nevertheless, it is crucial to consider the notion that ZANU PF keeps mum on 
succession mechanisms, especially when one examines President Mugabe’s speech after 
‘winning’ 2013 elections. 
 
 
 
 
99 
Mugabe said that: 
 
The principles we learn must continue to govern us that those in front must depend on those in the 
grassroots. We are leaders because there are people who support us, good leaders of course. Let us be 
with our people. 
 
Significant to note is the fact that ZANU PF has kept a tight rein on any official statements or 
thoughts related to the issue of succession in Zimbabwe. Reports concerning those vying for 
the presidency are usually based on conjecture and political gossip. The conventional 
wisdom in Zimbabwe is that there are two main factions within ZANU PF contending for the 
presidency on Mugabe’s departure, those who are grouped around the late Solomon Mujuru 
and are now grouped around his wife Joice Mujuru, and those grouped around Emmerson 
Mnangagwa. However, it has also been suggested recently that those formerly aligned to 
Solomon Mujuru now rally around Sydney Sekeramayi as Mugabe’s successor. The Standard 
24 June, 2012 published an article titled: “Generals Ditch Mujuru in Succession Struggle”. 
News Day of 17 April 2014 also had a similar heading in an article titled: “Sekeramayi 
Emerges as Likely Mugabe Successor”. It is important to highlight that neither Mujuru nor 
Mnangagwa admit that they lead factions – it has become a myth on their denial for reasons 
best known to them. 
 
Matyszak (2014:23) reckons that both the “Mujuru” and “Mnangagwa” factions have 
advanced differing and expedient perspectives on the manner in which the presidium of 
ZANU PF is to be constituted to advance the cause of favoured candidates to the posts. The 
blurring of the lines between ZANU PF as a party and the state has been a hallmark of 
Zimbabwe’s polity since 1980, and is reflected in the ZANU PF Constitution itself- that 
ZANU PF will always be the ruling party because it is the sole legitimate voice of the people 
of Zimbabwe. Such statements reflect ZANU PF’s ambition on the one party state which was 
challenged by the late Edgar Tekere. One manifestation of this is the confluence of the Party 
presidium and State presidium. 
 
The state and ZANU PF Constitution both establish the posts of a president and two vice-
presidents. Those holding the posts under the State Constitution have always been the same 
individuals who hold the posts under the Party Constitution (Matyszak, 2014). With Mugabe 
having the unfettered discretion to appoint both Vice - Presidents under the State 
Constitution, this power affects the process under the party Constitution. Combined with the 
fact that there is no unequivocal statement of term limits for the Presidium under the ZANU 
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PF Constitution, a sector within ZANU PF, and particularly the Presidium itself, which of 
course included Joice Mujuru, then advanced the notion that unless there is a “vacancy” in 
the presidium, the nominations from the Provinces prior to Congress for the top three 
position are a mere formality in the same way as the People’s Conference is required yearly 
to declare the President of the party as the ZANU PF candidate for the State Presidency. 
Mugabe and his supporters have thus adopted the refrain that “there is no vacancy in the 
Presidium”. For instance, The Herald of 9 June, 2014 published an article titled: “No 
Vacancies in the Presidium”, while the Zimbabwe Independent 6 June, 2014 had an article 
titled “No Vacancy for President, Mujuru Told” This suggests that Mujuru had fallen out 
with Mugabe and the writing was on the wall that press representations depict Mujuru to 
have fallen out of favour from President Mugabe. The writing was already on the wall for 
Mujuru and her allies. Mugabe had never told Mujuru that there was no vacancy in the 
Presidium. Before she was expelled from ZANU PF, Mujuru and her supporters sought to 
advance the view that she was number two in the party, implying that her ascendance to the 
presidency merely required endorsement. 
 
Those challenging these views were labelled factionalists, opportunists and sell-outs causing 
dissention within the party (Matyszak, 2014). The Sunday Mail of 13 April 2014 published 
an article titled “Mujuru blasts opportunists”, while The Zimbabwean of 11 September 2013 
carried a news article with a heading, ‘Mujuru is Next: Gumbo “. The Financial Gazette of 
17 April 2014 also published a similar article titled “Intense Intrigues in Zanu PF 
Succession”. The statement by Gumbo suggests that Mujuru was Mugabe’s natural 
successor, a view that was disputed by the Mnangagwa faction which contended that fresh 
elections for all posts within the Presidium must take place every five years by way of 
nominations from the provinces. The Mnangagwa faction’s view was that these nominations 
are not merely a formal and automatic endorsement of the incumbents (Matyszak, 2014). 
 
ZHRNGOF and RAU (2014) assert that a second fault line dividing the Mujuru and 
Mnangagwa camps is a result of the Unity Accord which absorbed Joshua Nkomo’s PF 
ZAPU party into ZANU PF in December 1987. The accord ended the Gukurahundi in which 
an estimated 20 000 people in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces were killed by the 5
th
 
Brigade deployed to the region ostensibly to crush PF ZAPU aligned “dissidents.” 
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It is alleged that Mnangagwa was the brains behind the atrocities but this is sensitive subject 
in ZANU PF. One section of ZANU PF claims that there was an unwritten pact between 
ZANU PF and PF ZAPU that the four posts in the Presidium would be shared between the 
two liberation parties, with ZANU PF occupying the presidency and a vice presidential post, 
and PF ZAPU take the other vice presidential position and the post of National Chairman 
since the power base of PF ZAPU is in Matabeleland, the further inference by some is that 
the PF ZAPU posts will be held by members of the majority ethnic group in Matabeleland, 
the Ndebele. RAU (2014) argues that while some factions within ZANU PF might wish to 
exploit ethnic considerations, some political observers have cautioned against using ethnicity 
as an analytical lens for understanding ZANU PF internal dynamics. For several years, and 
most obviously in the aftermath of Mugabe’s electoral defeat in March 2008 (when those 
heading the security sectors stepped in to make sure Mugabe’s “victory” in the presidential 
run-off election in June), it has been evident that the President and any aspirant to the 
presidency are heavily dependent on support from security sector. 
 
It is important to highlight that there was early manoeuvering on succession battles in the 
ruling party, from the time the executive presidency was created, and the Unity Accord 
signed in 1987, there was little challenge to the triumvirate of Robert Mugabe as President 
and Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda as Vice- Presidents. The only position which 
admitted any fluidity was that of National Chairman a possible future stepping stone to the 
Vice – Presidency on the demise of any of the two Vice – Presidents (Matyszak, 2014). 
Positioning and manoeuvering around the issue of succession to President Mugabe began as 
early as 1999, when sectors within ZANU PF were beginning to view President Mugabe as 
an electoral liability (Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe 2014; RAU and ZHRNGOF, 2014). 
 
The Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions firstly locked horns following the death, on 1 July 
1999, of Joshua Nkomo, and then the PF ZAPU nominated Vice President. Pursuant to what 
PF ZAPU member has described as a series of “secret meetings”, the National party 
Chairman, Joseph Msika was “elected” as the new Vice – President by the congress that 
convened in December 1999. News Day of 21 December 2011 published an article titled 
“ZANU PF tried to impose Nkomo Successor”. The article quoted Dumiso Dabengwa, the 
leader of the revived ZAPU. Although a member of PF ZAPU, and raised in Matabeleland, 
Joseph Msika was Zezuru, the same ethnic group as President Mugabe. 
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This caused disgruntlement within PF ZAPU who felt that Msika had been imposed from 
above, and not being Ndebele, was not an appropriate representative of the Matabeleland 
Provinces. However, being fourth in the Presidium hierarchy and previously second in 
command to Joshua Nkomo within ZAPU, his elevation to the vice- presidency was not 
overtly contentious (Matyszak, 2014). 
 
The promotion of Joseph Msika to the vice-presidency left the position of National 
Chairperson open, and Mnangagwa threw his hat into the ring for this position. Had he 
succeeded in the quest, he would have been in pole position to succeed Vice-President Simon 
Muzenda, also a Karanga, and within reach of the Presidency after Mugabe’s departure 
(Matyszak, 2014). It was apparently astute political manoeuvering by Solomon Mujuru, 
however, that secured the nomination of John Nkomo, an Ndebele, from eight of the ten 
provinces. As an Ndebele Nkomo was unlikely rival to Solomon Mujuru’s choice for the 
Vice – Presidency when the opportunity arose – as it did with the death of Simon Muzenda 
on 20 September 2003. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 The Tsholotsho Saga 
 
The “Tsholotsho Declaration” refers to a meeting organized by a ZANU PF faction led by 
Emmerson Mnangagwa, which allegedly sought to remove President Robert Mugabe from 
power in 2004. The meeting was held at Dinyane Secondary School in the Tsholotsho 
District of Matabeleland North Province. It became a very sensitive issue in ZANU PF to an 
extent that some ruling party stalwarts were expelled from the party, while others were 
demoted. With the vacancy in the Vice – Presidency, after the death of Simon Muzenda, the 
appointment of a successor was never going to be easy. Mugabe and ZANU PF were, 
however, seemingly content to wait for the ZANU PF Congress of December 2004 before 
filling the vacancy. 
 
According to Matyszak (2014), a bruising battle took place between the Mujuru and 
Mnangagwa camps in the intervening period, from which the Mujuru camp emerged the 
stronger. CCZ (2014) argues that intrigue has defined Mugabe’s post-colonial leadership 
style as he constantly out manoeuvered competition in his own party. Those who have tried 
to challenge him using the internal party process have often been outwitted or have been 
forced to leave the party. Cases in point are Edgar Tekere’s departure in 1989 and Simba 
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Makoni’s breakaway in 2008 out of frustration. Following ZANU’S merger with ZAPU in 
1987 through the signing of Unity Accord, Mugabe has managed to maintain a delicate 
balance where cadres from ZANU PF have occupied the second Vice-President’s position, 
with Shona always holding the first Vice-President’s position. An attempt to upset this trend 
was ruthlessly suppressed in October 2004 when a planned secret meeting by six provincial 
chairpersons of the party and senior leaders to scuttle the ascendency of Joice Mujuru to the 
post of Vice-President was aborted after it was interrupted by state intelligence. 
 
ZHRNGOF and RAU (2014) contend that after a series of meetings in August 2003, headed 
by provincial chairmen and provincial governors, presided over by the national political 
commissar, it was clear that Mnangagwa had the support for the Vice-Presidency from all 
except three provinces – Mashonaland Central, Harare, and Mashonaland East. 
 
The Mujuru alignment, which included elements from the three disaffected provinces, came 
together shortly after these meetings began. A strategy was devised whereby the gender issue 
was to be used to undermine the Mnangagwa group. The Mujuru camp thus latched upon a 
resolution, first put forward by the Women’s League at its August 1999 meeting in Victoria 
Falls, that one of the four members of the Presidium must be a woman. Apparently, the 
league had threatened to boycott the forthcoming December Congress if its demands were 
not met. Ironically, given subsequent events and that she is now regarded as being very 
firmly on the Mnangagwa side of the fence, Oppah Muchinguri as Deputy Secretary of the 
Women’s League, reportedly played a key role in driving the proposal. 
 
The Women’s League was prevailed upon to repeat its demand at its preliminary meeting of 
2 September 2004, (which was then headed by Thenjiwe Lesabe). Accompanied by his wife 
Grace, Mugabe attended the meeting and announced that he supported this demand. Mugabe 
seemed poised to frustrate anyone harbouring presidential ambitions and that way he is kept 
balanced between factions to remain in power. The Mnangagwa faction was unimpressed, 
therefore plotted to out-manoeuver Mujuru group. However, a September 2004 resolution by 
the Women’s League saw Mujuru being nominated for the Vice-Presidency, although a 
group linked to long time Presidential aspirant Mnangagwa had planned to nominate him for 
the post ahead of the December congress. According to CCZ (2014), a livid Mugabe 
suspended the six chairpersons and later demoted Mnangagwa to an obscure ministerial 
portfolio for going against a party position. Jonathan Moyo was removed from the Politburo 
(and subsequently the party, and also as Minister of Information). 
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What is interesting to note is that succession battles and factionalism continue to unfold in 
the ruling party. Many events have since occurred in the revolutionary party and tables 
continue to be turned as this thesis unravels the drama. 
 
4.4 Grace Mugabe’s Entry into Main Stream Politics 
 
“People say I want to be president, why not? Am I not Zimbabwean?” The 49-year old said 
when addressing veterans of the county’s liberation struggle at her farm in Mazowe. 
Zimbabwe’s First Lady Grace Mugabe has announced her candidacy to succeed her 
husband, 90-year-old President Robert Mugabe, when he leaves (Mail & Guardian, October 
23, 2014). 
 
First Lady, Grace Mugabe’s entry into active politics can be understood from Oppah 
Muchinguri, the former Secretary of ZANU PF’s Women’s League’s description of the First 
Lady as “…an Angel, a Queen and the nation’s own Cremora” in reference to her near-
perfect being, as well as her philanthropic disposition. 
 
Therefore, the ascendancy of Grace Mugabe and her vicious attacks on Joice Mujuru is a 
manifestation of the resurrection of a historically stated intent by Mugabe to rule till death. 
Grace Mugabe was introduced into the political terrain to stem perceived and real aspirations, 
especially by Mujuru and her backers to ascend to the Presidency during Mugabe’s life time. 
A Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition publication titled “Protracted Road to Transition: Dissecting 
Zimbabwe’s succession Conundrum” (2014) reveals attempts to link current developments 
and discourses in ZANU PF politics to the late1980s aspirations by Mugabe for a one-party 
state, which Zimbabwe seems to be now. In addition, it links this one-party state discourse to 
the “life presidency” aspirations of Robert Mugabe, and perhaps the possibilities of a 
matrimonial succession, which would allow Mugabe to rule from both his death bed, and the 
graveyard (CCZ, 2014:7). 
 
Developments around the succession question actually point to what could be one of the 
biggest national challenges at the moment; a leadership crisis that is characterised by 
leadership aspirations that is steeped towards the acquisition of power more than 
transformation of people’s lives. A leadership that is bent on the ‘will to power’ is 
preoccupied with its own interests and personal aggrandisement, and instrumentalises the 
same to promote personal, fraternal and factional interests. 
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While a leadership that is preoccupied with the ‘will to transform’ seeks power to discipline 
it, it uses it for the benefit of the masses, and transforms it and the systems that support it, for 
the good of the people. It can be argued that recent and current developments with regard to 
the ‘succession question’ in ZANU PF and Zimbabwean, including the definite entry into 
Zimbabwe’s mired political field of First Lady “DR” Grace Mugabe, and Mugabe’s 
continuous hold of power are denotative of his unfinished quest for a one party-state in 
Zimbabwe and pursuit of the life presidency project. 
 
Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (2015) argues that the orderly transfer of power from one 
political leader to another is a litmus test for the stability and legitimacy of a political system 
and the success to which the transfer is orderly conducted posits the maturity of the political 
system. Throughout history, succession to power has been one of the trickiest political 
problems faced by politics, no matter what kind of political infrastructure they run. ZDI 
(2015) further contends that in prehistoric tribes as much as in modern countries, who 
becomes the new leader whenever the incumbent paramount dies, the term of office expires, 
renounces or loses his capacity to rule, has been and is a tough political problem, for it can 
very easily and frequently cause fights between candidates to ascend to the throne. The 
transfer of power from one individual to the other has become more of a crisis of stability 
and survival of the political system particularly in personalised, charismatic and powerful 
monolithic parties such as ZANU PF. In Zimbabwe, the issue of presidential succession has 
been a thorny one since independence as the ruling ZANU PF has declared it is the only 
legitimate party to rule this country. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the second part of the device was to increase Grace Mugabe’s political 
capital by placing her at the Secretary of ZANU PF Women’s League. While the league was 
then headed by Oppah Muchinguri, Muchinguri is likely to have stepped aside willingly 
(from her confessions) in the hope that Grace Mugabe and by extension, President Mugabe, 
would elevate her into senior Politburo post then possibly into the presidium as a reward. The 
then ascending of the Mujuru faction made it probable that Muchinguri would in any event 
have lost the position to Olivia Muchena a Mujuru ally, who had long coveted the post at the 
impending Women’s League Conference. This was hinted by Muchinguri herself in The 
Herald of 18 October 2014 in the article titled “Why I let post go: Muchinguri”. 
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The Zimbabwean Independent of 17 September 2014 also published an article titled “Knife-
edge tension at Women’s League Conference” in which Muchinguri declared surrendering 
the post. The tension that characterised this conference was reminiscent of the 2009 
Women’s League Congress. 
 
With Muchinguri being part of the plotters (the four leaders were later referred to as the 
“gang of four”) who were hoping to ensure that both Vice-Presidential positions were vacant 
by the time of the Congress, it should be recalled that the ZANU PF constitution then 
prescribed that one VP had to be a woman. Muchinguri hoped that the post of the party 
Secretary for Administration would also become vacant so that she could have been 
confident that surrendering her position as head of the Woman’s League would have been 
merely a prelude to obtaining higher post. It is also ironic that Oppah Muchinguri played a 
key role in having Joice Mujuru elevated to the post of Vice-President in 2004, yet she 
(Muchinguri) was now plotting for the expulsion of Mujuru, her fellow cadre. Within ZANU 
PF, anything other than the unrestrained eulogisation of Mugabe is considered a blasphemy 
(Matyszak, 2015). The Standard of 8 February, 2015 published an article titled ‘Mugabe: a 
God-given Leader- Kasukuwere.” 
 
Mugabe is depicted as divinely appointed – an example of exaggerated outlandish praise in 
order to gain favours. Accordingly, one means by which each faction within ZANU PF has 
traded barbs has been to accuse the other of disloyalty towards the party leaders. This attitude 
resonates with the concept of “We’’ are right and “They” are wrong. It would seem the ruling 
party’s philosophy is … if you are not with us, you are against us, which is narrow and 
fallacious. 
 
Van Dijk (1998:69) argues: “ideologies are representations of who we are, what we stand for, 
what our values are, and what our relationships are with other groups, in particular our 
enemies or opponents, that is those who oppose what we stand for, threaten our interest and 
present us from equal access to social resources and human rights.” In other words, an 
ideology is a self-serving schema for the representation of Us and Them as social groups. 
Van Dijk (1998:33) maintains that many group ideologies involve the representation of Self 
and Others, Us and Them. Many therefore seem to be polarised – we are Good and They are 
Bad, ‘We’ group is presented in a favourable light and the ‘They’ group unfavourably. This 
ideological polarisation consists of ‘emphasising our good properties/ actions; emphasising 
their bad properties/actions, mitigating our bad properties/actions; and mitigating their good 
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properties/ actions” (Kuo & Nakamura 2005: 410). Few believed that Grace Mugabe would 
have been elected as Secretary of the Women’s League without Mugabe’s consent. Matyszak 
(2015) reckons that the proposal had to be considered as beyond reproach. Criticism directed 
at Grace Mugabe’s ascendency would be conceived as a criticism of Mugabe, and could be 
used as a club to bludgeon opponents or to raise complaints about them to Mugabe. 
 
Under the guise of campaigning for Grace Mugabe’s appointment and showing support, 
provincial committees rushed to nominate Grace as their “candidate” for the Central 
Committee. ‘Matabeleland Backs First Lady’s Endorsement” and “Harare offers First Lady 
Key Slot” were headlines that appeared in The Herald of 28 July 2014 and 27 August 2014 
respectively. The committees were joined in their show of support by numerous other 
individuals and bodies, the youth league, church groups among others. For example, 
“Leagues Throw Weight behind Amai (Mother) Grace Mugabe”, was the headline of an 
article published in The Herald of 29 July, 2014. The Herald of 8 August 2014 had “Youths 
Endorse Amai Mugabe”. The endorsement of the First Lady was expected to be a foregone 
conclusion within ZANU PF structures, arguably out of fear of “Big Brother.” Consequently, 
the government controlled press represented the first family in positive light. 
 
Worth noting was the fact that none of the privately-owned press published similar articles, 
instead, they heavily criticised the First Lady’s conferment of a doctorate which has been a 
controversial issue in Zimbabwe. Gitlin (1980) argues that news frames are replicated across 
the journalistic profession where they assume a natural process of selection and omission 
leading to stereotypes. This thesis argues that private media deliberately did not report on 
Grace Mugabe’s endorsement because of their ideological inclination. 
 
A period of “Grace Mania” was followed by praise singing about the First Lady and 
numerous vehicles in the cities, particularly Harare were emblazoned with posters carrying 
her image (Matyszak, 2015). All state institutions, be they universities, colleges, 
polytechnics, parastatals and even privately owned organisations joined to congratulate the 
First Lady. 
 
It has become a norm and culture in Zimbabwe to express solidarity when President Mugabe 
makes appointments of similar nature. The Mnangagwa faction controlled state newspapers, 
The Herald, The Sunday Mail, Sunday News, The Chronicles, and electronic media also set 
into motion saturation coverage of the First Lady’s activities, marked by a slick of 
obsequiousness (Matyszak, 2015). 
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Every flattery by eager cadres was dutifully reproduced. An agenda was set for the 
Zimbabwean society. As McCombs and Yuksel (2004:328) argue: “Agenda setting theory 
basically explains how and why the public learn how much importance to attach to a topic 
from the emphasis placed on it in news coverage”. The mass media sets the agenda for public 
attention and lay the groundwork for public opinion. In short, this is “ the idea that the media 
don’t tell people what to think, but what to think about” (Baran and Davis 2003:311). 
 
The Daily News 9 October 2014 published an article titled “Grace Mugabe for President”. In 
the article, Oppah Muchinguri was reported to have referred to Grace Mugabe as the “Queen 
Mother. The Queen of the Queens…” Such representation is suggestive of a to-be crowned 
president. Such flattery was a means to gain ultimate recognition for yearned promotion 
which, when denied, may cause frustration and even deep hate. According to Matyszak 
(2015), the encomium around Grace Mugabe and her new political prominence may have 
been overdone by the plotters. It was such that it led to speculation that the public was being 
prepared for her to be appointed to one of the Vice-Presidential positions at congress, and a 
prelude to her ascendance to the presidency. 
 
With Grace Mugabe having been elevated to the party hierarchy the stage was set for the next 
act of the plot. A decision was taken that she would address rallies in each of the country’s 
ten provinces. The central theme of Grace Mugabe’s speeches was factionalism within the 
party. She would be presented as someone who would unify the party and expunge the 
scourge of factionalism. Her well-meaning efforts in this regard would be treated as spurned 
by Mujuruites (a term coined to refer to those aligned to Mujuru), and the idea appears to 
have been that she would slowly ratchet up the pressure, and, carefully monitoring any 
backlash from the Mujuruites, gradually increasing both the intensity of the attacks on those 
claimed to be fanning factionalism (Matyszak, 2015). It is interesting and curious to note that 
throughout Grace Mugabe’s speeches in all ten provinces in which she viciously attacked 
Joice Mujuru; President Mugabe did not make any comment or restrain his wife. 
 
Mugabe was apparently incensed with Mujuru as a result. Mujuru responded by denying that 
she had any ambition to take over the presidency and countered that the allegations were 
themselves a plot to remove her from the Vice-Presidency, asking Mugabe “Is this the way 
you want to remove me from the Vice Presidency?” Mugabe reportedly responded that “it is 
the people who elect leaders“. “Mugabe, Mujuru in Stormy Meeting”, The Zimbabwean 
Independent 22.08.14). 
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Mujuru’s ally, Webster Shamu, accused the youths of trying to foment a ‘Nhari type” 
rebellion against Mujuru. “Nhari” and others rebelled against ZANU PF Leadership in 
Zambia; most of the members were killed in 1974. Mugabe did not take any action at the 
State House gathering, simply referring the matter to the next Politburo meeting for 
consideration. Despite Mugabe’s obvious displeasure with them Mujuru and her allies were 
not cowed. 
 
Days after Mugabe left Zimbabwe for China, the very next week, on 23 August, 2014; 
Mujuruites proceeded with an immediate attempt to purge the Youth League of some key 
members considered hostile. Harare Province Youth League leader, Godwin Gomwe was 
first in the firing line, while Temba Mliswa reportedly led moves to remove Vengai Musengi 
and his deputy Joseph Nyariri in Mashonaland West. The Herald of 27 August 2014 
represented this purge in an article titled “Youths Targeted in ZANU PF Purge”. 
 
The state controlled press intended to instigate emotions so that the President would react on 
the perpetrators. I can argue that the press was at the forefront in exacerbating and fanning 
factionalism. In a normal situation the media is supposed to report events and individuals in a 
manner aimed to resolve conflict and not to fuel it. On the day of the scheduled Politburo 
meeting, 3 September 2014, The Herald published a significant editorial, which seemed to be 
an unprecedented criticism of Mugabe. The editorial (which reflects the official line) 
bemoaned the fact that “no heads had rolled” as a result of the “bhora musango” [ball off-
target] campaign, no heads had rolled following the provincial elections the previous year 
despite “vote-buying and manipulation” and no heads had yet rolled over the vote-buying in 
the Women’s and Youth League elective conferences. ZANU PF’s inaction on saboteurs 
since 2008 explains the prevailing problems. 
 
‘Unless those behind the Shenanigans are made to answer for their actions, they will continue 
their nefarious agenda in the knowledge that nothing will happen to them. To this end we 
hope and we are sure we speak for the generality of Zimbabweans, that the special politburo 
meeting will not be another talk show. Heads must roll or must be seen to roll to foster 
discipline down to the grassroots. Where the alleged irregularities are proved, results must be 
nullified so that intra-party democracy triumphs’ (The Herald, 3 September, 2014]) ‘Time 
ZANU PF Showed Some Teeth” (editorial) and “Politburo Urged To be Decisive” (The 
Herald 3 September 2014). 
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The Herald took a partisan position dictating to President Mugabe and the Politburo what 
decision they should make. The Herald’s agenda was clear, instigating, exacerbating and 
fuelling conflict. The editor of this state owned newspaper seemed to be the mouthpiece and 
conduit of the elite, particularly the Mnangagwa faction which controlled the pro-government 
newspapers. The Herald’s allegiance to the ruling party is unquestionable but its reportage 
fans factionalism and divides the party instead of building peace and fostering unity in the 
liberation movement. What is important to note is that before 2013 most government owned 
media which have a left leaning and subscribe to ‘pan-Africanist’ ideology were always pro-
ZANU PF, but it can be argued that post-2013 they aligned themselves to a particular faction 
in the ruling party. 
 
“ZANU PF’S inaction” can only be read to mean that of Mugabe, and The Herald could not 
have been urging or have expected the Mujuruites dominated politburo to take action – the 
call was really for Mugabe to exercise his powers as leader and act “decisively “. “Time 
ZANU PF Showed Some Teeth” and “Politburo Urged to be Decisive” (The Herald 3.09.14). 
The result of the Youth and Women’s League Conference elections were allowed to stand. 
This was represented in The Herald of 14 September 2014 in an article titled “Politburo 
Upholds Conference Results”. The Daily News of 5 September 2014 published an article 
with headline “Mujuru Prevails”. 
 
From the Daily News headline, it can be argued the newspaper clearly had an agenda to 
support Mujuruites. It can be argued that the two dailies were opposed on their agenda 
setting. Although it can be argued that the privately owned press generally supports or is 
sympathetic to opposition parties, in this scenario, it sympathises with the Mujuruites, who in 
a way represent the “opposition”. May be the private press’ could explain the claimed 
‘middle of the road’ approach when it comes to reporting issues, events or personalities. The 
question this thesis may raise is: is this consistent and sustainable? 
 
4.5 Mnangagwa Faction Strategy 
 
This section attempts to examine press presentation of one faction in the ruling ZANU PF 
party. The media played a key role in fuelling factionalism. Parent (1993) argues that framing 
is achieved in the way in which news is packaged, the amount of exposure, the tone of the 
presentation, the accompanying headlines and visual effects, and the labelling and 
vocabulary employed. 
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It should be underscored that even President Robert Mugabe was now aware that there state 
controlled media was fanning factionalism. Therefore, there was no more pretence that 
government owned media was pro a faction in ZANU PF. 
 
With Mugabe in his 91
st
 year ahead of the congress, the build-up to the congress was 
destined to be fraught with controversies as those seeking to succeed Mugabe strategically 
positioned themselves. A key factor in their positioning was control of the provinces. Until 
its development, the ZANU-PF party constitution provided that the provinces submitted to 
congress their candidates for the presidium and central committee. 
 
Although these candidates would be elected by congress, in practice they were merely 
endorsed. It thus caused considerable alarm to the “Mnangagwa faction” that the provincial 
executive council elections at the end of 2013 delivered nine of the ten provinces Mujuru. 
Complaints about the manifest electoral improprieties around these elections were ignored by 
Mugabe and the Politburo. A fight back strategy was required. 
 
Matyszak (2015) contends that Plan A was for the Mnangagwa faction to use its control of 
the media to undermine Mujuru. A series of exposures of “obscene salaries” being earned by 
top officials began to appear in the state owned press. The privately owned press also 
reported on the “salary- gate” extensively. The tactic did nothing other than to incur the ire of 
President Mugabe, who in a public address called his Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo, 
believed to control state media, a “weevil”. Didymus Mutasa, the party Secretary for 
Administration followed the cue given by the President, stating that weevils must be dealt 
with by “Gamatox”, a long banned insecticide (Matyszak, 2015:1). Thus, the two camps 
became known as “weevils” and “Gamatox” or “Team Weevils versus Team Gamatox”. The 
Standard, of June 8 to 14, 2014 published an article titled ‘Moyo’s' World Crumbles’. The 
article reported that during a politburo meeting, Mugabe initially ordered the dismissal of 
editors who had been appointed by Moyo claiming that they were sourced from institutions 
that were advocating for “regime change”. 
 
Speaking at the funeral of ZANU-PF Politburo member, Nathan Shamuyarira at the National 
Heroes Acre, Mugabe hinted about an impending crackdown on what he described as “party 
weevils” that were destroying the ruling party from within. Mugabe had accused Moyo of 
using the media to fan divisions in the party. Mushava and Moyo (2015) quoted President 
Mugabe saying: “Even in ZANU-PF, we have the weevils. But should we keep them? No. 
Even our youth are already infested with the weevils.” 
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The President (and his wife Grace) seemed to have been persuaded also that Didymus 
Mutasa and other “Gamatoxes” were plotting to remove him from power at the impending 
congress and install Vice-President Joice Mujuru in his stead (Matyszak, 2015). Mugabe 
appears to have given a green light to Moyo, a group which became known as the gang of 
four, leading a larger group of twelve dubbed the “clean dozen” to prevent the plot and rid 
the party of senior Mujuru allies. 
 
 
It would seem that although President Mugabe does not trust Jonathan Moyo he cannot do 
without him for propaganda purposes (he is a necessary “weevil”). According to Matyszak 
(2015), the means by which this was to be accomplished was partly through Grace Mugabe, 
who, as Mugabe’s wife, was rightly judged to be immune from criticism. With her status first 
elevated as incoming head of the Women’s League Grace Mugabe began a campaign to 
denounce “factionalism”, which, with the aid of the state media was constructed as 
synonymous with Mujuruites. Rather than two factions competing for power, media 
propaganda created the image of a solid ZANU-PF headed by Mugabe under the attack from 
a “putschist cabal”. 
 
 
Matyszak (2015:2) further argues that; “with the ground thus prepared by Grace Mugabe, the 
plotters set about gaining control of the provinces.” Mugabe directed that the suspensions of 
the Youth League members were to be reversed and, it seems, that there were to be no further 
suspensions of party members before congress to prevent the ongoing chaos in the party. The 
Daily News of 12 October 2014 published an article titled “Suspended ZANU-PF members 
Appeal to Khaya Moyo” while The Herald of 4 September 2014 carried a story with a 
headline “Harare Province Defies Politburo Directive”. The newspaper representations of 
anarchy in the ruling party had become the agenda in Zimbabwean society. The Herald 
seemed to whip the president’s emotions again after it earlier instigated in its editorial, as 
previously discussed, that the Politburo “…should show teeth.” 
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4.6 Press Representation of Grace Mugabe’s Nationwide Rallies 
 
 
 
Zimbabwe‘s First Lady Grace Mugabe makes her grand entrance into politics following her recent 
nominations as national secretary of the ruling party’s Women’s League through a sensational two 
week-long crusade around the country, whipping supporters into a frenzy and ruffling the feathers of 
Vice President Joice Mujuru…Tapping into party grievances and adopting the Zanu PF Youth 
League’s anti-factionalist slogans to rally support for her husband, Mrs. Mugabe’s movement up the 
Zanu PF ladder adds a new twist to the battle for the president’s succession…”(Zimbabwe – Grace 
 
Mugabe’s rise to power and pole position in succession race 
 
Africa, October 24, 2014). 
 
 
Grace Mugabe’s first rally was held in Chinhoyi, Mashonaland West on 2 October, 2014. 
Mashonaland West is President Mugabe’s home province. The First Lady reportedly 
denounced factionalism, stating that, instead of fighting amongst themselves, the ZANU-PF 
leadership should attend to service delivery (Matyszak, 2015). Throughout her rallies 
factionalism was the First Lady’s leitmotif. With regard to those leading the “factions”, 
Mugabe’s wife stated: 
 
 
We have been hearing that some people have been leading factions for a long time and now 
we hear that they are receiving money from the US to remove President Robert Mugabe…we 
see then dancing… here as if they love the President, they are good at chanting slogans in the 
public, but deep down their hearts don’t love him… At night, they are plotting his ouster 
claiming that he is old hence he must go so that they take over (Daily News 14 October 
 
2014). 
 
 
The Standard, 2 November 2014 published an article with the headline ‘Mugabe to blame for 
ZANU – PF fights! (Feluna Nleya)’ The article reported that Mujuru’s alleged ties with the 
West were revealed in the whistle-blower website Wiki Leaks cables which suggested that 
she clandestinely met with former US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Charles Ray “under cover 
of darkness” in December 6, 2009, after dodging her security and the Central Intelligence 
Organisation. The Whistle-Blower website also exposed that other senior ZANU-PF officials 
such as Jonathan Moyo and Savior Kasukuwere met with officials from the US Embassy. 
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The newspaper article also quoted political analysts, Ibbo Mandaza and Charles Mangongera 
who concurred in accusing Mugabe of propping up a faction and then crushing it when it 
threatens his interests. The article further claimed that Mujuru fell out of favour with Mugabe 
because of her “soft spot for the West”. 
 
It should be noted how newspapers choose their sources. Journalists rely on sources to write 
their stories. Ogenga (2010) asserts that sources have the power to decide what information 
they withhold or give out to journalists depending on the interests they have on a particular 
issue. Journalists tend to form symbiotic relationships with sources with authority, credibility 
and those who are readily available. In this symbiotic relationship, some sources become 
more utilised than others (McGregor, 1997). The sources mainly utilised are usually 
government and credible officials since they are recognisable and credible owing to their 
status of prestige which makes the audiences easily trust them (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). 
The symbiotic relationship between journalists and sources, where journalists constantly use 
some and not others creates a powerful frame within which news is constructed. The more 
powerful the source, the more likely he or she will be used in the news production process 
(Ndlela, 2001; Schudson, 2003). In this thesis the selected newspapers used different sources 
to create specific representations. 
 
 
At the second rally, on 6 October, 2014, at the ZANU-PF Conference Centre in Gweru, 
Midlands Province, Grace Mugabe reportedly made the first reference to the need to remove 
Provincial Chairmen, whom she claimed were ineffective, adding that some senior party 
politicians were conspiring with the MDC-T and Western powers (Matyszak, 2015). The 
First Lady is also reported to have castigated those whom she alleged were bribing delegates 
ahead of the December Congress and called on them to desist from the practice. 
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The third rally, in Harare on 8 October, 2014, was billed as a “mini accord” as Grace Mugabe 
portrayed herself as magnanimous by bringing together those who had spoken for and against 
her ascendancy, (see picture above) and as part of a claimed role as the unifier who would 
stamp out factionalism in the party. 
 
 
Photographs and captions dominated the representation of Grace Mugabe rallies as shown 
above. The photographs used were those representing factionalism and Grace as an 
embodiment of unity. An image alone in news is polysemic that is open to a number of 
interpretations. To clarify what the image means and so to make it relevant to the purpose of 
the news, texts are added. Ogenga (2010) contends that the image serves as a ‘hook’ while 
the text anchors meaning. 
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The same photograph takes a different connotation with different accompanying texts. The 
photographs that were used to represent First Lady’s rallies seemed to reinforce the need for 
unity in ZANU PF. The Herald of October 2014 published a story with the headline “Amai 
Mugabe to nip factionalism in the bud;” which reported on the “Meet the People” rally held 
at the City Sports Centre in Harare. Oppah Muchinguri was reported to have said “the 
decision to ask the First Lady, Dr. Grace Mugabe to lead the party organ was meant to stem 
factionalism that had taken root in the party,” (Farai Machivenyika and Felix Share: 2014:2). 
In another story of the same paper titled ‘Unity Accord’ struck in Harare, the First Lady told 
thousands of people at the rally that the day would be historic in the politics of ZANU-PF, 
before unexpectedly calling Midzi and Gomwe to come to the stage where the latter 
apologised. She forged a mini ‘Unity Accord’ between the two as illustrated in the 
photograph above. 
 
 
It is yet to be seen whether her mission to ‘end factionalism’ was accomplished or that the 
party was further divided by her rhetoric, myth and symbolism. Gamson et al in their book 
titled: ‘Media Images & the Construction of Reality’ (1992) argue that the production of 
images rather than facts or information is a more subtle form of meaning construction. Facts, 
as much as images, take on their meaning by being embedded in some larger system of 
meaning or frame. Fiske (1987) suggests that reading media imagery is an active process in 
which context, social location, and prior experience can lead to quite different decoding. In 
the same way photographs utilised in this thesis are subject to different readings as they 
assume particular ideological representations. 
 
 
However, the suggestion that “Mujuruites” were to be forgiven and brought back into fold 
appears to have been abandoned at the rally in Masvingo on 9 October 2014. At this rally, 
Grace Mugabe inched closer to disclosing that Mujuru herself was a prime target and subject 
of her excoriation. She claimed that those who wanted to rule in place of her husband were 
unable to do so and, having been placed in their positions by Mugabe, could just as easily be 
removed (Matyszak, 2015). 
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She is reported to have warned that: 
 
Some of you here were called (by Mugabe) and were warned, but you did not listen. You 
know what’s next. There are many people who can take the job that you have. You are a 
crook. If you harden your head, what if the person you are fighting for loses? What will you 
do? Where will you go…? Most people were being spoon-fed by my husband. He worked for 
them, yet today you hear them saying they want to rule the country. Are you able to rule? 
Leave us alone, you are revolting, you are not able to rule the country (‘I’m Aiming for High 
Post – Grace Mugabe’ (News Day, 10 October 2014). 
 
 
Oppah Muchinguri claimed that the First Lady had an important role to play in the party. She 
stated that: 
 
 
We realised that there were some who wanted to take over from Mugabe but we plotted 
against them and decided to use our mother (Grace Mugabe) to come and take over because 
she is a worthy candidate…We had to do this because it was the same people who are 
undermining us and intimidating us to support their cause to replace baba VaMugabe (father 
Mugabe) but we have put it to an end by the coming in of Amai (mother i.e. Grace Mugabe) 
 
(Daily News, 11 October, 2014). 
 
 
Before Grace Mugabe began her rallies, the initial path was cleared for her. This set the tone 
for her rallies and did not make it appear as if she was promoting maverick policies and 
discussing factionalism which the party had previously wished left out of the public domain. 
The public were aware of the existence of these factions despite the fact that both Mujuru and 
Mnangagwa denied it. There were three significant developments marking this process 
according to Matyszak (2015). Firstly, trenchant criticism of two prominent Mujuruites by 
President Mugabe himself; an outstanding interview with war veteran Christopher 
Mutsvangwa, published in The Herald; and the meeting with the Youth League at State 
House already mentioned. 
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The strident tone of the interview is well captured by this opening salvo by the abrasive war 
veteran in regard to a question referring to “reports” of factionalism within ZANU-PF: 
 
An ambitious coterie of political chancers…has also recruited lumpen elements with criminal 
intent… pursuing a fascist agenda as they employ Nazist tactics to try to wrestle power and 
then proceed to resurrect a post-Rhodesian political agenda. The coterie is totally opposed to 
the revolutionary history of the party whose regalia and banners they are so much wont to 
flaunt. ... Now ever the busy-body Mutasa, he has been angling to abuse the illustrious record 
of another cadre, the Vice President…Mujuru. In a scheme that sidesteps fellow comrades 
who fought alongside her, there is some coaxing at instigation of Mutasa and cohorts on Vice 
President Mujuru to make her challenge His Excellency Mugabe. This conspiracy is directed 
at the man who has given Vice President Mujuru post-independence high offices from the 
onset of the Republic, an honour and recognition that has not been accorded to any other of 
her peers (The Herald, 16 August 2014). 
 
 
Mutsvangwa’s tone was full of vitriol, mockery, denigration and despise. What is of interest 
is that state owned press was setting the agenda and taking sides in fuelling factionalism. 
Mutsvangwa belittled the roles played by Mutasa and, to some extent, Mujuru, in the 
independence war, maintaining that Mutasa was a coward who had done everything possible 
to remove himself from zones of danger and that the legend that Mujuru had downed a 
Rhodesian helicopter, was manufactured by Webster Shamu. The interview was extremely 
significant in the sense that any doubt that the party was not deeply divided had been 
abandoned. And the cause of the division was openly declared to be a plot to oust Mugabe, 
orchestrated by Didymus Mutasa, and with the intent of placing Mujuru as the head of party 
and government. 
 
The Mutsvangwa interview starkly disclosed the depth of the antipathy between the opposing 
camps in ZANU PF. Also remarkable was the fact that Mutsvangwa made such comments 
seemly without fear of many adverse consequences, despite the fact that the party’s National 
Disciplinary Committee was under the control of Mujuru and her allies (Matyszak, 2015). 
When Mujuru-aligned youths and supporters clashed with Grace Mugabe’s supporters at her 
rallies, they claimed that they were not demonstrating against the First Lady herself, but 
rather against the use of the ‘down with Gamatox’ slogan. However, the Zimbabwe National 
Liberation War Veterans leader, Jabulani Sibanda, in a characteristically outspoken manner, 
refused to be cowed. Sibanda is reported to have said that: 
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If you want to find me guilty of not attending the First Lady’s rallies, I plead guilty on that 
one and I won’t attend unless the programme changes. I can’t attend a function where they 
say ‘Pamberi ne (forward with) Mazoe Crush’, 'Pasi ne (down with) Gamatox’. That slogan is 
unknown in Zanu PF---All able-bodied people should stand up --- and block attempts to stage 
 
a  coup,  both in  the  boardroom and  in the  bedroom (  ‘Jabulani  Sibanda  Arrested 
 
Herald, 29 November, 2014). 
 
 
Sibanda was suspended from the party shortly after a politburo meeting and was arrested for 
insulting the President. The foregoing discussion highlights importance of state media 
sources which create particular frames and representations. Gans (1979) further explored the 
relationship between reporters and sources. He argues that the power of official sources, 
combined with the need for efficiency, ultimately structures how news organisations decide 
what news is. 
 
 
Following the First Lady’s comments about Mugabe’s power of appointments, an article 
appeared in The Sunday Mail on 12 October, 2014, arguing that the election of the Presidium 
was the root of factionalism in the party. The article quoted plotter, Patrick Zhuwao, and 
maintained: 
 
 
Observers said this situation saw the non-appointed officials creating their own centers of 
power, which resulted in factionalism that manifested itself in vote-buying, violence, 
intimidation and general disloyalty to the President. They pointed out that the party 
constitution was at loggerheads with the 1987 Unity Accord as regards to how people could 
occupy the two VP posts. Article 4 of the Unity Accord states: “That Zanu PF shall have two 
Second Secretaries and Vice Presidents of the Party” (‘President should Appoint VPs, Chair’ 
 
(The Sunday Mail, 12 October, 2014). 
 
 
This suggests that the plotters were clearly setting the agenda for the December congress. 
Part of the propaganda techniques was to effect repetition, and the state-owned press 
published articles on the issue of President’s appointment powers. At her sixth rally in 
Gwanda, Grace Mugabe made reference to Mugabe’s appointing powers, but compared the 
party and state institutions rather than the party constitution and the Unity Accord as the 
plotters probably intended. 
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 (The 
 
As a result, when reporting on the rally, The Herald of 14 October, 2014, claimed that the 
First Lady’s remarks concerning appointments reflected “growing demands” that the 
President’s powers in this regard be aligned with the Unity Accord. 
 
The media set the agenda based on what the elite intent to decide on so that people are 
prepared slowly to accept the ultimate outcome. The rally in Mutare on 10 October, 2014, 
was significantly the most poorly attended and marked by clashes between youths led by 
Harare leader Godwin Gomwe and those supporting Manicaland supremo Didymus Mutasa. 
Grace Mugabe chided Manicaland province as being the worst culprit as far as factionalism 
was concerned and indirectly criticised party leaders in the province by decrying the 
successes achieved by the opposition MDC-T there. The First Lady’s speech was covered in 
The Herald of 11 October, 2014, in a story titled “Count Me Out of factions-Amai”. 
 
 
The Herald of 14 October, 2014, published a scathing story on VP Mujuru headlined: “First 
 
Lady Tears into VP aspirants”. The newspaper quotes Grace Mugabe saying: 
 
 
Some people like to ride on the back of the President, they think that being Vice President 
means sitting in the office and Mugabe working for them….We don’t want that, we want 
 
people who are capable. We don’t want! We don’t want! We don’t want a liability. We don’t 
want such one who spends time sitting with no ideas… (The Herald 14 October 2014). 
 
 
In addition, Grace Mugabe made repeated and pointed references at this rally to her 
husband’s power to make senior appointments, under both the party and state constitutions, 
stating also that the fact that a person was a Vice-President of the Party did not ensure that 
they would be a Vice-President of the country. 
 
 
The MMPZ’s (2014) comment on media coverage of ZANU PF factional fights notes that the 
state media took sides in ZANU PF factional wars. It expressed concern over the increasingly 
hysterical “news coverage” in the state owned media regarding developments surrounding 
the feuding factions within ZANU PF. The MMPZ (2014) asserts that while these pro-
government media are notorious for denigrating the political opposition, particularly during 
elections, the intensity with which the ruling-party controlled news outlets turned on a 
section of ZANU PF was disturbing. 
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Apart from the publicly owned media having a constitutional obligation to “be impartial” and 
“afford fair opportunity for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions”, 
they resorted to persecuting Vice-President Joice Mujuru and those who allegedly supported 
her. 
 
 
While these events made unsavoury reading for their own crude and offensive assaults on 
Vice-President Mujuru, the state owned media became willing recruits in amplifying the 
hatred and intolerance expressed by Grace Mugabe (MMPZ, 2014). 
 
 
Grace Mugabe publicly accused Mujuru of being corrupt, an extortionist, a “sell-out”, lazy, 
devious and deceitful, incompetent, inept, among other grave allegations, but it would seem 
that this was carefully “choreographed” to prepare for Mugabe’s vitriolic attacks on the Vice-
President and to convince the public of the “truth” of the allegations once made. However, 
most of the non-ZANU PF aligned press had little doubt that, although no names had been 
mentioned, the First Lady’s address was an attack on Joice Mujuru. For example, Daily News 
of 14 October, 2014, published an article with a headline; “Grace Savages Mujuru Again”. 
The headline itself depicts a tone of sympathy which is supported by the content. 
 
 
In her Lupane, Matabeleland North (13 October) and Bulawayo (14 October), Grace Mugabe 
only made covert reference to Mujuru, whom she chided for vying for a vice-presidential 
position. Before she took to the podium, a spat developed between Philip Chiyangwa and 
Temba Mliswa who was believed to be a member of the Mujuru faction chanted the “pasi ne 
(down with) Gamatox” slogan. The last two of Grace Mugabe’s rallies signalled a change in 
tactics. At a closed door provincial committee meeting ahead of the penultimate rally in 
Bindura, Grace Mugabe reportedly revealed the existence and content of the “spy tapes”. The 
attack on Joice Mujuru then recommenced with renewed vigour (Matyszak, 2015). The “spy 
tapes” were part of the scheme and propaganda to finally smear Mujuru. The plotters had to 
spin allegations which had to be covered in the state-owned media, both print and electronic. 
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The repetition of these accusations was craftily engineered for agenda-setting, in order to 
completely destroy Joice Mujuru. News Day of 17 October, 2014, quoted the First lady’ 
saying: 
 
 
The youths have alerted me about someone who is spearheading factionalism in their 
(Mashonaland Central) province and I told Baba (President Mugabe) to ‘baby-dump’ that 
person. I told him that if he does not dump that person, we will do it ourselves----you can no 
longer deny that you are a faction leader. Enough is enough, even those men who are being 
used by this faction leader; we will dump them when we dump that person (News Day 17 
 
October 2014). 
 
 
Grace Mugabe added that: 
 
 
The faction leader is moving around saying Mai Mugabe has money, yet the (same) person 
has diamond mines and has about 10% shares in almost every company. That is greed. That is 
corruption, yet the person goes around saying a lot of rubbish about Amai Mugabe. That is 
why I am saying to Baba (Mugabe), if he does not dump the person in the street to be 
devoured by the dogs, we will do it ourselves. Dumping her is the only way forward, dumping 
the baby so that she can be exposed to the elements. If we expose her, even flies or wild dogs 
will be repulsed with her corrupt activities, which stink (News Day, 17 October 2014). 
 
 
Contrary to her claims when she began her rallies, the First Lady’s speech does not bode well 
for unity or “stemming factionalism in the bud”. The coarse language and vulgarity used by 
the First Lady such as “baby dumping” was out of taste. Such crude language was also used 
at her second rally in Mazowe where she is reported to have said: 
 
 
Do not take unnecessary risks saying you are brave because you will end up being humiliated 
and have children laughing at you. You will be humiliated and left naked and dogs will not 
come near you because you stink, if you have put on perfume---.You are not going to heaven 
because God will not touch your stinking body. And even mosquitoes will not come near you 
 
because you stink 
2014). 
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 (“Go now, Grace orders Mujuru”: Daily News, 18 November, 
 
The Daily News of 17 October, 2014 published an article whose headline read “Grace 
Wants Mujuru Out.” By the 16 October, 2014, Grace Mugabe’s calls for Mujuru’s 
ouster had not only become overt, but she claimed to have made a direct challenge to 
her husband to expel Mujuru telling thus: “…I said this faction leader must be 
dumped by you. If you do not do it we will do it ourselves. We will dump her 
ourselves because she is dividing the party…” The challenge was repeated a few 
weeks later as reported in The Herald of 17 November 2014 in an article with the 
headline “First Lady Repeats Call for Mujuru Resignation”. 
 
 
The Herald quoted the First Lady declaring “We are saying to the President you made 
a mistake (in appointing Mujuru) and now correct that mistake.” It is clear that The 
Herald was taking a position and actively participating in widening the feud between 
Grace Mugabe and Joice Mujuru, thereby worsening factionalism in the party. At her 
final rally in Marondera, Mashonaland East, Grace Mugabe was particularly acerbic 
in her attack on Mujuru, though again, refraining from mentioning her by name 
(Matyszak, 2015). She claimed that the “demon of factionalism started in 
Mashonaland Central” (Mujuru’s home province), and went on to accuse Mujuru of 
being behind parties opposed to ZANU PF and in alliance with them, seeking to stop 
elections in 2013 and to remove President Mugabe accusing him of using his wealth 
to support Mujuru and factionalism, and that he was supporting an inept leader who 
could not stand against President Mugabe. 
 
 
4.7 Representation of the Purging of Provincial Chairpersons 
 
Matyszak (2015) contends that, in order to gain control of the provinces and preclude 
nominations to the Presidium, the plotters deemed necessary the removal of the nine allies of 
Mujuru who were provincial chairpersons, elected at the end of 2013, since the Politburo had 
directed the “suspensions of suspensions” in early September, 2014. Temba Mliswa, 
Chairperson of Mashonaland West, was the first target. 
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In order to effect that, a series of denigratory articles about Mliswa began to appear in the 
Mnangagwa camp- controlled press (state-owned media) in September, 2014. The Herald of 
19 September, 2014, published an article titled: “12 MPs in US Funding Scandal”. In the 
story, Mliswa was accused of being part of a group of 12 ZANU PF legislators whom The 
Herald dubbed as the “dirty dozen”, and also claimed that they had received funding and 
leaked the party’s classified information to an American CIA operative. 
 
 
The Herald of 10 October, 2014, carried an article titled: “Mliswa’s ‘dirty’ Liaisons 
Exposed,” in which the paper subsequently alleged that Mliswa was hobnobbing with white 
farmers and business persons, and implied that the donations he solicited from them were 
neither properly accounted for nor channelled towards the purpose for which they were 
requested. Whenever ZANU PF wanted to get rid of someone from their ranks the state-
owned press became a key instrument in rubbishing that official by employing propaganda to 
tarnish their image. The same tactic was used against Mujuru. 
 
 
The Daily News of 2 October, 2014, published a story with a headline: “They Want me Out: 
Mliswa.” According to the Daily News the first attempt to oust Mliswa by a vote in the 
Provincial Executive Committee (PEC), in early October, 2014, failed. It is worth noting that 
the privately-owned press sympathise with Mujuru and her allies who were represented as 
victims of the Mnangagwa faction. Thus the private press represented a faction of ZANU PF 
in positive light while another was portrayed negatively, whereas previously all ruling party 
elites were negatively represented. The Standard of 12 September, 2014, published an article 
headlined “I am still in Charge: Mliswa”, in which Mliswa maintained that the PEC meeting 
had been improperly convened and that due process had not been followed and that he had 
refused to accept his ouster as reported in The Sunday Mail of 12 October, 2014, in a story 
titled: “Mliswa still Chair”. 
 
 
The Daily News of 19 October, 2014, carried an article with a headline: “Mash West Trashes 
anti-Mliswa Drive”. The newspaper reported that a Provincial Inter-District meeting was held 
at which a reported 780 of 900 delegates reaffirmed Mliswa as Chairperson. There were no 
further votes of no confidence against the Provincial Chairperson until the conclusion of 
Grace Mugabe’s rallies (Matyszak, 2015). They then took place in rapid succession, 
commencing with the ouster of Retired Brigadier General Calisto Gwanetsa in Masvingo on 
30 October, 2014. 
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Almost all were as messy as Mliswa’s ouster. The Standard of 2 November 2014 carried an 
article titled “I am still Provincial Chairman: Gwanetsa”, but he was accused of causing 
chaos in the party by refusing to step down as was captured in The Herald of 4 November 
2014 in a story titled “War Vets stick to guns on Gwanetsa.” The Herald of 7 November 
2014 published a story titled “Vote of no confidence in Midzi, while The Daily News of 9 
November 2014 had an article titled “Violent ZANU-PF Mob Accosts Midzi.” The Herald 
supported ouster of Midzi while the Daily News depicted the ruling party as violent. 
 
 
Although all the Provincial Chairpersons initially refused to accept their expulsion, claiming 
procedural improprieties, they were eventually forced out of office. The other chairpersons 
who were also expelled include Jason Machaya, of the Midlands Province who accepted the 
result; Andrew Langa of Matabeleland South and John Mvundura of Manicaland Province. 
The Herald of 10 November 2014 had an article titled “Chairman Bites off the Dust” while 
The Sunday Mail of 16 November 2014 published an article titled “And Then There Were 
Only Four.” The Herald of 10 November 2014 reported on Jason Machaya’s expulsion while 
The Sunday Mail reported Mvundura ouster, which was reported in The Standard of 16 
November 2014 under the headline “Another Mujuru Ally Kicked Out.” Bulawayo 
Provincial Chairperson, Callistus Ndlovu was expelled on 17 November 2014, and this was 
reported in the state-owned press in Bulawayo, The Chronicle of 18 November 2014. 
 
 
Matyszak (2015) argues in his report that the Mashonaland East Provincial Chairperson, Ray 
Kaukonde was singled out by the First Lady for attack, allegedly for fanning factionalism, 
accusing him of bankrolling Mujuru. Notwithstanding this cue, a Provincial Coordinating 
Committee meeting of 1 November, 2014, rather than moving a vote of no confidence 
against Kaukonde, in fact expressed confidence in his leadership. An attempt had been made 
to force Kaukonde from office on 10 November, 2014, by ZANU-PF supporters drawn from 
the Youth League, War Veterans, War Collaborators, former political prisoners and 
detainees, as captured in The Herald 11 November, 2014, in an article titled, “Ray 
Kaukonde, Langa Kicked Out.” Kaukonde was eventually expelled on 17 November, 2014 
after the passing of a vote of no confidence. 
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Luke Mushore, Provincial Chairperson of Mashonaland Central, Mujuru’s home province, 
was the last of the group to be removed, on 18 November 2014. Again promoting 
factionalism and plotting to topple Mugabe were cited as the reasons for his removal and The 
Herald of 19 November 2014 carried an article titled “9
th
 Provincial Chairman Booted Out.” 
However, the Chairperson of Matabeleland North was not thought to be a Mujuru ally and 
survived the frenzy of expulsions. 
 
 
4.8 Pre-December Epic Congress Purges 
 
After the ZANU PF Provincial Chairpersons had been removed from their positions, the next 
move by the plotters was to purge senior officials allegedly aligned to Mujuru faction. 
Having slandered Mujuru’s allies through the public media with increasingly outlandish and 
unsupported allegations the next move was to expel senior members of the Mujuru faction, 
including Mujuru herself. Just before the purges of the Provincial Chairpersons had begun, 
an article with the headline US, VP Mujuru plot to oust President” had appeared in The 
Sunday Mail of 26 October 2014. In the article, it was reported that Mujuru, in cahoots with 
American intelligence agents were plotting to oust President Mugabe through a vote of no 
confidence in Parliament. Part of The Sunday Mail story claimed that: 
 
 
Investigations show that this was part of double-pronged strategy that included challenging 
President Mugabe’s incumbency at the ZANU-PF Congress in December… As such, 
President Mugabe would have first lost control of ZANU-PF, and then lost state presidency 
via parliamentary procedures hinged on Section 97 (Removal of President or Vice President 
from office) of the Constitution (The Sunday Mail 26 October 2014). 
 
 
However, the story did not gain much traction, probably because it was too legally technical. 
As discussed earlier, ZANU-PF had always felt that Mujuru had a soft spot for the United 
States of America as she was perceived to be a “moderate”, ideologically contrary to 
Mnangagwa who was considered a “hardliner”. In this regard, a well orchestrated plot to 
smear Mujuru was to use state-owned media to ‘expose’ her links with United States. 
 
Thus, The Sunday Mail of 16 November 2014 published an article with a headline “VP 
Mujuru Linked to President Assassination Plot.” 
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The story’s representation went a step further to make allegations of treason of Mujuru. 
Matyszak (2015) asserts that because false allegations of plotting to assassinate President 
Mugabe had been used repeatedly before this to neutralise political opponents, these 
allegations were likely to cause sceptical yawns among non-Mnangagwa loyalists and 
readers. It is imperative to note that when ZANU-PF is faced with a presidential threat to 
fight its hegemony, it uses treasonous allegations on its opposition. For example, The 
Zimbabwean Mail of 5 March 2015 carried an article titled “Robert Mugabe’s Imaginary 
Assassins”. Most notably against presidential challengers were Ndabaningi Sithole in 1997 
and Morgan Tsvangirai in 2002. Nevertheless, charges were dropped when ZANUPF lost 
cases in court. 
 
 
It is worth noting that state-owned newspapers never made effort to balance their reporting 
by way of seeking views of those alleged in plotting President Mugabe’s assassination. 
Professional values of verification, balance, ethics and objectivity were deliberately shelved 
or ‘suspended’ in order to achieve their goal – of destroying Mujuru remnant before 
Congress. 
 
 
The Herald of 19 November 2014 published an article with a headline “Goche under Fire”. 
The representation was meant to smear Nicholas Goche, a Mujuru ally, who was drawn into 
the issue when, three days after the first publication of the “plot” he was reported to have 
played a key role by seeking to recruit hitmen to kill Mugabe, travelling to South Africa and 
Israel under the guise of government business. Mugabe himself alluded to the plot when he 
said that “This man (himself) was to die in September and he refused to die in that 
September, and still refused to die. ‘Ah, it now needs sangomas’. They say to (Ray) 
Kaukonde, ‘look for a sangoma’”. 
 
 
The Standard of December of 21 to 27, 2014 published an article titled “Goche gunfire 
reports a pack of lies”. Part of the story depicts ZANU-PF’s scheme thus: 
 
 
The factional fighting in ZANU-PF that has claimed the scales of former Vice President Joice 
Mujuru and several powerful politicians in the party has taken a new twist amid indications 
some of the accusations levelled against the ousted party gurus could have been a pack of lies 
aimed at destroying their political empires. 
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According to the newspaper article, allegations were used to push hard through the state 
media, claiming that Goche had told an official at a sugar estate in the Lowveld that there 
was going to be real war at the Congress where Mugabe was set to be removed from his seat. 
The newspaper further reported that Goche had openly told witnesses that the alleged coup 
plotters intended to kill Mugabe before the ZANU PF Congress. This shows that the state 
media was used as tools for advancing factional agendas and were very instrumental in the 
eventual fall of Joyce Mujuru and her allies. Worth noting, however, is that, apart from 
hearsay, no evidence linking Mujuru and her allies to the assassination plots could be 
established, even though police were said to be investigating the matter, (Matyszak, 2015). 
However, this did not deter the state-owned press from treating the alleged plot as fact. 
 
 
The state-owned press began to refer to Mujuru and her allies as a “cabal” and then as a 
“putschist cabal”. Despite the relentless and scurrilous nature of these allegations, both 
before and after the congress, they were later cynically brushed aside as inconsequential by 
Jonathan Moyo, who stated that the allegations were merely normal “political banter” to be 
expected between rival groups in a pre-election environment. The fact that some key officials 
allegedly belonging to Mujuru had been thoroughly smeared and purged meant that ZANU-
PF factional plotters still had a final task to remove Joice Mujuru and members of Central 
Committee aligned to her. Again the state-owned newspapers played an important role in 
mudslinging targeted officials. 
 
 
4.9 The Fall of Mujuru 
 
Two days after the end of the Congress, on 9 December, 2014, the dismissal of Mujuru, 
seven ministers and one Deputy Minister was announced, not by Mugabe but, by the Chief 
Secretary to the President and Cabinet, Dr. Mischeck Sibanda. 
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The Herald of 10 December, 2014 reported on the dismissal of Mujuru in an article with a 
headline “VP Mujuru and Ministers Fired”. The Daily News of 10 December, 2014 covered 
the story under a headline “Carnage! …as Mugabe sacks Mujuru, 8 Ministers”. The Daily 
News article was accompanied by Joice Mujuru’s photograph whose caption read: “AXED: 
VP Joice Mujuru has been fired from government”. These headlines show that the state and 
private media interpreted the fate of a Vice President and other ministers in different ways. 
 
In the study of media discourses, headlines are particularly interesting. Brooks cited in 
Willems (2004) asserts that readers often tend to focus on the headlines of articles rather than 
on the content. Headlines serve as summaries of news articles and emphasise what the 
journalist considers to be the most important or most remarkable points of an article. 
Headlines also include the issues that reporters wish their readers to remember. Headlines 
often appear to be only partial summaries of the news text. Since headlines are usually read 
more frequently than the articles themselves, they are a powerful way to convey a particular 
ideological view. Headlines activate and reproduce the knowledge readers already have on 
the subject and may as a result also reconfirm readers’ prejudices. 
 
 
From the above arguments, The Herald’s intention was to demonstrate its lack of sympathy 
towards Mujuru and her allies. I can argue that since state-owned press has been instigating 
and fuelling conflict between Mujuru and Mnangagwa through its reportage, it was 
celebrating the fall of Mujuru. The content of the article clearly shows the position of the 
state controlled newspaper. The photograph is accompanied by a caption which read: 
“Mujuru ouster no answer to factionalism – Mujuru faction will have to engage the First 
Lady, but I don’t see that happening’’. 
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The discourse in the private media points to a significant phenomenon which satirises the 
futility of purging Mujuru and her allies hoping they get rid of factionalism. 
 
 
On the contrary, the Daily News’s headline “Carnage!” (10 December 2014) carries 
connotations of shock and horror at the unprecedented deed. The accompanying Mujuru 
photograph is meant to arouse sympathy as the image depicts gloomy, disbelief and 
melancholy. Willems (2004) asserts that the choice of vocabulary also constructs particular 
ideological representations of events. I also posit that “words” are the “garments” in which 
we “dress” thoughts. Apart from their descriptive function, words express views and 
attitudes. The selection of specific words rather than others has clear ideological implications 
because it often reveals the underlying beliefs of journalists about actors and events. The 
party could be more divided now and worse fissures may emerge with the passage of time, 
especially with speculations that a new political party is in the offing by Mujuru and allies. 
 
 
Another point of interest is how actors were grammatically structured. The roles of subject 
positions which grammar constructs for the participants have ideological meanings. 
Participants can be grammatically constructed either as direct agents of processes such as 
violence and repression or as affected participants, frequently as victims. For example, in the 
above article, Daily News headline “Carnage!…as Mugabe sacks Mujuru, 8 Ministers”. The 
representation is that Mujuru is a victim of a dictator, deduced from the diction employed 
“sacks”. Carnage has connotations of perish and destruction. In fact, Zimbabweans were 
aware of the impending disaster since it had been looming for long. The Daily News article 
confirms this in the lead paragraph; “AS EXPECTED, President Robert Mugabe has sacked 
Vice President Joice Mujuru and eight cabinet ministers perceived to be loyal to her, in a 
move analysts described … as “potentially catastrophic” for the country. 
 
 
The article reported on the axed ministers who included Didymus Mutasa (Presidential 
Affairs), Webster Shamu (ICT and Postal Services), Nicholas Goche (Public Service and 
Labour), Simbarashe Mudarikwa (Mashonaland East Province), Francis Nhema (Youth 
Development and Indigenization), Olivia Muchena (Higher & Tertiary Education), Dzikamai 
Mavhaire (Energy & Power Development) and Munacho Mutezo (Mavhaire’s Deputy). 
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Mujuru herself confirmed to the Voice of America’s Studio 7 station that she had indeed been 
fired by Mugabe, adding that she would, however, not be quitting the ruling party despite the 
enormous pressure on her to do so. The newspaper depicted that the dismissals would add to 
the uncertainty that was already bedevilling the country’s ailing economy. On the contrary, 
state controlled newspapers were silent on how succession struggles were impacting the 
economy. If anything, they glorified Mugabe’s efforts in securing “mega billion” deals sealed 
between Zimbabwe, China, Russia and Nigeria among others yet the country continued to 
reel under economic devastation. Eldred Masunungure, a University of Zimbabwe political 
scientist said that “…those decisions are not just political but will have serious consequences 
on the government”. In the same Daily News article of 10 December, 2014 referred above 
International Crisis Group’s Southern Africa Project Director, Piers Pigou was quoted saying 
that the economy would remain in a parlous state unless there was a “paradigm shift” in the 
political sphere.” Pigou also said it was unlikely that the vanquished Mujuru camp would 
have the courage to form their own party. 
 
 
The motivations for restructuring of the cabinet are not efficient and delivery. The President 
is motivated by vindictiveness and the need to get rid of ministers accused of siding with 
Mujuru and “plotting to kill him”. As usual, President Mugabe sees cabinet as a space for 
rewarding his loyalists and not as the chief policy-making organ that is supposed to drive 
government business. It is an extension of his patronage system. It can be argued that Grace’s 
feud with Mujuru divides ZANU-PF – this chaos has spawned and could split the ruling 
party and also lead to scores of legislators quitting the liberation movement. Zimbabwe 
Democracy Institute (ZDI) Director, Pedzisai Ruhanya was quoted by the Daily News saying 
that “…the congress only served to illustrate that ZANU-PF is a personal project of 
Mugabe…we are going to see the revival of Mujuru faction. This Grace thing is a passing 
phenomenon; she can only be here and there during the life of her husband”. 
 
 
After Mujuru and her alleged allies were fired, the following day, 10 December, 2014, 
President Mugabe announced the appointment of the Party Presidium, and what The Herald 
of 11 December 2014 reported as a 33 member politburo, comprising three members of the 
Presidium, 22 Heads of Department, five committee members (reduced from the 10 
previously) and three deputy heads of department. Mugabe exercised his power to add an 
additional politburo department to the 21 set out in the only recently amended document 
(Matyszak, 2015). 
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The Herald of 12 December, 2014 headline “President Unveils New Ministers” did not 
amuse Zimbabweans who knew it was a recycle of the same “deadwood” selected from 
‘loyal’ crop. 
 
It was evident that the fired ministers were punished because of their poor conduct 
(association with Mujuru) as party cadres, and not as ministers, who were at fault. 
Furthermore, the replacement ministers were appointed on the basis of factionalism and not 
meritocracy as prescribed by the constitution. President Mugabe’s comments during this 
changing of the guards are of considerable interest and are worth quoting at length 
(Matyszak, 2015). They appear in the article on the appointments in The Herald of 11 
December, 2014 in a story with the headline “VPs Appointed: Mnangagwa, Mphoko Land 
Posts”, where it was reported that, before the President announced the names of the party 
appointees, he declared that the position of National Chairman of the party had been 
“abolished”. Mugabe is reported to have said that: 
 
 
We are reducing that top heaviness, the two vice presidents have no real function except that 
they are deputies and I can give them work to do. We feel it’s not necessary that if you have 
the two Vice Presidents you have the Chairman. They can rotate so we want to do without the 
Chairman. 
 
 
It is interesting to note the Mugabe’s use of “we” meant himself. It is common knowledge 
that there is little, if any, internal democracy in ZANU-PF. When later asked about the 
change to the Party Constitution, which removed the requirement that one Party Vice 
President must be a woman, Mugabe replied: 
 
 
Ah, we have removed it? I do not think we have removed it. We just ignored it for now 
because of the circumstances when a woman, who grew too ambitious and, did not want to 
bid her time to see the President should either retire or die soon after the elections, she wanted 
to take over in a short space of time, the strategy. The man has just won the election, you want 
 
to push him out (President Robert Mugabe’s 91
st
 birthday interview, ZBC 
(online) 3 March, 2015). 
 
 
Matyszak (2015) argues that the duty to appoint the national Chairperson is that of Mugabe 
and Mugabe alone (Section 39 of the Party Constitution).Yet the unconstitutional decision to 
“abolish” the post is as if that of some unknown collective. 
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Hence it is “we” who decide to reduce the top heaviness, it is “we” who feel that if you have 
two Vice Presidents that a Chairman is not required, “we” who want to do without the 
Chairman. Mugabe uses “I” in regard to giving the Vice Presidents work to do, but 
immediately switches back to “we” in the next two sentences which concern his 
unconstitutional failure to appoint the Chairperson. 
 
In announcing the appointments to the Presidium, Mugabe refers to himself in the third 
person – not “I lead the presidium”, but “at the top is President Mugabe”; he does not say 
that he has appointed the Vice Presidents, but that they have seemingly acquired these posts 
without any action from him. 
 
 
Part of the scheme was to bar perceived Mujuru allies from contesting in the elections. In the 
Midlands Province, Francis Nhema and Flora Bhuka lost elections, which meant two Mujuru 
aligned officials had been removed. In the Politburo meeting, held on 22 November, 2014, 
Mugabe removed any remaining doubts as to which faction he supported. According to 
Matyszak (2015), an inappropriately jocular Mugabe snubbed Mutasa by failing to greet him, 
facetiously telling Kudakwashe Bhasikiti, the then Masvingo Provincial Affairs Minister, and 
a Mujuru ally that he was “in the wrong basket” (camp) or the wrong faction. It was reported 
that Mugabe, also teased Nicholas Goche saying to him in Shona “Ko, ndiwe urikunangirwa 
huroyi [you are the one who is being accused of witchcraft?], before mockingly singing a few 
bars of the song “Ndiwe muroyi ndiwe…” [You are the witch]. This was represented in The 
Sunday Mail of 23 November 2014 in an article titled “President Confronts Goche Over 
Coup Plot”. The Daily News of 26 November, 2014 published an article with the headline 
“ZANU-PF Heavyweights Lose”. 
 
 
The newspaper reported the plot in which those elite officials allegedly aligned to Mujuru 
faction were removed from Central Committee. According to Matyszak (2015), the PEZ 
simply did not put the names of those they considered undesirable on the list of eligible 
candidates. Attempts were made to block others, including Didymus Mutasa, from standing. 
When the polls returned Mujuruites, the results were annulled by the PEC. This meant that 
the names of candidates who had been selected were struck down and replaced by persons 
deemed to be more desirable, that is, those who allegedly belonged to Mnangagwa faction. 
 
 
The Daily News of 26 November, 2014, under the same article “ZANU-PF Heavyweights 
Lose” purported that Didymus Mutasa failed to secure a position in the Central Committee. 
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The Daily News of 10 November, 2014 published an article with a headline “ZANU PF 
Factional Wars Engineered by Mugabe” (Tendai Kumhungira, 2014). The article reported 
that one of Zimbabwe’s leading political scientists, Eldred Masunungure was of the view that 
ZANU-PF’s deadly factions and succession wars were part of President Mugabe’s 
“Machiavellian game” to remain in power. The newspaper quoted Masunungure saying: “He 
(Mugabe) is playing games, setting the people up against each other”. Masunungure’s 
observations came as the battle to succeed Mugabe shifted a gear up, with Mnangagwa 
supporters now going all out to smear and scandalise Vice President Joice Mujuru’s allies 
ahead of ZANU-PF elective Congress in December. 
 
 
The vicious attacks on Mujuru’s perceived supporters were meant to annihilate her voting 
base ahead of December Congress. This way, she would lose her power base so that she 
would not succeed Mugabe. The Daily News interpreted the state media’s attacks on Mujuru 
as “a comprehensive strategy to isolate Mujuru via provinces” (Masunungure, 2014). Hence, 
the suspensions were meant to ensure that the nominations of candidates to the presidium 
would weigh heavily against Mujuru, and in favour of the Mnangagwa faction. A similar 
strategy had been employed when Mugabe appointed Mujuru as the Vice President in 2004. 
Mugabe is reported to have encouraged Mujuru to “aim higher”, thereby creating the 
impression that he wanted Mujuru to succeed her. The new political developments in ZANU 
PF therefore, made observers wonder what had changed since then. 
 
 
The Herald of 26 November, 2014 published a story titled “Home District Shuts Door on 
Mujuru”. The newspaper reported on provincial elections in Mashonaland Central, Mujuru’s 
home province and how elections were handled. The paper quoted acting head of the 
Provincial Executive Committee declaring: 
 
 
We sat last week as the Provincial Executive Council and agreed that we should defend our 
President. We agreed that any member who is accused of plotting to assassinate the President 
 
we are not going to accept his or her curriculum vitae (CV) 
 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 (The Herald 26 November 
 
Matyszak (2015) posits that the applications as candidates to the Central Committee in 
Mashonaland Central for Lazarus Dokora and Epmaras Kanhanga were thus rejected on this 
basis along with at least ten (10) others. This was also captured in The Herald of 26 
November, 2014 as cited above. At the same meeting, the youths reserved special venom for 
Nicholas Goche who was present at the meeting where the petition was presented. The 
youths accused Goche of displaying “disrespect of the highest order by plotting to kill the 
president and that he was a saboteur unfit to occupy such a senior post in the party: (‘I Quit – 
Goche’ Daily News, 4 November, 2014). In the face of this threatening behaviour, Goche 
decided to withdraw his application to join the Central Committee; and this was reported in 
the Daily News of 24 November 2014 as cited above. The Herald of 27 November 2014 
published an article with a headline “Goche Accepts Card Carrying Member Status”. The 
state-owned Herald reported Goche as withdrawing his application voluntarily “to maintain 
unity in the party”. The Herald’s representation appears neutral on plotters’ instigation. 
 
 
The Herald of 24 November, 2014 carried a story titled “Mash Central Says No to VP 
Mujuru” which reported that the Mashonaland Central Provincial Election Directorate had 
rejected Joice Mujuru’s application. However, the Daily News of 26 November 2014 
reported that she had decided not to apply – this was depicted in a story titled “”ZANU-PF 
Heavyweights Lose” which was cited earlier. It should be noted that the two dailies had 
different agendas which influenced and shaped their framing of events - the same story but 
different representation. The failure by VP Mujuru to get nomination was just the beginning 
of the sealing of her fate in the ruling party. The Sunday Mail of 23 November 2014 
published a story under the headline: “How Mujuru fell out with Mugabe”. 
 
 
The state owned Sunday Mail newspaper published an article seeking to explain how 
President Mugabe fell out with Vice President Joice Mujuru. The newspaper claimed that 
President Mugabe had, for close to a decade been aware of a growing plot by senior ZANU-
PF officials to push him out by hook or crook and had elevated VP Joice Mujuru, but had 
bided his time before acting. The paper further claimed that the President had information 
about a fairly elaborate scheme from back in 2006 to topple him but had played his cards 
close to the chest to avoid rocking ZANU-PF before the 2008 harmonised elections and 
during the Inclusive Government’s tenure (2009 – 2013). 
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The newspaper article further reported that the 2008 elections which saw a clique aligned to 
VP Mujuru campaigning against President Mugabe under the slogan “bhora musango” (don’t 
score), resulted in ZANU-PF losing control of Parliament for the first time since 1980, and 
the Presidential candidate having to retain office via a run-off. 
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It should be highlighted that with three days before the 2014 Congress commences, Mujuru 
(pictured above) seemed down after she was blocked from filing her nomination to contest 
for the powerful Central Committee seat and the last minute amendments that allowed 
Mugabe the right to appoint his own deputies and national chairman. According to the article, 
political analysts argued that while Mujuru’s political end seemed certain she could be 
retained but in a weakened position. The newspaper quoted Charles Chirimambowa saying: 
 
For now Mujuru’s political currency is on the decline and she seems to be heading towards 
the door from the top table. However, Mugabe may keep her in the party but her position will 
be weakened (The Sunday Mail, 23 November 2014). 
 
 
Another media analyst, Pedzisai Ruhanya expressed his view thus, “Mujuru is now in a 
vulnerable position and her future now depends on Mugabe’s benevolence”. The article 
reported that the world is full of comebacks and Zimbabwe waits to see if Mujuru will have 
her own “Lazarus moment”. It is therefore worth noting that the press featured prominently 
in the ZANU PF succession plots, with state-owned press against Mujuru while the privately-
owned newspapers sympathised with her. 
 
 
4.10 Cartooning Succession Politics 
 
This section attempts to examine cartoons’ representations of political conflict. The cartoons 
used are those that mocked the political and socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe, 
particularly the purging of Vice President Joice Mujuru and her perceived allies. Just like the 
photographs and captions, the cartoons qualified or reinforced the existence of power 
struggles in the ruling party that needed urgent attention. They acted as political satires that 
ridiculed the main players in the purging of senior party members with the intention of 
exposing the plotters’ scheme to finally get rid of alleged ‘enemies’ in the former liberation 
movement. Even though, more often than not, the cartoon representations and other forms of 
representations amounted to misrepresentations according to ZANU PF, they have, arguably, 
exposed the situation in Zimbabwe and contributed to project power, succession and 
factionalism in ruling party. 
 
In addition, these cartoons just like the photographs, acted as powerful open texts that could 
be read differently by the audience but, most importantly, they seemed to reinforce the 
subject of the stories. 
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Most of the cartoons in The Standard have been done by Nutshell and those in Daily News 
by Tommy Namate. It is important to state that some cartoons analysed in this section do not 
bear the names of cartoonists. It should also be pointed out that only privately owned 
newspapers’ cartoons were identified for this section because of their agenda to depict purges 
in ZANU PF members as state controlled media did not seem to project the chaos that was 
unfolding in Zanu PF. This shows that news is a selection of events that are taking place in 
the real world at a particular moment in time (Willems, 2004, Chari, 2010, Foucault 1978). 
 
Political cartoons and comic stripes have been analysed in relation to concepts of power and 
resistance as ways in which those subject to power challenge the rulers (Mbembe 2011; 
Nyamnjoh 2009). Willems (2011) maintains that post-colonial laughter does not always 
address those in power, but humour may also point fingers at those subject to power in an 
attempt to make readers cope with the tragic events unfolding around them. 
 
 
Whilst I agree with these scholars, this thesis argues that cartoons which represented the 
unfolding drama on Joice Mujuru were allegedly crude and coarse humour. For example, a 
cartoon that was published in The Standard of November 02 to 08, 2014, (see below) depicts 
President Mugabe setting ‘Napoleon dogs’ on ‘helpless VP Mujuru’ who appears ‘resistant’, 
yet wincing with fear. In the cartoon, Mugabe, who looks jovial and enjoying Mujuru’s 
attack by ‘his dogs’ which are personified, holds on to strings attached to the dogs, 
symbolising his total grip on power. 
 
 
Perhaps, the cartoonist recalls George Owel’s “Animal Farm” where Napoleon kept ‘secret 
dogs’ which were meant to attack his rivals in the hour of need. In the meantime, the 
president is portrayed singing a defiant lyric meant to be sung by Mujuru, who at all odds 
refused to be ousted from the ruling party she had fought for. The song was “HANDIENDE!” 
[ I won’t go anywhere…], composed by a local musician, Steeve Makoni, whose music is 
replete with satirical themes. Of interest to note in the cartoon is that three of the five ‘dogs’ 
represent women at the forefront in attacking Mujuru, which symbolises that women were 
being used to destroy each other. 
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Important to note also in the cartoon is that three of the five ‘dogs’ represent women at the 
forefront in attacking Mujuru, implying that a woman’s worst enemy is another woman. The 
cartoon seems to tie in well with arguments raised by MDC-T Member of Parliament for 
Harare West, Jessie Majome, who was quoted by The Standard of November 23 to 29, 2014, 
in an article titled: ‘Grace Mugabe derails gender movement’. 
 
 
The remarkable gains that had been made in elevating women to positions of authority have 
been obliterated by the “cat fight” pitting the First Lady, Grace Mugabe, against the Vice 
President, Joice Mujuru. Female politicians and lobbyists observe the fight was retrogressive 
to the fight of equality. The newspaper quotes Jessie Majome arguing: “This is a very 
disturbing gender debacle which has clearly confirmed that the country is still largely 
patriarchal. Men are still in control and are using women to oust other women”. The 
outspoken legislator further observed that regardless of who was right or wrong, the fallout 
had denied efforts and reversed gains that had been made in pushing women into positions of 
influence. 
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The message appeared to be that someone was furthering their interests by setting up these 
women against each other, and of great concern is that other women are buying into this 
charade. Grace Mugabe even went to the extent of attacking Mujuru personally, by 
insinuating that she was ugly. 
 
 
The Standard also quoted MDC Secretary General, Priscilla Misihairambwi Mushonga 
saying that: 
 
 
This just confirms what we have always said, that space for women in politics is limited. We 
have been socialised in such a way that we believe that a woman can never dislodge a man 
from power…Women in positions of power are targeted because they are vulnerable to such 
attacks,…women are busy pulling each other down,…The men in the respective camps are 
quietly watching as the ladies claw at each other. I feel that even if there are issues to be 
cleared, it should have been done differently and not in the public domain (The Standard, 
 
23 November 2016). 
 
 
Gift Mambiri, an analyst was quoted saying “It was a tragedy that women were being used as 
pawns in a game whose main characters is men. What is queer about this whole issue is that 
men in the various camps involved have found it useful to manipulate the women for their 
own gains, and come congress time, the women will be elbowed out”. Mambiri further stated 
that the language to attack Mujuru was de-humanising, and exposed glaring gender 
connotations that would cast female political figures in negative light. 
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The Standard of 26 October, 2014, carried another cartoon depicting Joice Mujuru as a 
victim of Grace Mugabe. In the cartoon, Grace Mugabe is wielding a spiked knobkerrie 
targeted at Mujuru, whilst pointing at her. In the background, watching but unmoved, are 
President Robert Mugabe and another equally unconcerned ZANU PF official puffing his 
pipe. This symbolises the silence of President Mugabe during his wife Grace Mugabe’s so 
called “Meet the People” rallies. 
 
 
Mugabe’s silence when Mujuru was being viciously attacked meant that he was ‘setting’ her 
(Grace) against Mujuru. In the background, the cartoon further portrays that ZANU PF, as a 
party, was ‘falling apart’ and the ‘centre can no longer hold’, as signified by ZANU PF as a 
building requiring support props since it was on the verge of collapse and glaring cracks are 
visible. The cartoon further makes a caricature of the Zimbabwe economy, yawning and 
cracking, also supported by overwhelmed wooden props. 
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In the last couple of years, acres of space in the private media have been dedicated to 
debating leadership succession in ZANU PF and, in each article, the issue of an economy that 
is on the brink, due to factional fights, have been highlighted. The message in such 
representations suggests that ZANU PF does not care about people’s welfare but its hold on 
power. 
 
 
The Standard of November 16 to 22, 2014 published an ominous cartoon (see below) which 
depicted President Mugabe driving a commuter omnibus going to the December Congress, 
with him menacingly holding a lethal knobkerrie with spikes and looking through the 
window. Perilously and desperately clinging at the back of the same omnibus is Vice 
President Joice Mujuru, seemingly defying her being barred from attending the elective 
congress. Lying scattered on the ditches are other former ZANU-PF stalwarts who were 
brutally ousted from the party like Rugare Gumbo, Didymus Mutasa and Nicholas Goche. 
The cartoon further represents images of impending bruising as symbolised by Red Cross 
material as luggage on the bus – indeed there were going to be casualties physically, 
emotionally or both. ZANU PF is a revolutionary party known for spilling blood as can be 
deduced from some of its songs, sung during election campaigns. 
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The cartoon reinforces the discourse of power struggles evidenced by arguably callous 
purges of ruling party officials. It seems to argue that there are no permanent friends or foes 
in politics but only permanent interests. 
 
 
An opinion piece on the same page as the cartoon seems appropriately juxtaposed as it is 
titled: “It’s time for Joice Mujuru to run!” The unfolding drama in ZANU-PF helps confirm 
the fact that President Robert Mugabe intends to die in office – as well as show the depth of 
ruthlessness he is capable of in dealing with matters to do with preserving his power. The 
Mujuru faction, I argue, had come to know without doubt that Mugabe has been made to 
believe they wanted to dethrone him. It does not matter whether this was true or not. What 
matters is that the President’s wife, Grace, had said that and therefore Mugabe believed it. 
They were clearly aware of what Mugabe was going to do – destroy them to preserve his 
power and please his wife. They knew no amount of argument in denial would save them. 
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The Standard of 19 October, 2014, captured the First Lady’s intention by representing her 
vitriol in a cartoon (see below). The cartoonist depicts Grace Mugabe in ZANU PF regalia, 
wielding a spiked knobkerrie while pointing at Ray Kaukonde, who seemed relaxed and 
unmoved by the threats. In the background, the crowd at the rally looks excited, seemingly 
suggesting “he is in trouble today and he will face the music!’’, indicated by icons in the 
cartoon next to the victim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The First Lady is depicted as extremely furious but insulated against any backlash since she 
is the President’s wife, whose symbol and image is embedded on her party regalia. Using the 
Marxist theoretical view which propounds that works of art are reflective of the society from 
which they emanate, the cartoons in this thesis unravels and articulate issues of governance, 
power, corruption, gender, tribalism/ethnicism and succession struggles in Zimbabwean 
politics. They mock and expose hypocrisy, follies and errors of omission and commission in 
totalitarian regimes which gag people from expressing themselves. 
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It is through literary works that a society can evaluate its values by privileging that which it 
considers as important and rebuking what is viewed as anathema. Cartoons therefore satirise 
societal evils in order to expose the rot that maybe unfolding in a particular system or 
institution. 
 
 
Matyszak (2015), notes that after the rallies ended, Grace Mugabe continued the invective 
against Mujuru and her allies from the safety of her Mazowe Farm, where she not only felt 
safe to mention Mujuru by name, but directly charged that “instead of acquiring wisdom 
from President Mugabe, she (Mujuru) was busy plotting against him so that she takes over,” 
(quoted in “Resign Now”: The Herald, 24 October, 2014). She demanded that Mujuru resign 
or face dismissal. She called Mujuru “ungrateful, power hungry, daft, foolish, divisive and a 
disgrace” to ZANU PF and Zimbabwe. The First Lady said: 
 
 
Mujuru should just do the honourable and resign…It is not good to be fired. It would be better 
if Mai Mujuru resigns than wait to be fired by President Mugabe…If you are here and you 
support Mai Mujuru, you should immediately leave because what I am about to say will cause 
you diarrhoea. You should tie up your pants (The Herald, 24 October 2014). 
 
 
It is crucial to note that despite all the venom and vitriol targeted at her, Mujuru remained 
calm and composed. 
 
In the meantime, Harare Youth League Chairman, Godwin Gomwe, reportedly said that they 
would prevent anyone who criticised Mugabe in the media from attending congress. Thus, 
the press became a battlefield for factional fights which were growing nastier by the day. 
 
 
The Daily News 23 December, 2014 the editorial page published a cartoon titled “A Didymus 
Moment…” which depicted former Presidential Affairs Minister recently ‘guillotined’. The 
cartoon presented Didymus Mutasa in a ‘DUSTBIN OF ZANU-PF HISTORY’ being 
interviewed by a journalist. 
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Part of the cartoon message, probably from the reporter as an aside to readers; reads “AT 
LAST PUT IN HIS PROPER PLACE!!” which suggests mockery of Mutasa who used to be 
arrogant and flamboyant during his tenure in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZANU-PF Presidium. The other section of the cartoon, quoted from Mutasa’s previous 
confession reads “It’s a pity that now we can only talk to you, the independent media, 
because you tell it like it is unlike our own media. I have never heard them say the truth”. 
Didymus: “Rock Diesel Gamatox” Mutasa. The cartoon representation portrays crude 
humour in the sense that a former Presidium official who was notorious in attacking private 
media now says the state media does not tell the truth unlike independent media. Of interest 
to note also is the apparent signature of Didymus who identifies himself with the factional 
name “Gamatox”. 
 
 
Of interest to note is the journalist’s question to Didymus Mutasa “Last year when you said 
you would put cameras in the bedrooms of those who criticize President Mugabe, what did 
you mean to achieve?” I can argue that this question was painful to Mutasa, now that tables 
were turned. I should point out that the cartoon comes in the context when Didymus has been 
in recent weeks venting vitriol to President Robert Mugabe using ‘independent media’, 
particularly Daily News. Could we say for Didymus Mutasa that ZANU-PF is now “sour 
grapes?” 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
Although many ministers, deputy ministers and other ZANU-PF officials have so far been 
‘relieved’ of their duties, both in party and government, Didymus Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo 
have been most vocal. In most cases, the two have tended to ‘expose’ the ‘evil’ of the ruling 
party. A case in point could be what was represented in The Standard August 17 to 23, 2014 
in an article titled “You know the truth, Mutasa tells Mugabe”. The newspaper reported that 
Didymus Mutasa scoffed at criticism levelled against him by President Mugabe following the 
chaotic preparations to the ZANU-PF Youth and Women’s League Conferences. The 
President had publicly dressed down Mutasa for the chaos that blighted the party events. 
According to the party’s’ constitution, Mutasa was supposed to ensure that all the logistical 
arrangements for the conferences were in place. But Mutasa said he could not do much as the 
party coffers were empty. He defended himself against Mugabe’s attacks saying the fact that 
ZANU-PF was broke was public knowledge. It can be argued that the newspaper article 
represents ‘exposures’ within the ruling party. 
 
 
What is significant to point out in the cartoon which depicts Mutasa is that the cartoonist 
quotes Didymus Mutasa’s statement which he uttered on 17 December, 2014 but reported in 
Daily News of 18 December, 2014 in an article titled “It’s not over, says Mutasa…as he takes 
ZANU-PF war to SADC”. The newspaper reported that former ZANU-PF Secretary for 
Administration (who was also Presidential Affairs Minister) Didymus Mutasa says he and 
others who were ousted from the party for allegedly plotting to overthrow President Robert 
Mugabe from power and assassinate the ‘nonagenarian’ will not be forced out of the party. 
Mutasa wrote a hard-hitting letter to regional leaders imploring them to intervene in the 
country’s deepening political crisis spawned by the ruling party’s brutal and sometimes 
violent infighting. It is in this context that Mutasa was quoted by Daily News saying: “It’s a 
pity that now we can only talk to you, the independent media because you tell it like it is 
unlike our own media (state owned media). I have never heard them say the truth”. 
 
 
It should be recalled that the same Didymus Mutasa had threatened to muzzle the press in 
May 2014; the press which he now praises. The Standard of May 25 to 31, 2014 published an 
article under comment and analysis “Mutasa cannot be allowed to Muzzle Press”. The article 
reported that Mutasa threatened to take action against journalists who report about President 
Mugabe’s health. Mutasa was quoted as saying “Such news [Mugabe’s health and 
succession] will lead us to arrest journalists…”. 
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It should be pointed out that as the fourth estate, the media has a duty to report on any issues 
that are of public interest, and concerns about the President’s failing health fall in that realm, 
just as succession issues. On the contrary, Mutasa wants a press that cheats both the 
government and the people – one that flatters and lulls national leaders into a stupor of 
complacency and a false sense of infallibility. 
 
 
The scathing and blistering factional fights in ZANU-PF depicted so much bottled up 
bitterness in some cadres who thought an opportune moment awaited itself to expose senior 
ruling party officials. The Herald of 29 November, 2014 published an article with a headline 
“Once a sell-out, always a sell-out”. The article is an extract from The Manica Post (a weekly 
regional sister paper to The Herald) in which Provincial affairs Minister, Mandi Chimene 
was interviewed. She is a liberation struggle cadre who at one time boasted she disciplined 
suspended ZANU-PF national spokesperson, Rugare Gumbo, during the liberation struggle 
after he allegedly rebelled and caused the abduction and detention of senior members like the 
late Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze in Mozambique. Her interview came against the backdrop of a 
lot of issues that have been put onto the public domain ranging from factionalism, 
succession, corruption, assassination plots, and humiliation of the first and ousting of 
provincial chairpersons. 
 
 
The Manica Post allowed Mandi Chimene to ‘betray’ ruling party secrets in an 
unprecedented manner. The newspaper representation is that Rugare Gumbo (because he is 
being vocal now) was a sell-out and that he never repents like Dzikamai Mavhaire who at 
one time boldly told President Mugabe he must retire. This resulted in Mavhaire being 
suspended in ZANU-PF for five (5) years. The newspaper quoted Chimene saying: 
 
 
We had people like Olivia Muchena who were members of the late Abel Muzorewa’s United 
African National Council (UAWC) now political commissars in the Women’s League. What 
does she know about the history of the struggle? What can she teach me about the dos and 
don’ts expected of a cadre of a revolutionary party? Can she sing any one revolutionary song? 
Maybe she can sing a church hymn… 
 
 
The utterances can only depict how deep seated the fury ruling party members have towards 
one another. This further reveals disharmony had always existed well before issues of 
factionalism and succession were discussed publicly. 
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Important to note also is that Chimene looked down upon Flora Bhuka, Dzikamai Mavhaire, 
Didymus Mutasa, John Mvundura, Kasu, Kaunye, among other senior officials in the ruling 
party. Later on, Mandi Chimene crossed swords with Oppah Muchinguri, and took over 
Mutasa’s farm. These actions only serve to depict chaos, anarchy, hate and never ending feud 
in ZANU-PF in the unfolding, power struggles. 
 
 
The Daily News of 17 December, 2014 carried a headline ”ZANU-PF sharks turn on each 
other…as Mnangagwa camp fights over spoils”. The headline is accompanied by a 
photograph depicting anxious Mugabe scratching his head. The caption reads: “FEUDING: 
After vanquishing the country’s former number two Joice Mujuru, members of the faction 
led by newly appointed Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa in President Robert Mugabe’s 
ZANU-PF are believed to be fighting each other for power”. The newspaper reported that the 
faction aligned to Mnangagwa is now locked in a nasty and escalating fight for the spoils of 
their “thuggish victory” over Mujuru, with many in the camp apparently feeling that they 
have not been rewarded sufficiently for their role in annihilating the former VP’s camp. The 
article suggests that the so-called “Gang of Four” [G40] – comprising senior party officials 
Oppah Muchinguri, Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Patrick Zhuwao were deeply 
mired in the intra-faction brawls, amid suggestions that they were looking to grab more 
power in the party in the Politburo but were disappointed by Mugabe’s choices. However, the 
state media has now openly attacked Mnangagwa indirectly through one of his loyalists 
[Hungwe] who likened Mnangagwa to Jesus as represented in The Standard December 21 to 
27, 2014. 
 
 
“ZANU-PF politicians thrive on hero-worshipping” is the title of an article published in The 
Standard of 21 to 27 December, 2014. With another article titled “Mnangagwa likened to 
Jesus” in the same paper. The newspaper reported that Hungwe’s utterances comparing 
Mnangagwa to Jesus Christ prove that bootlicking had become entrenched in ZANU-PF. 
Hungwe, who was introducing Mnangagwa during celebrations, described the new VP as the 
“Son of Man” whose rise up the staircase of power was ordered by God. Christians accused 
politicians of being blasphemous using the name of Christ in vain as several ZANU PF 
officials have in the past used the analogy on Mugabe; Oppah Muchinguri called Grace 
Mugabe “Queens of Queens”. The phrase “Son of Man” suggests messiah which is only 
supposed to refer to Jesus Christ. 
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The newspaper representation is that choruses of praise – signing and idolising shifted from 
President Robert Mugabe and the First Lady Grace Mugabe to the new first Vice President 
Emmerson Mnangagwa when he hosted a huge rally at his Zvishavane home to celebrate his 
elevation to the new position. The argument is that Hungwe was trying to push for the 
creation of another centre of power in Mnangagwa, which suggests that all is not well in the 
ruling party. 
 
 
The Sunday Mail of 23 November 2014 published a story under the headline: “How Mujuru 
fell out with Mugabe”. The state-owned but ZANU-PF controlled Sunday Mail newspaper 
published an article seeking to explain how President Mugabe fell out with Vice President 
Joice Mujuru. At the time the newspaper was controlled by a faction of the party loyal to 
Mnangagwa. The newspaper representation is that President Mugabe had nearly a decade ago 
been aware of a growing plot by senior ZANU-PF officials to push him out by hook and 
crook and elevate VP Joice Mujuru, but had bided his time before acting. The paper 
established that the President had information regarding the fairly elaborate scheme back in 
2006, and played his cards close to the chest to avoid rocking ZANU-PF before the 2008 
harmonised elections and during the Inclusive Government’s tenure (2009 – 2013). 
 
 
The Sunday Mail further reported that the 2008 elections which saw a clique aligned to VP 
Mujuru campaigning against President Mugabe under the slogan “bhora musango” [don’t 
score], resulted in ZANU-PF losing control of Parliament for the first time since 1980, and 
the Presidential candidate having to retain office via a run-off. It can be argued that the ruling 
party will always devise means to ensure it remains in power which is viewed as “bhora 
mughedhi’’, as illustrated in the cartoon below. This was one of the few cartoons published 
in government controlled press but does not show the name of the cartoonist. In the cartoon, 
President Robert Mugabe is seen encouraging a cheerful woman striker scoring the ball, as 
illustrated by Mugabe’s words ‘’Bhora Mughedhi!’’ [Score the ball!]. In the same cartoon, 
another ZANU PF official is projected entertaining Joice Mujuru so that her plot of ‘’Bhora 
Musango’’ is thwarted. The cartoon suggests that Mugabe loyalists and party supporters 
could easily win signified by absence of a “goalkeeper’’ at the gate, thereby mocking Mujuru 
faction. 
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President Robert Mugabe then engineered a ‘brilliant’ campaign that saw him ‘resoundingly 
win’ the 2013 elections, thereby setting the stage for him to reassert sole control of 
Government and allow ideological realignment of the ruling party. State controlled media, 
which was now leaned to one faction in the ruling party assumed an agenda to spew vitriol 
on Mujuruites as plotters wanted to finally annihilate them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The newspaper reported about the alleged secret meeting between Mujuru and US 
Ambassador (as earlier discussed). Important to note is the allegation as quoted: 
 
 
President Mugabe could not fathom how a VP subordinate and denigrate the entire state in 
such a manner, and how his deputy whose elevation in 2004 he facilitated despite her 
relatively junior position in Government at the time – could plot his ouster in such brazen 
fashion (The Sunday Mail, 23 November 2016). 
 
 
Mnangagwa loyalists who controlled the state media were fuelling and fomenting the 
President’s anger against Mujuru. According to unnamed sources in the same newspaper 
article, another issue that indicated there was need for a clearing of the decks related to an 
incident around the same time in 2013 when President Mugabe was outside Zimbabwe and 
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Vice President called for a ZANU-PF Politburo meeting. The paper depicts that Mujuru 
loyalists supported the meeting, whose agenda remains murky, while several senior politburo 
members flatly rejected the call and pointed out that only ZANU-PF’s First Secretary would 
sanction such a meeting. The article reports that this plan failed but further says: 
 
 
…the past year (2013) has seen VP Mujuru increasingly try and establish a competing center of 
power by attempting to seize control of Cabinet and Politburo proceedings. She has been acting as 
de facto chair and President Mugabe has been watching her quietly, gently trying to point out 
where she is erring, but again those overtures have not been met kindly. 
 
 
The Sunday Mail article also says a source said VP Mujuru often hand-picked her factional 
supporters to dominate discussions while seeking to drown out alternative views. This 
entailed caucusing before Cabinet and Politburo meetings and agreeing on their own agenda 
for the discussions. According to the article in November 2013, she (Mujuru) interrupted the 
President as he spoke during an Extraordinary Politburo meeting which – among other issues 
 
– tackled media reports concerning factionalism in ZANU-PF. 
 
 
According to the article, the second stage of the scheme involved mobilising support to oust 
the President at ZANU-PF’s December National Congress and replace him with VP Mujuru 
and provincial chairs were tasked to lead this part of the plan; one of the chairs allegedly 
confided to The Sunday Mail that VP Mujuru had American backing to push out President 
Mugabe. Thus the state owned media were willing tools to be used in factional battles; 
particularly in blatant and unsubstantiated allegations such as those published in The Sunday 
Mail. This is real propaganda by mudslinging and smearing Joice Mujuru and her allies. The 
newspaper article merely talks of ‘a source…’ which can be fabrications, imaginations and a 
result of plotters’ scheme to annihilate Mujuru camp. 
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Of interest again to note is the motif of linking Joice Mujuru to America in order to whip 
peoples’ emotions and ire against her. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering the purge of ZANU PF officials’ pre and post December Congress, the ruling 
party could be likened to a hen eating its own chicks as illustrated in the cartoon above, 
thereby, causing panic within party ranks. This cartoon confirms the perception that ZANU 
PF is a party that devours its own; it suggests that probably no one is safe in the ruling party, 
it may be a matter of time before fresh purges begin as factional struggles continue unabated 
and the media is the new battleground. 
 
 
4.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the representation of ZANU PF succession battles, factionalism and 
power struggles in the state-owned and the privately-owned press with a view to gain insights 
on how the media are implicated in power struggles. The chapter also analysed the 
representation of ZANU succession politics in press cartoons. It discussed the concept of 
power and how it was manifested during the ZANU PF succession battles. 
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It argues that the press played a very crucial role in succession politics, particularly the fall of 
Joice Mujuru from grace. The press became a key platform upon which the succession issue 
was fought, with the state-owned media being representing Mujuru and her allies in negative 
light while the privately-owned press was sympathetic to her cause. This shows that the press 
is deeply implicated in power struggles and the individual politicians can either rise or fall at 
the hands of the press. The next chapter examines the representation of MDC succession and 
factionalism in privately-owned and state controlled press. 
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Chapter 5: Power, Succession Battles and Factionalism in the MDC 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the representation of power struggles and factionalism in the 
opposition political party, the MDC in the state-owned and the privately-owned press. The 
chapter argues that the media was polarised in its reportage. This chapter used representation 
techniques uncovered by Willems (2004) to analyse the representation of internal conflicts in 
the main opposition party. An attempt will be made to explore causes of splits in the main 
MDC that led to multiple splits and formation of new parties. Newspaper representation of 
these will be examined. The approach adopted in this chapter is to follow five steps, namely: 
defining political parties, factions, stages of splinter party formation, representation of 
succession struggles and factionalism in both the state-owned and private-owned press; and 
finally way forward for the opposition parties for 2018 elections and future. 
 
Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (2014) argues that the multiplicity of political players guided 
by democratic values is good, but it is also desirable to democratise and strengthen existing 
political organisations in the interest of wider democratic practices in the country. To ensure 
accountability, good governance and economic development, it is essential that there are 
strong, effective, democratic political parties that keep pressure on the ZANU-PF 
government to transform constitutional provisions into reality for all Zimbabweans. Chege 
(2007) asserts that strong and sustainable democracy is dependent on the existence of well-
functioning political parties and he further proposes that political parties are crucial actors in 
bringing together diverse interests, recruiting and presenting candidates, and developing 
competing policy proposals that provide people with a choice. Chege (2007) argues that in a 
democracy there is no substitute for open competition between political parties in elections. 
Throughout the world, however, political parties find themselves in crisis, unpopular and 
increasingly distrusted. They are suffering from declining membership, internal management 
practices that are often weak and not sufficiently democratic, and party system regulations 
that often set far-reaching limits to the way in which parties are allowed to operate (Chege 
2007). In Africa and in Zimbabwe in particular, political parties face challenges similar to 
those faced elsewhere in the world, challenges that are further exacerbated by diverse and 
complex political and development challenges. 
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Zimbabwean political parties, like any other social groupings, are susceptible to splits due to 
various reasons. According Gatsheni-Ndlovu (2011), splits that rocked political parties since 
1963 cannot be explained in terms of one factor or a singular political ideology. Splits are 
products of a build-up and coalescence of various factors, ranging from ethnic, constitutional, 
ideological, tribal, personality clashes and external infiltration. Thus, notwithstanding the 
incentives to stay together, parties sometimes do break-up. The effect of these splits on the 
electoral behaviour of voters, the electoral fortunes of parties and the development of party 
systems is immense, but varies from one party to the other. At this stage it is important to 
give a brief background of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). MDC has posed 
the greatest challenge to President Robert Mugabe’s ruling party, ZANU PF, since it came to 
power at Zimbabwe’s Independence in 1980. Founded in September 1999, the MDCT is a 
coalition of trade unions, church groups and student organisations. The party also draws 
support from the majority Shona and the minority Ndebele ethnic groups, as well as from 
whites in the cities and rural areas. However, conflicts within the party resulted in a split in 
2005 giving birth to a splinter party as a new competitor within opposition parties. 
Subsequently, more splits occurred and continue to occur to this day. 
 
5.2 Political Parties in Zimbabwe 
 
Conventionally, political parties have been treated as unitary actors. However, as Ozhan 
Demirkol (2014) states that most political parties face periods of intra-party conflict. 
Although most of these conflicts are resolved within party platforms, some conflicts are 
never resolved. This shows that political parties are not unitary actors. Moreover, studies on 
factionalism reveal that political parties are composed of sub-groups. As Manor (1998:1) 
argues, “different coalitions of forces are being formed within the party and actors striving 
for dominance interact with each other in the struggle for relative influence within the 
organisation; the interplay between internal actors, each with his or her own agenda, is thus 
the driving force of party life”. 
 
Political parties might be defined as any group seeking to elect government office holders 
under a given label, which may or may not be on the ballot (Epstein, 1993:9). While this 
definition enables us to select cases, it does not provide any room for intraparty actors. 
Hence, as Sartori (2005:3) suggests, “political parties might resemble a miniature of a 
political system with their authority structures, representative processes, electoral systems 
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and sub-processes for recruiting leaders, defining goals and resolving internal system 
conflicts”. They are composed of different organs that are horizontally and vertically linked. 
 
During factional conflict, the party leadership will be more likely to take sides with the 
majority faction that has voted for the leader since party leaders are primarily concerned with 
keeping their status as party leaders. I concur with Demirkol (2014) who states that this 
majority faction might be called the dominant coalition, that is, a coalition of internal party 
forces that align with the party leader in ruling the host party. 
 
Political parties are of central importance for the functioning of democratic systems (Lipset, 
2000). It is therefore not surprising that their structures and processes, as well as the factors 
which determine or influence them, have been analysed time and time again. Kollner and 
Basedau (2005) observe that the resulting stream of research has shown a great variety of 
possible organizational forms that political parties can take – and thus also a variety of ways 
in which parties perform society and state – oriented tasks. There is no universally solid 
organisational form of political parties, nor one that is forced upon them by sheer necessity. 
There is no ideal or best organizational form since today’s advantages of a given form can 
amount to disadvantages tomorrow (Panebianco, 1988:17, Wiesendahl, 1998:64; Siaroff, 
2002:168,189). Like all organisations, parties exhibit alongside their formal organisational 
structures informal relational systems, operating procedures, and norms which are 
institutionalised to different degrees (Kollner, 2006). 
 
A central insight of the literature on party organisation is that parties are not homogenous 
organisations which are sure of their goals and which follow some sort of unitary will. 
Rather, as Kollner and Basedau (2005) note, parties consist of coalitions of political actors 
who pursue their individual interests and goals. The coalitions these actors enter are based on 
the exchange of political resources (Panebianco, 1998). Just as politics in general can be seen 
as a process based on the conflictive and consensus-oriented relations among interdependent 
individuals, intra-party politics is characterised by conflict and consensus between 
interdependent groups within parties (Maor, 1997:147). The activities of intra-party groups, 
so-called factions, can not only influence changes in the identity, organisation, and internal 
decision-making processes of parties (Harmel and Tan, 2003). This brings us to the next 
section on factions. 
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5.3 Defining Factions 
 
Demirkol (2014) contends that party split is a consequence of sub-group formation and 
conflicting sub-group identities and/or conflicting interests. An analysis of literature on 
factionalism reveals that these internal actors have been labelled as currents, fractions, 
factions, cliques, conflict groups, wings (left and right), interest groups, tendencies or 
clientele groups. The variety of these label stems from the fact that scholars working on 
factionalism have attempted to provide typologies of three sub-party groups based on 
organisational and motivational dimensions. 
 
Earlier works on factions considered any intra-party grouping that competed with each other 
for the realisation of their goals as a faction. They were defined as semi-visible, irregular and 
unstable pre-party entities that could evolve into political parties (Chambers, 1963 cited in 
Belloni and Beller, 1976), or leader-follower groups with self-defined roles: “followers give 
support to the leader in parliament and in intra-party struggle, the leader has the primary 
responsibility to provide positions, funds, and other necessities of a good life” (Nicholas, 
1977:57). 
 
The previous chapter (Chapter 4) interrogate two factions in ZANU-PF, that is, one aligned 
to oust VP Mujuru and the other linked to Mnangagwa; and later in the chapter, a faction so-
called G40 comprised of Young Turks allegedly aligned to First Lady, Grace Mugabe. 
Because faction leaders of these ‘cliques’ have tried in vain to deny leading the factions, they 
aptly fit the descriptions given above as ‘semi-visible’. In this chapter, an attempt will be 
made to identify specific factions in MDC which later evolved into splinter parties. 
 
Factions structure the process of intra-party politics and decision-making, define the struggle 
for control of the party, its policies, its leadership and offices, its doctrines, its treasury 
among others; are devices for the distribution of party patronage – and, for governing parties, 
of government patronage; and they are instruments for generating and supporting rival 
candidates for public office (Demirkol, 2014). Factions are relevant for party splits as they 
are the main actors initiating party splits and forming new parties (Boucek, 2002:461). 
Similar to social movement or citizen initiatives, factions have a new demand or a neglected 
issue that they would like to be addressed. 
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They mostly pressure the party leadership for the fulfilment of the perceived demand but 
they might also evolve into potential new parties in the sense that they mobilise their political 
resources in order to take part in the decision-making process. A case in point is Ncube and 
Gibson Sibanda’s demand in 2005 that they (MDC) should participate in senatorial elections. 
When MDC President, Morgan Tsvangirai refused to participate, this ‘neglected issue’ 
resulted in the party split. 
 
What is significant about factions is not their structural properties but their relationship, 
activities and consequences of these activities for party politics. For this reason, factions can 
be defined as any intra-party combination, clique or grouping whose members share a 
common identity and common purpose and are organised to act collectively – as a distinct 
block within the party – to achieve their goals (Zariski 1960:33). These sub-groups enable 
the dissatisfied members of the parent organisation to voice their demands around a common 
leader. 
 
Kollner and Basedau (2005) define factions as a group or combination acting together within 
and usually against the larger body, such as in a state or political party. Factions are 
characterised by dissension within a group. In general terms these are two basic views with 
regard to factions and political parties. The vast majority of studies portray factions as groups 
within parties. There are, however, nearly as many views of such intra-party groups as there 
are studies. There is little agreement about the characteristics which determine factions in a 
constitutive manner. Studies have also arrived at quite diverging findings about the causes of 
factionalism and its consequences for political parties, party systems, and political systems. 
 
Before I deal with stages of splinter party formation in Zimbabwe and the possible structures, 
consequences, factors or causes of factionalism in political parties, it is imperative to define 
factions from a political-science perspective. In 1931, Harold Lasswell provided one of the 
first such definitions. The term faction is commonly used to designate any constituent group 
of a larger unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or policies. The 
faction arises in the struggle for power and represents a division on details of application and 
not on principles (Muller – Rommel, 1982:14). 
 
Beller and Belloni (1978:419) define factions as ‘any relatively organised group that exists 
within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes within 
rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part’. From this 
perspective, as Maor (1997:149) has put it succinctly, factionalism in political parties can be 
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understood as a form of conflict organisation which reflects the tendency of intra-party actors 
to act collectively to reach common goals. 
 
In drawing together the definitions of Zariski, Beller and Belloni, the term ‘faction’ is used to 
designate every intra-party grouping which exists for a certain period of time, possesses a 
minimum of organisation, exhibits a common group consciousness, actively pursue political 
goals (be these policy, personal or group specific ones) within a party and which thus can be 
discerned as a block within the party (Kollner and Basedau, 2005:9). Important to note is that 
factions are disciplined groups with a solid organisation who are conscious of their own 
existence and possess some stable personnel. Factions have a primary goal such as patronage 
(control of the party and government office by members of the faction, influence of party 
strategy and policy) and promotion of certain ideologies. 
 
5.4 Stages of splinter party formation 
 
Splinter party formation is an outcome that is reached only after a series of stages. Demirkol 
(2014) states that the first stage, dissent, is the phase during which dissident party members 
start to organise around a cause or during which already existent faction becomes 
disappointed with the party leadership’s policies and strategies. The second phase, intra-party 
conflict, is the phase where dissent is manifested in the form of exit or voice. The final part, 
departure is the stage when dissatisfied dissidents decide on the final strategy. 
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Figure 1 below illustrates stages of splinter party formation. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Stages of Splinter Party Formation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Demirkol, 2014) 
 
5.4.1 Dissent 
 
Most parties pass through periods of unity and dissension. There are numerous reasons for 
dissatisfaction. Some of the reasons are contextual and impossible to be generalised. For 
example, lack of internal party democracy, elite competition for power, intolerance and 
failure to handle factionalism within parties, personalisation of power and the premium 
placed on personal loyalties leads to the formation of breakaway parties. Other reasons for 
party splits include greed, perceived personal class differences, weak leadership, failure to 
adhere to the party constitution; and repeated failure to capture political power (Demirkol, 
2014; Simutayi, 2009; Mavhinga, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, we might take note of a number of factors that facilitate factional conflict. 
These include debate over the host party’s policy position due to the rise of new demands or 
electoral defeat, conflicts over strategies of the coalition under multipartyism, conflicts over 
distribution of spoils, and leadership succession in polities with high degree of personalism 
(Demirkol, 2014). It can be argued that some, if not all, of these factors led to the split in the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 
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A case in point is the issue of participating in the senatorial elections in 2005. The original 
MDC was formed in September 1999. Since then there have been two major breakaway 
formations, starting with the split of 2005 and another in 2014. They in turn have 
experienced their own cracks, leading to splinter formations. The first split led to a formation 
led by Professor Welshman Ncube, but it later split into two, with another referred to as 
MDC-M, led by Professor Arthur Mutambara. Before the split, there had been an earlier 
fracture, leading to a new formation called MDC-99, led by Job Sikhala (Magaisa, 2015: Part 
2). 
 
In 2014, senior MDC officials, Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma broke away from the MDC 
forming the MDC Renewal Team. Hardly a year after it broke away, the MDC Renewal 
Team also split, with Mangoma announcing the formation of the Renewal Democrats of 
Zimbabwe (RDZ), the newest kid on the block (Magaisa, 2015: Part 2). Detailed analysis of 
MDC splits and factors that led to the splits shall be explored later in this chapter. It is crucial 
to briefly illustrate potential reasons of dissent in a political party. Figure 2 below shows the 
various reasons for political dissent in a political organization. 
 
Figure 2: Potential Reasons of Dissent  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Demirkol, 2014) 
 
This thesis argues that political parties are not homogenous, as is seen in the political 
literature on political parties. Based on figure 2 above, some parties might decide to initiate 
change in their policy positions, especially following electoral defeats. Thus in 2005, 
Zimbabwe’s main opposition split after losing to Mugabe’s party that won flawed elections. 
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The MDC ‘dissidents’ won seats in defiance of party leader, Morgan Tsvangirai who later 
called for shift to mass resistance. MDC emerged divided as supporters of Mugabe won the 
majority of seats in senate elections. Tsvangirai vowed to lead a newly radicalised party 
prepared to take to the streets rather than contest elections. Tsvangirai expelled the 26 
candidates; an action which his rivals within the MDC said violated the party’s constitution. 
The editor of the country’s two remaining independent newspapers, The Zimbabwe 
Independent and The Standard, Iden Wetherell lamented Tsvangirai’s decision commenting 
thus: 
 
This is yet another tragedy for Zimbabwe…At the moment when the country is crying out for solutions, both political and 
economic, the best democratic alternative has collapsed into name-calling. The MDC intends to go down fighting, 
unfortunately not ZANU-PF but itself. 
 
After abolishing the senate in 1990, President Mugabe pushed through a constitutional 
amendment to re-establish it in 2005. Critics argued that the reconstitution of the senate was 
a ploy to increase patronage by Mugabe. Out of the 50 elected seats, Mugabe could also 
appoint 16 more senators. 
 
The senatorial election was also notable for the near disintegration of the MDC. After MDC 
leader Morgan Tsvangirai had expelled the 26 candidates party leaders ignored his order and 
instead voted to suspend him and to order him to appear before the party’s disciplinary 
committee on misconduct charges. However, the suspension had no effect or force because 
there were no grounds in the MDC constitution for censuring or impeaching of the president, 
only congress could do so. 
 
5.4.2. Intra-party conflict: Voice or Exit 
 
Demirkol (2014) posits that dissent starts in a latent way. It becomes observable when it is 
manifested by a group of dissidents in various forms, including party split. Intra party 
conflicts might take two forms: intra-elite conflict and elite-follower conflict. Intra elite 
conflict is usually accompanied by elite follower conflict since members of the conflicting 
elites have their respective followers in the party organisation. Intra elite conflict is the 
conflict that occurs within the parliamentary party, including those between members of the 
parliament and party representatives in government, whereas elite-follower conflict signifies 
any other internal disputes (Demirkol, 2014). 
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As Maor (1998: 10-11) states: 
 
 
Intra-party conflicts, for example, may be manifested by resignation of elite members (i.e. the ‘exit’ 
option), dissension in parliament and petitions and appeals to party elites with the intention of forcing 
a change in party strategy (i.e. the ‘voice’ option). Elite-follower conflict, by comparison, may be 
manifested by a decline in party membership (i.e. the ‘exit’ option), demonstrations of party activists 
and petitions or appeals to party elites with the intention of forcing a change in strategy (i.e. the ‘voice’ 
 
It should be pointed out that dissatisfied members might leave the organisation (exit), or 
express their dissatisfaction directly to some authority (voice). However, my argument is that 
voice is preferred to exit. This brings us to the loyalty option, which corresponds to an 
attitude or commitment to the party. 
 
According to Hirschman (1970:77-78) any individual with consideration attachment to an 
organisation will often search for ways to make himself/herself influential, especially when 
the organisation moves in what s/he believes is the wrong direction. Because of this, loyal 
members of an organisation are more likely to resort to voice rather than exit (Dowding, 
John, and Mergroupis, 2000). For example, when Welshman Ncube, Gibson Sibanda and 
other members of the MDC left the party in 2005 some influential members in the executive 
such as Tendai Biti, Chamisa and Elton Mangoma remained loyal to their leader Tsvangirai. 
However, when the MDC split for the second time in 2014 Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma 
left the splinter group MDC-T to form their own party but Chamisa and Thokozani Khupe 
preferred to voice their discontent rather than leaving. 
 
Party split is initiated by the decision of the dissidents. When they are dissatisfied with the 
performance of the party leadership they might simply leave the party. In other words, they 
might resort to the exit option either with or without attempting to voice their dissent within 
the host party (Dowding, John, and Mergroupis, 2000). 
 
I argue that such a move demonstrates that such party members lack purpose because they 
follow persons instead of ideology and policy. In any political party, MDC included, there 
are supporters who easily join the bandwagon without personal conviction. It follows that 
when party dissidents resign from a party, they might simply remain as independent, switch 
to an ideologically neighbouring party or form a new party. Although party switching is a 
preferable option for individual deputies, it is a highly costly option for the dissident faction. 
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This is due to the large number of dissidents which may make it difficult for the targeted 
party leadership to absorb the dissenting faction without harming the delicate balance of 
power within it. Investing their resources in a political project that might achieve success is 
likely to deter the dissenting faction from exit in the first place. For this reason, dissident 
faction is more likely to use the available means of dissent diffusion and voice their demands 
before departure. 
 
It is important to point out that there are various ways to voice dissent within party 
organisation and outside the party. Within party organisation, voice dissent could be done 
through national congress motions, call for extraordinary congress to debate the party line, 
call for group meeting among others. On the other hand, voice dissent outside party 
organisation may be through vote of no confidence, press release, memorandum, resignation 
(exit). Moreover they force the party leadership and executive boards to resign. As for MDC-
T, an extra-ordinary congress which was supposed to be held in 2015 was called for in 2014. 
 
5.4.3 Factors influencing the outcomes 
 
Party split is a consequence of the interplay between the dissenting faction and party 
leadership. It occurs when the party leader refuses to accommodate the demands of the 
dissent faction and when the dissenters insist on the realisation of its demands. Studies on 
new party formation have shown that this interaction is conditioned by exogenous factors. 
The dissent faction is expected to leave the party when the costs of exit are low and when 
benefits of exit are high (Tavits, 2006). However, as Demirkol (2014) posits, even when 
costs of exit exceed perceived benefits of exit; a dissident faction might be forced to exit 
when the party leader completely or partially purges members of dissenting faction. 
Dissidents who voiced demands are expected to leave the party when the party leadership 
does not accommodate their demands. The party leader’s resort to the option of whip 
depends on a number of endogenous factors, including the nature of disagreement, 
leadership’s autonomy and the relative size of the dissenting faction in the party system. 
 
5.4.4 Endogenous Factors 
 
All factions are bound to be united by some kind of common endeavour. They might strive to 
change or conserve the policy position of the parent organisation. Studies on individual party 
splits demonstrate that parent organisations are prone to split in cases of major disagreements 
over policy goals or policy positions and strategies of the parent organisation towards 
 
166 
 
external stimulus that leads to re-evaluation of the party’s policy position (Boucek, 2002; 
Cole, 1989; Hine, 1982). 
 
Party leadership will be less likely to accommodate dissidents’ demands in case of 
disagreements over party’s policy goals. In the event that ideology does not act as a unifying 
bond, parties might be prone to splits (Owens, 2003; Reiter, 2004: 268). Indeed, conflicts 
over selective benefits might threaten party unity in case their disagreement revolves around 
the legitimacy of party leader. If the dissenting faction directly attacks the party leader and 
attempts to undermine his rule, then accommodation becomes impossible given that party 
leaders are primarily concerned with keeping their status as party leader (Back, 2008: 74). 
This scenario is what happened to MDC-T when dissident members cited earlier attacked 
party leader, Tsvangirai, and undermined his leadership. Therefore, the party leader is less 
likely to accommodate the dissidents’ demands if the dissenting faction rejects the legitimacy 
of party leader’s rule. 
 
5.4.5 Exogenous Factors 
 
As stated before, party splits are likely to occur when the party leader refuses to 
accommodate the dissident faction’s demands and when the dissident faction refuses to step 
back in the factional strife. When deciding on their strategies, the leadership to the dissenting 
faction exercises some degree of foresight and is aware of the possibility that they might be 
expelled (Ceron, 2011: 196-197). Hence, they take the costs of new party formation and 
potential viability of a new party into consideration before entering into factional competition 
with the party leader and the dominant coalition. I argue that MDC dissent faction may not 
have calculated the costs of new party formation. I posit they acted impulsively without any 
clear purpose hence the frustration and continued spits into smaller and smaller entities 
which serve no purpose to the electorate and nation. 
 
Demirkol (2014:93) states that entry costs are the costs required for the formation of a new 
party. ‘These costs include the costs to register officially, to appear on the ballot, to pass 
through the visibility filter, and to access public offices”. 
 
Another exogenous factor influencing the calculations of the dissidents is perceived viability 
of a new party. Accordingly, political entrepreneurs are less likely to invest on new parties 
when the party system is institutionalised since they calculate that their potential new party 
will be less likely to receive support. Senior members of the MDC who decided to leave the 
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party and later MDC-T did not seem to have considered exogenous factors seriously as the 
new parties they formed do not have an impact on the electorate. This is evidenced by the 
lack of support base and unending defections and resignations by key members, resulting in 
few seats in parliament. The viability of a possible new party and the host party can be 
measured by public polling. 
 
5.5 Departure: splinter party formation versus infiltration 
 
Once the dissidents depart from the parent organisation, they have four options. According to 
Demirkol (2014), they might abandon politics, remain independent for a while with the hope 
that their demands will be reconsidered by the host party leadership, infiltrate into an 
ideologically neighbouring party that welcomes the dissidents or form a new political party 
to represent the issues which they believed were underrepresented by the parent organisation 
(Berrington, 1985). Although individual party members might simply abandon politics, this 
is less likely for members of a dissenting faction. This is due to the fact that they have a 
unifying theme to be realised (Boucek, 2002). Hence, they have three main options (Turan, 
Iba, and Zarakol, 2005:19). 
 
The first option is to resign and remain independent and is mostly a preliminary step to the 
formation of new party. That is, resigned officials mostly wait for the echoes of their exit in 
the host party with the hope that their departure would trigger discontent of a larger section 
of the host party. During this wait-and-see period, they are less likely to engage in publicised 
negotiations with another established party since such an act will not be welcomed by 
‘dissidents’ remaining sympathisers. However, once they realise that they will no more 
influence developments in the host party, they will either search for dialogue with the 
existing parties or start to work on new party formation (Turan, 1985:24). 
 
For example, when Joice Mujuru and her allies were purged by ZANU-PF, they went 
through these three options (similarly the same with dissidents from MDC-T). Now that there 
are possibilities and rumours of People First party, an off shoot from ZANU-PF, there are 
millions of sympathisers for Mujuru and her allies, allegedly many top officials in the 
Politburo, Central Committee, war veterans and party structures to the cell level. The People 
First party was secretly, quietly and strategically being formed for fear of infiltration and 
possible purges before it was officially launched. This was a wait-and-see period. 
 
 
 
 
168 
5.5.1 Causes of Party Splits: MDC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, December 2014) 
 
The image in the above insert symbolises the deep cracks that developed in the main 
opposition, MDC-T which subsequently led to the second split in the party in April 2014. 
Chege (2007) states that various reasons account for party splits including low levels of 
internal party democracy, greed, perceived class differences, weak leadership, failure to 
adhere to the party constitution, repeated failure to capture political power, and the failure to 
handle factionalism within the party. 
 
According to Magaisa (2015) reasons for party splits are diverse and include factionalism, 
lack of discipline and loyalty, lack of opportunities for advancement, the cost of leaving, 
benefits of leaving, lack of ideological fluency, fatigue and frustration, low costs of forming 
parties, sponsored parties, big egos and delusions of grandeur among others. In this section, I 
will attempt to analyse a selection of these and fuse some of the factors which are related in 
an effort to explain the frequency of splits and breakaways in the opposition parties. The 
MDC family, as Magaisa (2015) calls it, is the primary point of analysis. 
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Emmerson Mnangagwa, the Vice President of ZANU PF was quoted by Magaisa (2014) 
 
mocking the MDC thus: 
 
There is one major difference between Zanu PF and MDC…Zanu PF fires while MDC splits. Look 
now we have about five MDCs; MDC Tsvangirai, MDC Mutambara, MDC 99, and MDC Biti. So 
MDC splits and Zanu PF fires. 
 
While Mnangagwa’s statement may sound cynical, smirking and crude, he was speaking an 
uncomfortable truth. Magaisa (2014, Part 1) observed, “Opposition supporters won’t have 
liked the sound of it (Mnangagwa statement), but with a party being formed before you can 
say the ‘D’ in the MDC, it’s hard to ignore the statement. We are at the point now where the 
image in the public consciousness is of an opposition that is forever fighting small internal 
battles or creating smaller and smaller entities, each claiming to be the solution”. Zimbabwe 
Democracy Institute (ZDI) (2014) asserts that a split invariably weakens the party as it dents 
its credibility and negatively affects the party’s recruitment drive and supporters’ loyalty and 
affiliation. ZDI(2014)’s study established that the MDC-T split seriously weakened the party, 
although the Morgan Tsvangirai group remained significantly stronger than the Tendai Biti 
group in terms of grassroots support. 
 
I concur with Magaisa (2015) who posits that big ego and delusions of grandeur is one of the 
reasons for party splits in MDC. Magaisa (2014, Part 2) argues, “This might sound harsh but 
some characters are quite simply delusional or have huge egos. The trouble is everyone 
wants to be a leader and none wants to be led”. There is nothing particularly wrong with 
ambition…but it is also easy to be ambitious and impatient at the same time and to be 
delusional about one’s prospects. In an election when splinter parties held candidates in each 
constitution, opposition parties competing against each other instead of the ruling party, the 
electorate becomes confused. The result is that votes are split among smaller parties instead 
of the electorate voting for one grand coalition opposition in order to triumph. 
 
5.5.2 Factionalism 
 
Contrary to common thought, factionalism is not, on its own, a problem. Factions are natural 
in any group of people. So it is hardly surprising that there are factions in political parties. 
Kollner and Basedau (2005) contend that factionalism can affect the stability and 
institutionalisation of parties and party systems and it can impact on the efficiency and 
legitimacy of political parties and political systems as a whole. 
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Factionalism tends to be regarded as a phenomenon belonging to the ‘pathologies of politics’ 
(Friedrick 1972 cited in Kollner and Basedau 2005:13). This certainly reflects the views of 
party leaders and officials for whom the existence of factions poses an open challenge to 
party management. Indeed, factions can undermine the cohesion and the effectiveness of 
political parties. Clear –out dissent within a party and ensuing repression can take parties to 
the verge of disintegration. A case in point is what happened to MDC where dissent led to 
splits which seem to cause confusion in members and electorate base. 
 
Factionalism can lead to intra-party decision on personnel that are not based on merit and 
ability of the people involved but on their factional affiliation. I have highlighted specific 
examples in chapter 4 where ZANU PF purged Mujuru faction members who were alleged 
and perceived to be harbouring intentions to eliminate President Robert Mugabe. 
 
Faction-based intra-party conflict can also lead to blurry and contradictory positions of a 
party and thus render voters’ decisions more difficult - it leads into voter apathy. 
Factionalism can impede or block intra-party discussions and issue-oriented debates can be 
drawn into the vortex of inter-faction power struggles (Kollner and Basedau 2005). 
Therefore, factionalism can destabilise the party system and it can lead to growing cynicism 
on the party voters. 
 
Magaisa (2015) asserts that opposition parties, just like ZANU PF, also face the challenge of 
factions. Factions can be around issues but more often they are around personalities within 
the party. People rally around their favourite leader, which results in factionalism based on 
personalities. 
 
As Magaisa (2015) asserts, the difference between ZANU PF and the opposition parties is 
that ZANU PF has been able to manage factions, with Mugabe using his vast political skills 
to play one faction against another for decades, while managing power. It can be argued that 
ZANU PF factionalism was created and engineered by Mugabe in order to perpetuate his 
hold on power. The MDC, on the other hand, and its formations have not been able to contain 
the factional wars - the result has been splits. The trick, Magaisa (2015) argues, is in 
developing systems within the party to manage and contain factional wars and to avoid splits. 
Factional wars will never cease, they just have to be managed. 
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5.5.3 Lack of discipline and loyalty 
 
I posit that members of a political party whether in a senior position or at cell level, should 
respect their leader(s). There should be a clear hierarchical order from cell to presidium and 
that orders come from the top and the subordinates listen and implement. Although I agree 
that there is some form and measure of discipline and loyalty in ZANU PF, I do not concur 
with Magaisa (2015) in his assertion that in the opposition parties there is a laissez faire 
approach. 
 
Magaisa 2015 admits: 
 
I have often criticised the MDC (both privately and publicly) for trying too hard to be democratic and 
that often times this has worked against the party. In other words, at times it has tried to be democratic 
for its own good; far too often important decisions are left to the mob and the mob rarely agrees on 
issues and the decisions of the majority are not always the right decisions. Democracy is not always 
about the majority; it also understands the minority view, which might be the correct one. The result is 
conflict, with the minority often feeling hard-done by. The leadership has to be firm and give direction 
on important issues. 
 
I agree with the above observations but could have been more convinced if he had cited 
specific examples in particular context than generalising. According to Magaisa (2015: Part 
1), “In Zanu PF, people rally around the party and their leader. If they are not happy, they 
might sulk, but eventually they will keep around. If they are suspended, they will live in the 
hope of returning again. In the opposition, if someone sulks, he is likely to go and form his 
own party. Lack of loyalty and discipline are important factors in this regard.” 
 
My argument in this thesis is that ZANU PF members who are suspended or expelled remain 
silent not because of loyalty but fear that if they speak out, assets, wealth and gains they have 
accumulated will be withdrawn. Some of them might fear for their lives as anything can 
happen to them. A case in point is pre and post congress purges where Didymus Mutasa’s 
farm has been taken by Mandi Chimene because he has been exposing the dark side of 
ZANU PF. Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo decided not to remain silent after they were purged, 
perhaps they never harbour to re-join the liberation movement after suffering humiliation but 
decided to form their own party with Mujuru as their leader. 
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5.5.4 Lack of opportunities for advancement 
 
There is a view that parties split and people form their own parties because they are frustrated 
by the style of leadership and lack of opportunities for advancement. The lack of succession 
planning and the refusal by leaders to give way to others are often cited as major points of 
disagreement in opposition parties, leading to the formation of splinter organisation. When 
the MDC Renewal Team was created in 2014, moving away from the MDC-T, the major 
grievance was against party leader Tsvangirai, whom the dissenters thought had outlived his 
usefulness to the party but was refusing to let go. When Professor Welshman Ncube and 
others left in 2005 to create their own MDC, they complained about the leadership style but 
the split was sparked by a major disagreement over the decision to participate in that year’s 
senate elections (Magaisa 2015). 
 
Any leadership aspirants are given the harsh treatment, as Joice Mujuru saw in 2014. 
Sometimes decisions have been made that were unpopular with other factions. But all this 
has not led to those unhappy factions leaving and forming their own parties. I have already 
alluded to some possible reasons why ZANU PF members remain stuck despite frustration 
and disillusionment. Magaisa (2015) cites Tsholotsho Declaration as an occasion where a 
faction led by Mnangagwa was angling for a better position in the succession race. 
Mnangagwa was almost certain to become the Vice President, ahead of his rivals before his 
bid was cruelly thwarted, leading to the decimation of his own faction. 
 
Mnangagwa and his group could have walked away, sulking and deciding to form their own 
party. But they did not do that. They took their punishment silently. One of the alleged 
architects, Professor Jonathan Moyo was fired but came back a few years later and at the 
time of writing the Mnangagwa faction was in ascendancy and Moyo was back in his old 
post. If what happened in 2004 in ZANU PF had happened in the opposition…a new party 
would have been formed. However, I argue that Mugabe has inconsistency insofar as 
disciplining dissenting factions is concerned. If he forgave the Mnangagwa faction why did 
he purge Mujuru and her perceived allies? As for Jonathan Moyo, my view is that Mugabe 
and ZANU PF cannot do without him, particularly during election period- he may call him a 
“weevil” or “devil incarnate” but the truth remains that Moyo seems an indispensible 
propaganda spin doctor for ZANU PF to remain in power. 
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5.5.5 The Cost of Leaving 
 
One reason people stay within or around ZANU-PF even after serious frustrations or being 
mistreated is that the cost of walking away to form a new party is too high compared to the 
cost of leaving opposition parties. Magaisa (2015) posits that ZANU-PF is part of a complex 
web of interests and structure which he refers to as The System. It is possible to be outside 
the ZANU-PF party structures, but to still remain part of The System. Members who behave 
well can maintain their place within The System. This explains why those who get suspended 
or expelled choose to be contrite and to remain silent in order to keep their spaces within the 
system. 
 
 
According to Magaisa (2015), The System can be vindictive. Since much of the wealth and 
assets that most ZANU-PF officials own are derived from the benefits conferred by The 
System – through corruption, patronage and state benefits – there is always the risk that the 
system can withdraw those benefits if one becomes a political nuisance. For that reason, most 
of those who are mistreated by ZANU-PF choose to take their punishment quietly and hope 
to live another day. 
 
 
In addition, unlike ZANU-PF, the opposition is not part of The System which controls state 
machinery like the police and prosecution services that can easily be deployed to deal with 
those who become politically difficult. There are none of those harsh consequences for 
leaders who leave the opposition to form their own rival parties (Magaisa, 2015). It can 
therefore be argued that the cost of leaving the opposition party to form their own is much 
lower than the cost of leaving ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF malcontents stick around while MDC 
malcontents go on to form their own parties, all in the name of democracy. 
 
 
5.5.6 Benefits of leaving 
 
Forming a new party might actually bring more opportunities and benefits especially if there 
is donor support. Arguably, with opposition parties seemingly failing to dislodge the ruling 
party, international donors are now sceptical in sponsoring parties. Another factor could be 
that continuous splits in opposition parties makes donors lose confidence and trust in them. 
This is worsened by media reports that senior party officials misuse funds for their own 
personal comforts like love scandals and purchase of lavish houses in upmarket suburbs. 
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Press representation on MDC-T depicts that the opposition party is now broke because the 
main funders such as Roy Bennett and Western donors have withdrawn their funds. 
 
 
5.5.7 Lack of Ideological Fluency 
 
There is a critical need to interrogate the lack of ideological fluency within the opposition 
parties. Magaisa (2015) contends that people rally around causes – such as the need to end 
injustices, to promote human rights, to remove a leader – but without the firm ideological 
base upon which the traditional liberation party is often built. It can be argued that parties are 
formed around individuals or the need to remove individuals. When there is frustration with a 
leader, people find a new person and they form another party. However, this cannot be said 
of the main MDC when it was formed; however, the splinter parties may lack ideological 
base or they may not have firm ideologies that people believe in. According to Magaisa 
(2015:Part 2), the opposition came together with the primary mission of removing Mugabe 
and ZANU-PF…it was the big umbrella which united all those seeking “change” from 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF. 
 
 
5.5.8 Fatigue and Frustration 
 
As I have alluded to earlier, the MDC was formed to remove Mugabe and ZANU-PF to 
pursue change but this has not happened yet, so it caused frustration. The party has been very 
close, especially in 2008, when Tsvangirai beat Mugabe in the first round of the elections 
before the sordid acts of violence that forced him to withdraw from the run-off election in 
June. Magaisa (2015) argues that each time the party has been thwarted, largely, through 
unfair means and rigging, people have been killed, some have disappeared and homes and 
livelihoods have been broken. All this has taken its toll on the members. Then there is the 
curse of July 31 2013. It was not just an unfair and controversial election defeat, it broke 
spirits. It has been said that some leaders were almost suicidal. It inflicted substantial trauma 
on the opposition and its leadership. After all that had been done, after all the promises and 
the expectation, it dawned on most that it seemed almost impossible to take power from 
ZANU-PF. Hence the thought that perhaps, it was time to change the formula and that this 
should necessarily involve leadership change. Rather than ZANU-PF, they began to question 
themselves and their leadership. 
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This fatigue and frustration led to impatience, serious friction, recklessness and poor 
judgment, which eventually resulted in the split. What is regrettable is that senior party 
officials who initiated the split lacked political maturity to discern what exactly had 
happened in the election where ZANU–PF itself was shocked it had won. 
 
In the next section of this chapter I will analyse press representation of succession struggles 
and factionalism in the MDC. 
 
 
5.6 MDC SPLIT 2005: Pro-Senate versus Anti-Senate election  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Tsvangirai says he will never forgive Welshman Ncube for the 2005 split) 
 
 
 
 
The real causes of the MDC split in 2005 are varied and complex depending on which one 
views them. Those who were pro-senate hold their own perceptions while anti-senate 
factions justify their own perceptions and give their reasons in not participating. Ironically, 
ZANU-PF and its sympathisers also have their own opinion. Nevertheless, the bottom line is 
that the split had negative implications for the development of opposition politics in the 
country. The Daily Mirror Zimbabwe 23 November 2005 published an article titled “MDC 
infighting to hand ZANU-PF victory” which was written by Patson Matsikidze. The 
newspaper quoted Matsikidze saying: “The MDC, the once popular party among urbanites 
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has become the ‘sick man’ of Zimbabwean politics as it suffocates in the fumes of its intra-
party violence and seemingly irreconcilable differences”. The depiction of violence in the 
opposition is contrary to its values and principles. The month-long standoff – precipitated by 
the heated debate over senate participation had occurred in the light of historical factions 
where cliques in the party represented tribal, ideological and elitist interests. Tensions within 
the MDC spilled into the public arena with senior party officials washing all the dirty linen in 
full view of everyone. Given such a scenario, ZANU-PF seemed to be riding on the wave 
created by the tensions within the MDC. President Robert Mugabe took advantage of his star 
rally in Manicaland to hammer out what he referred to as the political immaturity of the 
opposition. The name calling, mudslinging and character assassination that dominated the 
MDC was described by Mugabe as “a triumph for ZANU-PF which was getting stronger 
causing the MDC to break into pieces”. 
 
 
Tsvangirai critics lashed out at his position on the senate issue and then his unilateral 
blocking of a decision by the National Executive Council (NEC) to participate in election for 
the upper house. The impasse greatly minimised the MDC’s chances of performing as well as 
it could have done in the senate elections. Zhangazha (2005) argues that the differences on 
whether the MDC must or must not participate in the senate elections are symptomatic of a 
serious departure by the MDC leadership from the party’s founding principles and the 
creeping in of “political elitism” that feeds on patron-client networks. Zhangazha, cited in the 
newspaper above argues that “elitism has the tendency to emerge in a period where a party or 
organisation becomes too comfortable with itself, and negates the principles upon which it 
was founded. Tsvangirai gravely erred in allowing this sort of elitism to creep in, where a 
system of patronage about who participates in parliament or not becomes the order of the 
day. Or alternatively, where the “Top Six” begin to behave as though they were a ZANU-PF 
presidium and in the process battle for control of elite, an organ as the National Council as if 
that is what the party was formed for”. The argument further raised was that MDC was no 
longer as consultative and inclusive as it was from the onset. 
 
 
It can be argued that differences, especially in a big political party like the MDC, are 
necessary and the essence of democratic discourse, but the way the MDC leadership behaved 
was amateurish and retrogressive. Pasirayi (2005) lamented that the behaviour of the MDC’s 
so called “Top Six” is no different from the way the ZANU-PF politburo behaves. “But the 
problem can be traced back to Tsvangirai who has forgotten the reason why the party was 
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formed and has made himself become too bureaucratic and elitist in his approaches and 
strategies” (Pasirayi, 2005:1 The Daily Mirror Zimbabwe, 23.11.05). 
 
 
Prior to the formation of the MDC, teams were dispatched to the provinces, including areas 
such as Binga, Lupane, Tsholotsho, Mudzi, Nyazura, Chimanimani, and Rutenga to mention 
but a few, to consult with the people of Zimbabwe to speak on the Zimbabwe they wanted. 
The template that was used in the data gathering and consultation exercise had three 
questions: what is the current economic and political situation in Zimbabwe? What are the 
remedies to the situation? And how should the situation be resolved? The process culminated 
in the production of a voluminous document called the “raw data” that was used by delegates 
to the All Working Peoples National Convention that was held under the theme “An Agenda 
for Action” in February 1999. It is this convention which gave birth to a political movement 
that called the MDC. 
 
 
It is this history that we can use to explain why things have turned out the way they have in 
the main opposition party. The point that Zhangazha (2005) raised about political elitism in 
the MDC which has fashioned out in a manner reminiscent of ZANU-PF politics is 
responsible for the cracks that are emerging in the opposition party. Pasirayi (2002) asserts 
“some of the most vocal members of the MDC today who are creating confusion may need to 
be lectured on how the party was formed. Some of these members had been active in 
opposition politics and had flirted with parties like the ruling ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe Unity 
Movement and the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats and failed to make an impact”. 
 
 
Taking a cursory look at the MDC politics today, they resemble a completely divided 
movement, with the divisions taking tribal, regional and ideological lines. It can be argued 
that there was the existence of a faction of academics in the MDC – a faction said to be 
dovish in its approach to political challenges. It is alleged that this group favoured the courts 
and dialogue as opposed to street protests to resolve political disputes. Some MDC leaders 
had played squarely into the hands of ZANU-PF intelligence by trying to be legalistic or 
academic as opposed to being revolutionary in their conduct. This is the reading that we get 
from the differences that ensued as a result of the senate election. The argument I raise in this 
study is that opposition parties should guard themselves from infiltration, particularly from 
ruling party agents such as CIO. 
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Pasirayi (2005:3) argues: 
 
After the death of Jongwe, there were efforts to bar Chamisa from standing as candidate in Kuwadzana 
because the seat had been reserved for Murisi Zvizvai, himself a late comer in MDC politics 
(mafikizolo in Ndebele) but also a close confidante of the MDC leader. Had it not been a screaming 
front page story in The Daily News that pre-empted Tsvangirai’s motive, Chamisa would not be the 
legislator for Kuwadzana. 
 
The above scenario confirms the persistence of patron-clientilism in the rank and file of 
MDC- a reflection of undemocratic practices under this patronage system that the MDC 
leader has perpetuated. 
 
 
It is significant that I explore MDC leader’s reasons for urging his supporters to boycott 
senate elections which resulted in low turnout. Tsvangirai and critics argued that the sole 
purpose of the senate, which can veto measures passed by the lower house, was to provide 
sinecures to Mugabe’s allies. Tsvangirai urged the party not to contest the poll because it 
would be rigged by President Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF. The MDC leader also opposed 
the poll arguing it was a waste of resources for a country that should be focusing all its 
energies on addressing hunger that was threatening a quarter of its people. Against this 
background party secretary general Welshman Ncube, deputy president Gibson Sibanda and 
other top leaders revolted against their party leader insisting the MDC should contest after its 
national council voted for the party to do so. They also accused Tsvangirai of violating the 
part’s constitution when he allegedly sought to overturn the decision of the national council. 
 
The Zimbabwe Independent of 2 November 2005 published an article with a headline 
“Tsvangirai denies violating constitution”. In the article, Dumisani Muleya (2005) reported 
that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai denied a series of allegations levelled against him by the 
rival faction led by party secretary-general Welshman Ncube. Tsvangirai denied accusations 
that he had become a dictator by “wilfully violating” the constitution, overruling the party’s 
national council, the administrative and policy-implementing organ and unleashing youth 
militia on colleagues. The MDC’ s pro-senate faction announced that vice president Gibson 
Sibanda had suspended Tsvangirai after a disciplinary committee allegedly found him guilty 
of violating the party’s constitution by issuing a call to boycott the poll. 
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In a letter dated 24 November 2005, Sibanda told Tsvangirai of his suspension thus: 
 
Please be advised that the national disciplinary committee of party met 20 November and resolved to 
suspend you from your position as President of the party with immediate effect… 
 
What is interesting to note is that in 2005 the dissatisfied faction expressed their voice 
through a letter to the party leader, a similar strategy adopted by dissident faction later in 
2014 when Elton Mangoma also wrote a letter to Tsvangirai telling him to step aside. 
However, Tsvangirai scoffed at the suspension arguing that only the party’s congress could 
censure him. Therefore, the party leader’s response was to force the dissatisfied faction to 
leave the party which later formed their own political party known as MDC-N, the ‘N’ 
indicating the name of the new party leader Ncube. The Zimbabwean situation an online 
publication of 28 November 2005 reported that the two factions of MDC could engage in a 
war of attrition over the ownership of the organisation’s name and assets. The factions were 
positioning themselves to unrest control of the party’s assets. 
 
There was a perception among political observes that the judges, some of whom were 
sympathetic to the ruling party, would grant the use of the party’s name and emblem to the 
less popular pro-senate faction to further destabilise the opposition. However, MDC 
supporters and youths thronged Harvest House (the party’s headquarters) to ensure that 
Tsvangirai was not hindered from working there. Ironically, the pro-senate faction was not 
allowed to set foot at the Harare House and subsequently lost the case to property rights, 
though they labeled their party MDC-N. The Standard of 14 February 2011 carried an article 
with a headline “We own Harvest House -MDC-T.” The newspaper reported that during a 
public debate over whether or not public officials should declare their assets, ZANU PF and 
MDC-T politicians engaged in peaceful discussions on the same table. ZANU PF Goodson 
Nguni made stunning accusations, claiming the MDC-T headquarters, Harvest House was the 
property of Ian Makone the party’s director of elections and also the chief secretary to 
Morgan Tsvangirai that time. 
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5.7 Press Representation of MDC-T splits: 2014  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In April 2014, the MDC-T suffered yet another major split following the 2005 split over 
disagreements on whether or not to participate in the country’s senatorial elections. To 
distinguish between the two splinter parties, the MDC led by Morgan Tsvangirai was named 
MDC-T while the other formation was dubbed MDC-N. Mavhinga (2014) observed that the 
MDC-T has been slowly losing support because of this split despite the 2008 election result 
where it almost dislodged ZANU PF from power. 
 
Some scholars noted that during the Inclusive Government era (February 2009 to July 2013), 
there was a gradual shift of public opinion and political affiliation. According to a survey 
conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute in June 2012, the support base of MDC-T 
declined from 38% to 20% from 2010 to 2012. Masunungure (2013) also argues that after the 
2008 elections, the MDC-T lost many of its passive supporters and not a few of its core 
supporters. 
 
According to ZD1 (2014), following the disputed July 2013 elections ZANU- PF effectively 
retained its hegemony leaving opposition political parties severally weakened and 
disoriented. 
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After the MDC failed in its legal and diplomatic bid to ensure the conduct of fresh elections, 
it started to battle strong internal conflicts. Disgruntled with the party’s loss, some high 
ranking members began to call for leadership renewal, especially regarding the party 
presidency calling for an early congress to elect a successor to Tsvangirai in order to ‘renew’ 
the party and the leadership. In chapter two, I explored how Roy Bennet, the then party 
treasurer, Ian Kay, former Member of Parliament for Marondera Central; and Elton 
Mangoma, the then deputy treasurer expressed their voice to Tsvangirai. 
 
Mavhinga (2014) reckons that the tension within the party fuelled violence, suspensions and 
counter suspensions which finally culminated in a split, with the pro-renewal team led by 
Sekai Holland and the secretary-general, Tendai Biti, and the other formation remaining loyal 
to Morgan Tsvangirai. The loss of 2013 elections was not to be blamed on an individual but 
the entire party was supposed to take deep introspection then map a way forward 
collectively. The Standard of December 15 to 21, 2013 published on article with a headline 
“MDC-T dead and buried - Mugabe”. The newspaper reported that on closing the three-day 
conference held in Chinhoyi, Mugabe said his party was now “born again” after the elections 
in which the opposition party suffered a massive loss to ZANU PF in the July 31 harmonised 
elections. Mugabe was quoted saying the MDC-T was no longer a stumbling block following 
the collapse of the Government of National Unity (GNU), vowing the opposition party would 
never “resurrect after the loss”. 
 
The newspaper further quotes President Robert Mugabe vowing that “They will never rise 
again…We dug graves for them and interred them in those graves”. The depiction of Mugabe 
seems that during the four years of the GNU tenure ZANU PF was being hamstrung by the 
inclusive Government, hence the failure to improve the economy, yet the parallel structures 
that were created by both parties were meant to destabilise each other in struggle for 
hegemony and control of the soul of the nation. The Herald of 29 April 2014 carried an 
article titled “MDC-T split engineered in the west” by Panganai Kahuni. I have argued in 
both chapter two and four that Zimpapers always reflect the ruling party’s ideology and 
views. Their allegiance to ZANU PF can be very disturbing through blatant unprofessional 
bias. 
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The state-owned newspapers representation is that the ‘west’ sponsors intellectuals and 
academics to front its national interests. Kahuni (2014) alleges: 
 
Political organisations that are formed under the guise of academic freedom and whose so-called 
intellectual members use universities and university students to front their political agendas are bound 
to fail. Political organisations that are formed under the asymmetric cover of the need to uphold tenets 
of democracy, human rights, rule of the law and corporate governance are destined for serious troubles 
such as happened with the MMD in Zambia, and is happening with the MDC formations in Zimbabwe. 
 
It can be argued that state owned newspapers use column writers disguised under different 
names and designations to express the ZANU PF official line of thinking. Some of these 
writers are local while others write from abroad under categories of political commentator, 
analysts, and staff reporter among others. I agree that all the parties in the GNU acted 
undemocratically by suspending members from the party before holding their elective 
congress. Important to note is the agenda-setting role of the state-owned press which is 
reflected in their headlines, discourse, tone and vocabulary; arguably intended to fuel conflict 
in the opposition. 
 
The Herald of 14 March 2014 carried an article titled “MDC-T on the verge of splitting”. 
The article reported that internal squabbles characterised by violence against senior officials 
were fomenting a split in MDC-T as revealed in the Guardian Council of the party report 
written by Sekai Holland, Samuel Nkomo, James Makore and Cephas Makanyana. The 
council is mandated with offering guidance to the party. It was alleged that Tsvangirai 
attempted to block the report from being presented to the national council as it contained 
issues of leadership renewal. It was alleged that exactly 10 days after the report was 
prepared, Elton Mangoma, Promise Mkwananzi and Tendai Biti were attacked at Harvest 
House but MDC-T spokesperson, Douglas Mwonzora disowned the report. 
 
The newspaper representation was that Tsvangirai was becoming a dictator who fuelled 
violence on his colleagues, such representation from ZANU PF aligned press does not come 
as a surprise as it has always negatively reported MDC from 1999. The article further 
portrayed that Tsvangirai was losing in grassroots structures, thereby confirming analysts’ 
assertions that internal conflicts and splits weaken the party. 
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The guardian council said MDC-T had lost its grip of local, regional and international 
politics since its heavy defeat to ZANU PF on July 31 2013. The council further said there 
was rampant violence, vote-buying, factionalism and manipulation of voting processes 
during internal polls. The Standard of 29 June 2014 carried an article with a headline 
“Renewal team wooed by ZANU PF: Tsvangirai”. In the article Tsvangirai is quoted saying, 
“While we think we are moving together, we get some other people rebelling. Others have 
started chickening out yet we have not achieved what we wanted to achieve. They are saying 
Tsvangirai must go but have we achieved our goal of removing Zanu PF?” He further alleged 
that the 2005 rebellion by Welshman Ncube was a rebellion to support ZANU PF, and that 
the rebellion by Biti and Mangoma was no renewal but also strengthening ZANU PF. 
 
Another article in The Standard of 2 May, 2014 titled “MDC-T split pre-planned: Moyo” 
depicts dissent faction was rather impatient in voicing their grievances before congress. 
According to Lovemore Moyo (2014) in an interview with the reporter, the letter by Elton 
Mangoma to Tsvangirai to step aside was unprecedented as he was supposed to wait for 
congress although some analysts argue it was his democratic right to express his views on 
any issue including the performance of his party leader, especially in private, as Mangoma 
did in this case. 
 
However, it was alleged that the letter was part of a process leading up an attempted palace 
coup. But why write to someone instead of approaching them? It would seem that Mangoma 
had a hidden agenda, especially given that MDC-T offers a ‘surgery platform’ within the 
standing committee at the beginning of every year for the presentation of concerns for 
evaluation. Nevertheless, the nature of internal conflicts is always controversial and complex 
to resolve as members offer conflicting views to what would have been their motives. 
“Absolute power for Tsvangirai was ill-advised,’’ read the title of an article in The Standard 
of September 21 to 27, 2014. This shows that “unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of 
those who possess it’. This is what William Pitt, Earl of Chatham and British Prime Minister 
from 1766 to 1778 said in a speech to the House of Lords in the United Kingdom sometime 
in 1770.Yet another thinker, Lord Action said in 1887: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely”. Sadly, these famous pieces of wisdom appear to have escaped 
some officials in MDC-T who called for a constitutional review to grant more powers to 
party President Morgan Tsvangirai. 
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The newspaper reported that the officials…wanted the party’s constitution to be amended so 
that Tsvangirai could become an imperial president with powers to cherry - pick national 
executive members, as opposed to having them directly elected by the membership. For their 
self-serving scheme to be successful, they also wanted to water down the powers of the 
secretary-general, leaving the party more or less like a personal chiefdom. It can be argued 
that the post of secretary-general was targeted for obvious reasons. Previous office bearers - 
Welshman Ncube and Tendai Biti - who both broke away from MDC and formed splinter 
formations, had prevented Tsvangirai from doing whatever he liked in the party. They were 
too powerful for the president and his men’s liking. I argue in this study that there is 
similarity between MDC and ZANU PF where in 2014 ZANU PF amended the party 
constitution to empower President Robert Mugabe to appoint his two deputies and members 
of the politburo thereby creating one centre of power. This has also been done in MDC-T 
constitution, incidentally amended in 2014 where Tsvangirai is now the centre of all powers. 
Could it be argued MDC-T was taking notes or cue from the ruling party? 
 
The Standard of November 9 to15, 2014 published an article “Tsvangirai emerges weaker 
from congress?” The writer of the article, Silence Charumbira (2014) asserts that whenever 
the going gets tough, in the face of fierce opposition; leaders of political parties often call for 
congress to measure their popularity and consolidate power. That appears to have been the 
same tactic employed by MDC-T leader, Tsvangirai who called for congress a year earlier 
than scheduled to fill the void in positions left after the party suffered a second split in April 
2014. 
 
The newspaper representation is that Tsvangirai used the congress to entrench his powers, 
assuming authority as the custodian of all assets and to supervise all leadership. He also got 
powers to suspend any national executive through the national council. I concur with 
Masunungure who was quoted by the newspaper saying “...from a democratic perspective 
Tsvangirai has ceased to be a democrat due to the constitutional amendments that have made 
sure he has amassed power. Tsvangirai has literally become owner of the party as the 
amendments have allowed him to privatise the party instead of it being a public institution’’. 
The irony in the headline is that when the article depicts that “Tsvangirai is not stronger 
when the amendments give him more power. However, the MDC-T party spokesperson, 
Obert Gutu defended the amendments claiming MDC-T came out stronger and more united 
after the congress. 
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 5.8 Election boycott: A survival manual for MDC-T? 
 
This study argues that the political drama that grips the nation through power struggles and 
factionalism in both ruling party and main opposition is a cause for concern to Zimbabweans. 
As ZANU PF is engulfed in the fluid succession inferno logic should have dictated that the 
political pendulum swings in favour of the opposition as the former liberation movement is 
on the verge of a split. But even staunch opposition supporters are astonished by the 
prevailing narrative from the Harvest House, in particular the glorification of election 
boycotts at a moment when Mugabe appears to be more vulnerable than ever before. It is 
significant to point out that in its last Congress, the MDC-T agreed not to contest on any 
elections in the country until electoral reforms are implemented by the government. Muchayi 
(2016) asserts that historical evidence has proved that election boycotts are a suicidal weapon 
to fight an entrenched dictatorship and more so in a terrain littered with landmines. In fact, 
the strategy has never proved to be effective. It can undermine the legitimacy of an election 
but never alter its outcome. According to Muchayi (2016:2) 
 
Historical evidence drawn from the Jamaican general elections of 1993 widely believed to be the most 
successful election boycott in history…allowed the ruling party to win all seats in the House of 
Representatives, with the sitting incumbent retaining his post for another seven years… In Ethiopia, 
opposition parties boycotted the 1994 parliamentary elections and the strategy fired back as the ruling 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front romped to victory…Several Ghanaian opposition 
parties boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections, protesting the re-election of the incumbent Jerry 
Rawlings as president, only to regret as the dictator never budged and his party pocketed 189 of the 
200 parliamentary seats as stake…The Cameroonian opposition also tested their own medicine in 1997 
when they decided to boycott presidential elections which the incumbent Paul Biya won with a 
landslide, garnering over 92 % of the votes. 
 
Given such precedents one wonders whether opposition parties in Zimbabwe and the MDC-T 
in particular, are aware of this damning historical evidence. In fact, far from being an 
appealing weapon to fight dictatorship, election boycotts are often loathed by many, for 
opposition parties cannot achieve success by avoiding competition however flawed the rules 
governing such contests maybe. All the above evidence proves that it would be naïve for the 
opposition in Zimbabwe to overestimate the backing of the international community in the 
event that they decide to boycott all future elections, for boycotts do not always garner the 
international attention necessary to allow the boycotting parties to gain some benefits. 
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As I argued earlier, if the opposition failed to force Mugabe to implement the needed reforms 
while they were still in the inclusive Government, how can they dream of overcoming this 
obstacle through election boycotts? Muchayi (2016) further argues that the idea of boycotting 
elections is flawed in that its proponents assume Mugabe to have retained some decency in 
him to succumb to external pressures. 
 
The argument of this thesis is that the consequences of boycotting all future elections on the 
political landscape of Zimbabwe will ensure the survival of the incumbent’s regime as they 
empower the existing establishment. It is significant to note that ZANU PF strategies of 
winning elections have evolved but the opposition fails to keep pace with this trend. Muchayi 
(2016) reckons that in 2007-2008, the ruling party relied on open violence against its 
opponents but today it relies on the manipulation of the electoral process. All these are 
weapons at the regime’s disposal to cling onto power. By boycotting elections, the opposition 
leaves a political vacuum that needs filling. 
 
5.8 MDC-T not Contesting in Elections: Faces another Split 
 
This section attempts to analyse press representation of MDC-T resolution of not 
participating in by-elections, then interrogate consequences of such a position. The Herald of 
18 March 2015 carried a story titled “MDC-T MPs KICKED OUT…By- elections loom as 
21 seats vacant”. The newspaper reported that parliament expelled the legislators after MDC-
T wrote disowning them, saying they were no longer representing its interest in the House of 
Assembly after they joined the recently formed United Movement for Democratic Change 
(UMDC). The new party is a merger between former MDC-T secretary-general Tendai Biti, 
who broke away to lead MDC Renewal Team, and Welshman Ncube, who lead the MDC. 
The newspaper reported that Tsvangirai faced MDC-T rebellion if he decided to boycott the 
impending by-elections as some senior members in his party were eying constituencies left 
vacant following Parliament’s decision to expel 17 MDC Renewal Team members from the 
National Assembly. 
 
The speaker of the assembly, Jacob Mudenda expelled the MP’s after confirming that there 
was no longer any dispute in the courts concerning the leadership of the party. It is important 
to note that this decision sparked a fresh fight over party assets and properties between the 
two rival MDC factions. However, Tsvangirai camp occupies the party headquarters at 
Harvest House in Harare and most of the provincial offices except in Manicaland. 
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After court decision MDC-T retained ownership of party asserts, property, name, symbols 
and finances. The Daily News of 25 March 2015 published an article titled “MDC NOT 
CONTESTING IN BY-ELECTIONS”. 
 
The bold headline suggests emphasis of MDC-T’s position of not participating in the by-
elections for the 14 seats. Ironically, the party was quick to replace the seven MPs whose 
seats fell vacant under the Proportional Representation platform, itself a form of participation 
in the election process (as many critics argue), while shying away from facing ZANU PF in 
the 2014 contested constituencies. However, MDC-T party spokesman, Obert Gutu said the 
party had upheld its October 2014 congress revolution not to participate in any general or by-
election before the implementation of key electoral reforms. It is important to underscore the 
fact that Tsvangirai was reportedly under pressure from senior party officials who wanted to 
take up the vacant seats to bring vibrancy to parliament and this fuelled potential rift in the 
party. 
 
The Sunday Mail of 22 March 2015 carried an opinion piece titled “Again, why should I vote 
for you?” written by Joram Nyathi (Group Political Editor). Nyathi (2015:10)’s view is that 
the multi-partyism often does help to keep the ruling party in check. The fear of losing power 
in elections is an incentive for any government to do better. I also argue in this study that for 
a political party to become a serious contender for power it must have distinguishable 
policies; it must have something to sell to the electorate. It must go beyond the protest vote 
and lay out programmes of action to challenge those of the incumbent. 
 
 
Nyathi’s opinion is that Tsvangirai leadership raises a lot of questions. The party has been 
thrown into turmoil over the decision to recall the 21 MPs who broke away with Tendai Biti. 
So why get people out of parliament if you are not ready to replace them? To vote or not, that 
is the question which split the original MDC in October 2005. The same hypothetical 
question could have been raised in 2014 when MDC-T leader was adamant his party would 
boycott by-elections. Although Nyathi’s (2015) views largely sound cynical on MDC-T and 
its leader Tsvangirai, there are some valuable arguments he raises in the article. Based on 
what I have reiterated, state-owned newspapers invite ZANU PF sympathisers to write 
articles in favour of ruling party while scathing opposition parties. What is interesting to note 
is that state controlled press portrays sympathy towards the splinter faction of the MDC-T 
while depicting Tsvangirai as a dictator. 
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On the other hand, the private press representation is that of sympathy for Mujuru as victims 
of Mugabe’s ruthlessness. Such press reportage confirms the polarisation of media 
environment in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
The Herald of 11 April, 2015 published a story titled “MDC-T faces potential split,” in 
which Tsvangirai was portrayed as undemocratic and that MDC-T is losing support even 
from within. I concur with the representation that MDC-T is losing support base from the 
grassroots which may cost the party in 2018 elections unless the party changes strategy and 
policy. The contents of the story in The Herald of 11 of April 2015 were the same verbatim 
with that of The Sunday Mail and even privately-owned press - reflecting lack of creativity 
and originality on the part of reporters who seem to use the same template despite belonging 
to different media houses. The agenda for state-owned media is largely to portray opposition 
parties, particularly MDC-T as ridden with conflict. 
 
 
The Chronicle of 13 April 2013 a sister paper to The Herald had an Editorial Comment: 
“Khupe faces political waterloo”. The newspaper representation was that MDC president 
Morgan Tsvangirai has always viewed himself as the embodiment of his party and the near 
cult status attained at the height of the country’s economic challenges between 2001-2008, 
which left him convinced that the opposition party was nothing without him. The Editorial 
Comment stated that “This delusion of grandeur knows no bounds and woe be tide anyone 
who dares oppose him. His latest fight with Khupe is therefore not surprising given the brutal 
manner he dealt with dissent in the past”. This indicates that Tsvangirai’s unilateral reversal 
of a national council decision to participate in the 2005 senatorial elections precipitated the 
first split where Welshman Ncube and his group left to form a splinter MDC. It is argued that 
Tsvangirai has always used whatever means necessary to hold onto power and neutralise 
opponents. 
 
 
The 2005 split was likely fuelled by strains caused by Tsvangirai’s treason trial and tribalism, 
as revealed by an unpublished report which was compiled by the party. The report compiled 
by a three-men commission comprising Tichaona Mudzingwa, Moses Mzila Ndlovu and 
Giles Mutsekwa into violence that erupted at the party’s Harvest House in May 2005 
suggested the party was inexorably heading towards a split, plagued by tribal, mistrust and 
competing political ambitions. 
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The report said fears that Tsvangirai would be jailed at the end of his treason trial split the 
party, with one faction of senior officials unprepared to have Tsvangirai’s deputy, Gibson 
Sibanda, an Ndebele-leading the party. 
 
 
The Herald of 14 April, 2015 carried an article titled: “Renewal MPs Court Challenge Fails”. 
The newspaper reported that a bid by 21 members of the breakaway MDC Renewal Team to 
challenge their expulsion from parliament hit a brick wall after the Constitutional Court 
threw out their application. The court found no fault on the actions of speaker of parliament, 
Advocate Jacob Mudenda and Senate President Edna Madzongwe in announcing the 21 
vacancies. 
 
 
Mudenda argued that the former MDC-T MP’s: 
 
 
Knew, or must have known or should have known, or ought to have known that the natural or probable 
consequences of them receiving the letters(s) of expulsion from a political party was to be followed by 
 
the concerned members’ recall from Parliament 
 
 
It would seem the Constitutional Court acted correctly, but perhaps knew the seats were 
destined for the ruling party. Chances were that even if MDC-T was going to contest for the 
14 seats, ZANU PF was going to grab some fairly or unfairly because the electoral base for 
MDC-T was dwindling due to infighting. Ironically, Tendai Biti, a ‘competent’ lawyer 
himself, a recipient of the fateful letter, could not fathom his fate too. The state controlled 
Herald quoted Mudenda cynically arguing: 
 
 
All these important events have already taken place and what is now left for the applicant is simply to 
accept his/her fate, because, to use the language of a rancher, the horse has bottled out of the pen, and 
to use Shakespearean language, it is a high-sounding application but signifying nothing or, to use 
biblical language, this application is no more than a noisy gong or a clanging bell which will not 
produce the desired results (The Herald 13 April, 2015). 
 
 
The newspaper representation is that the expelled MPs had their ‘marriage’ with MDC-T and 
parliament ended. It should be noted that on 4 March 2015, the first applicant, William 
Madzimure had received a letter from MDC-T expelling him from the party and instead of 
rushing to court to protect his alleged fundamental rights he went to Tendai Biti. 
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(The Herald, 13 April 2015). 
 
One can only conclude that what is was to be – it was one way of paying the price for 
immaturity and impulsive manner of expressing dissent when the disagreement arose. It 
seems state owned press agenda was to continue reporting MDC-T conflict with the sole aim 
of vilifying the party leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. What is of interest to note is that the 
newspaper published articles which were written by Alex Magaisa on Tsvangirai. 
 
 
The Herald of 9 May 2015 had a headline “Ex-advisor speaks on Tsvangirai.” Magaisa 
(2015) alleged that MDC-T leader, Morgan Tsvangirai lacks strategy to unseat ZANU PF 
and that his decision to boycott elections is ill-timed as the party does not have a viable 
alternative. He told The Herald in a wide ranging interview that MDC-T failed to pursue 
purported reforms during the inclusive Government era because it had been “comforted by 
luxuries of office”. 
 
 
According to Magaisa (2015): 
 
 
You have to say you are boycotting, but you are also doing A, B, C, and D to ensure that your demands 
are met. Otherwise you will remain in a perpetual state of boycott. Or if you eventually change your 
mind after many boycotts, people will say, but why did you waste all those opportunities boycotting 
lections? 
 
The argument being raised by Magaisa is that MDC-T should always have a backup plan. 
The depiction we get is that MDC-T has no formula against ZANU PF - a seasoned 
opponent. The Herald of 12 May, 2015 published an article titled “Zim opposition politics 
now in the mortuary,’’ written by Susan Chipanga. Chipanga (2015) posits that Zimbabwe 
opposition parties are in a crisis and that none of the political leaders inspire confidence in 
the voters. The reporter based her arguments from survey results by Afro barometer that 
people no longer have confidence in the opposition parties as confirmed by the July 31, 2013 
elections in which MDC-T lost ZANU PF. The newspaper representation of opposition 
parties in general and MDC-T in particular, sounds biased as it echoes the usual discourse 
that MDC-T called for sanctions which have resulted in the economic meltdown. The article 
suggests there are new subtle ways being mooted and put into action by the opposition to 
dislodge Mugabe. One way is to destroy ZANU PF from within which was tried in the 2008 
presidential elections through Simba Makoni but proved to be a dismal failure. 
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Chipanga (2015) fails to realise that had Makoni established a grand coalition with MDC-T, 
ZANU PF would have been defeated. However, she cynically alleges that Joice Mujuru is 
another character being touted as the favourite to fill the opposition vacuum as per “the daily 
song of her foot soldiers, Rugare Gumbo, Didymus Mutasa and the rabid private media.” I 
concur with Chipanga’s projection on the possibility of a grand coalition being mooted as the 
panacea to removing President Robert Mugabe from power in 2018 as doomed. If the grand 
coalition comprises Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn led by Simba Makoni, MDC-T led by 
Tsvangirai, ZAPU headed by Dumiso Dabengwa and Lovemore Madhuku’s National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA), then it may not go far. Arguably, these are power hungry 
and narcissistic individuals who cannot go past their own imagined self-importance for them 
to consider choosing one amongst them to lead the coalition. The fact that Simba Makoni 
could not form a coalition with Tsvangirai’s MDC-T in 2008 is evidence of this. While there 
is a likelihood of a demise of ZANU PF, it yet does not point to a rise of the opposition given 
its ego-dominated politics of refusing a coalition, confirming Magaisa’s (2014) argument that 
the fundamental challenge within opposition parties is that of “big egos and delusions of 
grandeur”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Will these opposition leaders (in the photograph above) form a grand coalition to dislodge 
ZANU PF the system; or join Mujuru’s People First towards the 2018 elections? In this 
study, I disagree with Susan Chipanga (2015) when she depicts opposition parties’ ‘death’ 
based on a survey by Afro barometer conducted in November 2014. 
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She paints a gloomy picture that the main opposition party, MDC-T is doomed yet she fails 
to consider events that occurred in MDC-T soon after they lost to ZANU PF on July 31 2013 
election. Politics is dynamic and it is dangerous to pronounce the death of the opposition on 
the basis of this survey. I agree with Magaisa’s (2015) views when he was interviewed by 
The Herald, 9 May 2015. Magaisa argues “…it is common cause that the opposition has 
gone through some difficult times in the past two years. These challenges were more 
prominent last year and, at the time that the survey was conducted, in November 2014, the 
main opposition party – the MDC-T – was dealing with a messy internal split, after some of 
its senior leaders broke away to form the MDC Renewal Formation”. 
 
 
It is this study’s contention that there was a lot of confusion and uncertainty among the ranks 
and all these problems afflicting the opposition may have contributed to its poor showing in 
the survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Herald of 9 May 2015 published a cartoon by I Mpofu pertaining to the Afro barometer 
survey. One section of the cartoon says: “Afro barometer survey exposes MDCs” then the 
other part portrays Tsvangirai – MDC-T leader laughing off: “HA?!...MAYBE IF IT WAS 
EUROBAROMETER!” 
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The cartoonist tries to make a caricature of Tsvangirai by echoing the ruling party narrative. 
The implication and reading we get is that Tsvangirai scoffs at surveys by locals but may 
only subscribe to Western projections – the sponsors of opposition parties according to 
ZANU-PF. The cartoonist and Afro barometer survey depict political attitudes and 
perceptions which are subject to scrutiny. Zimbabwe needs a strong opposition because it is a 
necessary part of the checks and balances that are critical in a democracy. Magaisa (2015) 
contends that ZANU-PF itself knows that a firm opposition is necessary. It is in Zimbabwe’s 
interest to have a stable opposition that performs its democratic function or mandate. But it is 
important to have unity among the opposition’s numerous formations. The opposition needs 
to address this issue of fragmentation as this is unhelpful especially when dealing with a 
formidable opponent like ZANU-PF, which is not only older and has considerably more 
experience but also has the advantage of incumbency. 
 
My theory, which concurs with Magaisa (2015), is that post 2013, there was a lot of 
frustration and fatigue in the party (I have discussed this in Section 4.4.7 of this chapter). 
MDC-T and, arguably the majority of Zimbabweans, were hopeful the opposition would 
form the next government but after the shocking loss opposition supporters were shocked and 
traumatised. This frustration and fatigue also led people to ask questions and to think that it 
was necessary to explore new channels. According to Magaisa (2015), after July 2013, 
people did not know what to do. They looked at what had happened in shock and asked what 
else do we could do to win power that we have not done before? 
 
5.9 Another split imminent in MDC-T: Tsvangirai versus Chamisa? 
 
I argue in this section that MDC-T is not free from internal strife, with the fear for the 
democratic movement always being whether or not it will splinter again. Conflict around 
specific personalities persists much to the threat of unity within the party. I concur with 
views of Zimbabwe Peace Project (2015:3) that “unless and until the parties (both ZANU-PF 
and MDC-T) have considerable unity of purpose and basic tolerance for diversity, peace 
within their movements will always be at threat”. The main opposition party, the MDC-T had 
its share of internal turmoil in October. Conflict, albeit milder than it is in the ruling party, 
showed that the unity of purpose is under threat in MDC-T. Known for splintering and re-
splintering, the opposition party’s propensity for possible split is always present with the 
party leader, Morgan Tsvangirai being pitied against Kuwadzana legislator, Nelson Chamisa. 
Although the party still denies any rift, instances in certain areas, for example in Bulawayo 
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following the death of Nkulumane legislator, Thamsanqa, among a few others, illuminate 
turbulences and power struggles within the party (ZPP, 2015). Both the state-owned and the 
privately-owned press were awash with stories of internal strife between Tsvangirai and 
Chamisa. 
 
It can be argued that the former made screaming headlines for obvious reasons – to fuel and 
exacerbate conflict in the opposition party so as to instigate a third split in the main 
opposition – MDC-T – ahead of 2018 harmonised elections. An online post on 13 June 2014 
published an article titled “Chamisa vs. Tsvangirai”, ‘constitutional renewal’ row, daggers 
drawn”. The lead paragraph of the article depicts Tsvangirai in a real battle for his survival in 
the leadership of the MDC-T against Nelson Chamisa. The Daily News of 5 November, 2014 
published an article with a headline “Tsvangirai speaks on Chamisa ouster”. This article 
comes after Chamisa lost to Douglas Mwonzora, who became the MDC Secretary General. 
Tsvangirai told the newspaper in an exclusive interview that Chamisa’s sudden fall does not 
mean he stops taking a prominent role in the MDC and that he could be co-opted into the 
MDC National Executive. Daily News quoted Tsvangirai saying Chamisa’s loss was a repeat 
of the stunning upset at the 2011 MDC congress in which party veteran Elias Mudzuri lost 
the organising secretary post to Chamisa, but Mudzuri was co-opted into the executive where 
he performed effectively. 
 
However, supporters of Chamisa allege that the legislator resisted a raft of constitutional 
changes that had been proposed by Tsvangirai, which were meant to dilute the powers of the 
Secretary-General and centralise power in the MDC leader’s office. This allegedly did not sit 
well with Tsvangirai and his supporters although Tsvangirai denied that there was a rift 
between him and Chamisa. Tsvangirai describes his relationship with Chamisa as a ‘father – 
son” relationship. 
 
Responding to the issue of centralising power in his office, Tsvangirai said sometimes 
instability arises because of confusion of roles. “And you need role clarity to ensure there is 
more coherence than situations where there appears to be competition rather than 
cooperation” (Tsvangirai quoted in Daily News, 5 November, 2014). It is interesting to note 
that newspapers have been reporting that Chamisa and others wanted to form a party and that 
he wanted to remove the leadership by calling for another congress but Chamisa asserted that 
people should work towards strengthening the party in readiness to take power from ZANU-
PF. 
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The Herald of 4 November, 2015 carried a story titled “Chamisa takes a dig at ‘guilty’, 
‘afraid’ Tsvangirai”. The state owned newspaper which is the main mouthpiece of ZANU-PF 
had its sustained agenda of fanning conflict in MDC-T leadership in its lead paragraph: “Top 
opposition MDC-T politician and Kuwadzana East House of Assembly member, Nelson 
Chamisa, who is reportedly leading a faction seeking to torpedo leader Mr. Morgan 
Tsvangirai…made a thinly veneered dig at the latter saying he was running scared, barely a 
fortnight after a local newspaper reported him as saying his boss was “seeing shadows”. 
 
It should be pointed out that the newspaper based its opinion on Chamisa’s statement which 
he had posted on a social media page whose followers immediately situated it in the internal 
fight within the opposition camp. This was a far-fetched misrepresentation of what maybe 
going out in real life - Chamisa’s posted statement read. It would seem the media has become 
the battlefield for ideas between the ruling party and opposition. Daily News of 20 
November, 2015 published a story with a headline “ZANU-PF trying to derail Tsvangirai”. I 
have argued earlier in many instances that the privately owned press in general, and Daily 
News in particular is sympathetic towards MDC-T; and by extension downtrodden opposition 
parties such as the emerging People First with its ranks. 
 
It is not surprising therefore; that the newspaper alleges ZANU-PF is meddling in MDC-T 
affairs. The lead paragraph of the article confirms my view, “with ZANU-PF arguably at its 
weakest point ever due to its deadly factional and succession wars, there are claims that the 
ruling party is working to weaken the MDC ahead of the 2018 elections by manufacturing 
divisions among opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s leadership team”. 
 
The sources suggested that President Robert Mugabe’s ruling party was “hell-bent on stirring 
animosity” between Tsvangirai and former MDC organising secretary, Nelson Chamisa. It 
can be argued that there is a massive propaganda and disinformation campaign against 
Tsvangirai and the MDC by ZANU-PF, with some MDC bigwigs biting this misinformation 
blitz by the CIO. The reading we get from the article is that senior colleagues were allegedly 
and “willingly participating in the plot as they felt that with Chamisa out in the cold their 
own political careers will fly’’ - as they know that after Tsvangirai few can stand against 
Chamisa who has a strong support base. Although Chamisa is not a member of the MDC’s 
standing committee – its top decision making body (synonymous to the politburo of ZANU-
PF) – some of MDC-T officials have accused him of allegedly leading a party faction that 
wants Tsvangirai out, a claim that Tsvangirai himself is said not to support. 
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The Herald of 25 November 2015 published an article titled “MDC-T ‘splits’ yet again”. The 
newspaper reported that a split was looming in the opposition MDC-T party due to power 
struggles between leader Morgan Tsvangirai and Nelson Chamisa. The state owned press’ 
tone and intention is to depict a sense of loss to Chamisa when it describes him as 
“…reduced to an ordinary card-carrying member…”. The newspaper was trying to fan 
conflict when it alleged Chamisa’s loss was “…engineered by Tsvangirai”. The newspaper 
further exacerbates and sows animosity when it claims that “… a serious rift has grown 
between the two politicians which is feared to soon culminate in a split”. The Herald sought 
to authenticate its views by quoting Zimbabwe Peace Project’s report titled: “Internal Strife: 
 
 
A cancer in Zimbabwe’s main political parties,” (October 2015). The reporter cites that 
“factionalism has led to clashes in Harare and Chitungwiza, leading to disruption of 
meetings” of MDC-T. The Herald extensively quotes the ZPP (2015) report, only selecting 
sections which refer to MDC-T but ignoring those which concern ZANU-PF. The concept of 
selection and emphasis in state-owned party press only serves to demonstrate its allegiance to 
ZANU-PF and adversity to opposition parties. In 2016 the state owned press continued to 
paint a bleak picture in the relationship between Tsvangirai and Chamisa but the youthful 
legislator shamed their detractors. The Daily News of 2 January, 2016 carried a story titled 
“Tsvangirai is my father: Chamisa”. In the lead paragraph, the article states: “Kuwadzana 
East legislator, Nelson Chamisa has rubbished what he calls “persistent but patently false” 
state media reports that he is engaged in an escalating power struggle with MDC President, 
Morgan Tsvangirai”. Chamisa told Daily News that he could never fight with Tsvangirai 
whom he affectionately referred to as “my father” – echoing Tsvangirai’s words which I 
described earlier as “father-son” relationship. Therefore, one can argue that state media and 
other detractors were determined to make a good relationship appear sour. 
 
 
It should be acknowledged that the claims that the two were at war have made headlines for 
weeks on end in pro-ZANU-PF state media. The Herald of 20 January, 2016 published a 
story titled “MDC-T fights escalate”. The state newspaper reported that MDC had allegedly 
suspended two district chairpersons in Masvingo over the alleged feud yet the chairpersons 
were suspended ostensibly for attending a meeting organised by the yet to be launched 
People First party fronted by deposed former Vice-President Joice Mujuru. 
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It can be argued that the two may have been suspended for alleged defection although state 
media claimed that they were Chamisa allies. The opposition party was also said to have 
been forced to abandon disciplinary proceedings against Bulawayo Senator, Matson Hlalo, 
an alleged Chamisa ally, after Hlalo was suspended for dragging the party to court over a 
leadership dispute in Bulawayo. 
 
 
It is imperative to underscore the fact that as long as the Zimbabwean society and media 
landscape are polarised, in an environment of political conflict between ruling ZANU-PF and 
opposition parties, press representation will be characterised by hegemony and counter 
hegemony. Political parties employ media as mouth piece for their ideologies, policies, 
campaigns and propaganda purposes. ZANU-PF uses state controlled media while MDC-T 
depends on privately owned press. 
 
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed power struggles in the opposition, Movement for Democratic Party. 
The chapter explored the causes of the splits in the MDC formations. The chapter also 
analysed the representation of succession struggles in the state-owned and privately-owned 
newspapers. The chapter contends that the future of politics is in the hands of the electorate 
and citizens in Zimbabwe. The chapter also argues that endogenous factors contributed to the 
split of the MDC. The endogenous factors include dissenting and ideological conflicts over 
selective benefits which might threaten party unity in case their disagreement resolves around 
the legitimacy of party leader. The chapter also found out that endogenous factors such as the 
refusal of a party leader to accommodate dissenting voices and the refusal by them to step 
back in the factional fight escalate into conflict. 
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Chapter 6: Political Conflict between ZANU-PF and MDC 
 
 
“Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely” (Lord Action). 
 
 
“We can easily become like that which we oppose or hate most” (Desmond Tutu). 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines representation of political conflict in the ruling party ZANU PF and 
main opposition MDC. This chapter discusses the betrayal of liberation movements in Africa 
in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, which gave rise to opposition forces, thereby 
culminating in political conflict. The chapter draws parallels between colonial rulers and 
liberation-movements. Further, the chapter discuses decolonisation as a method of 
consolidating rule that is maintained through processes of rhetoric and national unification. 
This is followed by press representation of political parties in Zimbabwe. 
 
Whilst the ruling parties born out of these liberation movements insist that they have fulfilled 
people’s expectations from independence, I argue in this study that the majority of citizens 
feel disillusioned; hence opposition parties are formed to offer alternative governments. That 
power corrupts is by no means a solely African truism. Nor that giving up power - even in 
democratically anchored and regulated conditions with a long tradition - is difficult for many 
once they have had a taste of it (Melber 2002). The challenge Zimbabwe has faced since 
1980 is that neither the country’s nor the ruling party constitution prescribes presidential term 
limits like what other Southern African countries do. This resulted in President Robert 
Mugabe holding onto power for 36 years and still shows no sign to relinquish power as he 
insists he will be the presidential candidate for 2018 elections. Although he claims leadership 
is chosen by people the ugly factional and succession struggles in ZANU PF suggest that 
some feel he must hand over power to a younger person. 
 
 
When liberation movements overthrew imperialist forces starting from the 50s, there was a 
pervasive sense of promise and hope among Africans. The role of these liberation 
movements should be to transform African nations to uphold the democratic principles they 
strived for (Melber 2010). However, this role change is rarely realised as ruling parties 
morph into a new elite replacing the former oppressors. 
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6.2 Post-Colonial Leadership 
 
The post-colonial realities have not met the expectations of those who considered the fight 
against colonialism as a fight for the implementation of positive values (Saul 2010a: 2). 
Instead, the post-colonial reality reflects the contradictions and challenges of revolutionary 
optimism turned into the self-righteous entitlement culture of new elite: a ‘predatory elite’. 
(Naidoo, 2010). In this chapter, I argue that political conflict in Zimbabwe was a result of 
many and complex factors including political dominance by the ruling party, corruption by 
the elite, gross abuse of human rights, lack of democracy and individual freedom as echoed 
by Saul (2010) above. Some far-sighted scholars and writers on the African continent had 
seen this coming. Helliker (2010:137) reminds us that the Durban based social scientist Rick 
Turner, who was assassinated by the apartheid-regime in the mid-1970s, already foresaw “the 
rise and consolidation of statism”. More than 40 years ago Turner foretold that: 
 
 
The political party as mediator between the individual and government tends to take on the 
characteristics of the system itself, the ‘party machine’ dominates the membership and the 
rank and file becomes increasingly divorced from policy making. …The political arena 
becomes polarised between an atomised mass and a number of small groups trying to 
manipulate the mass in order to get political jobs. The result of this is to move the source of 
power in society out of the political arena and into the control of functional power groups 
 
(Turner, 1971:81). 
 
 
It is an undeniable fact that ZANU PF government has monopolised strategic jobs 
and posts both in government and parastatals leading to mismanagement and collapse 
of the latter mainly due to corruption. If one dismisses the most commonly 
conventional explanations for Africa’s failure to live up to the potential that its 
valuable natural resources and youthful population would predict, then how can the 
continent’s dismal political and economic performance be explained? Meredith 
(2006:13-14) in his book titled “The Future of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to 
the Heart of Despair – A History of Fifty years of Independence” points the finger at 
the failure of post-colonial leadership. 
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He focuses in particular, on the role of a number of African leaders whose characters 
and careers had a decisive impact on the fate of their countries, which are “the 
reasons why, after the euphoria of the independence era, so many hopes and 
ambitions faded and why the future of Africa came to be spoken of only in 
pessimistic terms”. Many elderly Zimbabweans often speak of the glory of the past; 
sad enough, referring to colonial because all their hopes and aspirations were 
shattered by the new government. It is imperative to note the critical post-
independence period when, after an all - too-brief “honeymoon”, the pattern for the 
future was set with the transformation of the leaders of liberation movements into 
tyrants: 
 
 
As founding fathers, the first generation of nationalist leaders – Nkrumah, Nasser, Senghor, 
Houphouet-Boigny, Sekou Toure, Keita, Olympio, Kenyatta, Nyerere, Kaunda, Banda – all 
enjoyed great prestige and high honour. They were seen to personify the states they led and 
swiftly took advantage to consolidate their control. From the outset, most sought a monopoly 
of power; most established a system of personal rule and encouraged personality cults 
 
(Meredith 2006:162). 
 
 
President Robert Mugabe and Angola’s Eduardo dos Santos are some of the longest serving 
leaders in Africa, and continue with their authoritarian rule at all odds. However, these two 
leaders have been criticised, not necessarily for their long stay in power, but because of 
monumental failures after the first ten years of rule. Critics can only talk of advanced age in 
despotic rulers due to dismal economic and political blunders. 
 
 
Not surprisingly, during the entire period from the beginning of decolonisation with the 
independence of Ghana to the end of the Cold War and the beginning of what Samuel 
Hautington calls the “third wave of democratisation”, only one African leader, President 
Adan Abdulle Isman of Somalia (1967), ever peacefully relinquished his office following 
electoral defeat (Peter Pham 2008:130). He adds that over the course of the same time frame, 
only three African heads of state retired voluntarily: Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal 
(1980), Ahmadon Ahidjo of Cameroon (1982), and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (1985) – and 
Ahidjo, apparently underwent a change of heart and subsequently tried (unsuccessfully) to 
shoot his way back into office a year after vacating the presidency (Diamond 1997). 
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Meredith’s chapter-long study of the tragic evolution of Ghana’s Nkrumah who, in 1966, 
also became one of the first African leaders to be overthrown in a military coup d’état, is 
especially illustrative of what would become a recurring pattern: 
 
 
Surrounded by sycophants and praised daily by the press, he became increasingly remote 
from the realities of the crisis that Ghana faced, resenting even mild criticism, refusing to 
believe that anything had gone wrong. Every setback he attributed to imperialists and neo-
colonialists plotting against him. When ministers arrived bearing reports of economic 
difficulties, he was impatient and dismissive. Palace intrigues swirled around him (Meredith 
 
2006:188 cited in Pham 2008:131). 
 
 
The flawed leadership in Zimbabwe under Mugabe’s ZANU-PF which has been in power 
since 1980 reflects the same, if not worse tragic scenarios of all African states. As 
demonstrated in previous chapters, the ruling party’s strategies to remain in power included 
tight control of the state-owned media and clampdown on the opposition. The ZANU-PF 
leadership completely resent dissent voices from within the ruling party, which is considered 
taboo. Those who had the audacity to publicly criticise the President were dealt with in a 
brutal manner and humiliated. The opposition has been subjected to a surfeit of abuses and 
has been labelled agents of the West, stooges, puppets, sell-outs, and unpatriotic elements. 
The private press has also been vilified and accused of being vehicles of destablisation and 
agents of the erstwhile colonialists. 
 
 
6.3 Liberation Movements as government 
 
Post-Colonial governments in Africa were born out of protracted and violent liberation 
struggles. Melber (2010) asserts that these governments took control of the state machinery 
and reorganised themselves as political parties. Their legitimacy to rule stemmed from their 
participation in the liberation struggle (in Angola and Mozambique this claim was based on 
the relative military success in fighting the Portuguese occupation and taking control of the 
state). In Zimbabwe and South Africa the legitimacy was secured more visibly through 
general elections. Since then, with varying results (and sometimes with the use of further 
organised violence as illustrated, most spectacularly in the case of Zimbabwe), they have 
been able to maintain their political dominance and control over the state apparatus. 
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It should be pointed out that most liberation movements, particularly ZANU-PF, always 
maintain that it was solely through the barrel of the gun (not negotiations) which brought 
political independence in 1980. Those born free may never come to know how independence 
came because ‘patriotic history’ brings its own version in order to justify the continued hold 
on power by ruling party. Every sober-minded Zimbabwean appreciates the role of liberation 
movement but what perhaps remains as the area of controversy is ruling party’s unjustified 
hold on to power despite losing in elections. 
 
 
As Melber (2010) asserts, the social transformation of Southern African societies shaped by 
settler colonialism can, at best be characterised as a transition from controlled change to 
changed control. The result is a new ruling political elite operating from commanding 
heights, whose foundations are further strengthened by selective narratives and memories 
related to the war(s) of liberation. These create new (to some extent invented) traditions to 
establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under the sole authority of one particular 
agency of social forces (see Kriger 1995 and Werbner 1998b for Zimbabwe; Melber 2002c, 
2005 and 2007 for Namibia). 
 
 
The mystification of the liberators plays an essential role in this fabrication. Visible signs of 
post-colonial ‘patriotic history’ include the Chimurenga (liberation struggle) music of 
Zimbabwe, which has been turned into a perverted form of self-adoration under the Mugabe 
regime. Examples include the late Elliot Manyika, Chinx Chingaira, Webster Shamu, Mbare 
Chimurenga Choir, among others, whose music extols the exploits of ZANU-PF and 
President Robert Mugabe. Their music suggest a one-dimensional linearity from early to 
modern anti-colonial resistance and celebrates the leaders of ‘the one and only’ liberation 
movement and government. 
 
 
The situational application of militant rhetoric as a tool for inclusion and exclusion in terms 
of post-colonial national identity is common practice. It demonstrates that declared notions of 
national reconciliation and the slogan of ‘unity in diversity’ do not receive the appropriate 
acknowledgment in terms of political pluralism. Politically correct identity is defined by 
those in power narrowly along lines of (self) definition and (self) understanding (Melber 
2010:82). As observed in the case of Zimbabwe: 
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(W) hilst power relations had changed, perceptions of power had not changed. The layers of 
understanding regarding power relations, framed by socialization and memory, continue (d) to 
operate. …[Although] actors had changed… the way in which the new actors executed power 
in relation to opposition had not, [because] their mental framework remained in the colonial 
setting. Patterns from colonial rule of ‘citizens’ ruling the ‘subjects’ [were] repeated and 
reproduced (Yap 2001:312 – 313; original emphasis). 
 
 
The independence process in Zimbabwe and Namibia resulted first and foremost in an 
internationally monitored and legitimated transfer of political power. That the political power 
exercised by and large met the definitions and expectations of a democratic political system 
was a desired result, but not the main goal. The liberation struggle was understood and 
primarily perceived as the right to self-determination of the population on the basis of free 
and fair general elections. 
 
 
Decolonisation, not democratisation, was therefore, the priority (Melber 2010:821). ZANU-
PF has become sceptical of international monitors and observers, particularly those from 
Europe and America, since the formation of MDC. Therefore, the ruling party has been 
adamant that only AU and SADC countries will be selected to monitor and observe general 
elections. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF enjoys solidarity from former African liberation movements, 
who, despite prevailing violence during campaigns, torture bases in rural areas, flawed 
electoral processes, lack of electoral and media reforms, among others, will endorse the 
elections as free and fair. This solidarity was well captured and represented in The Herald of 
4 December 2011, in an article headlined “Liberation movements support President’s 
candidature”; and another one in The Herald of December 5 2014, headline “Liberation 
movements express solidarity with Zanu PF”. It is worth noting that the representation 
blames external enemies for the ruling party’s failures. An example of this is found in a story 
published in The Herald of 5 December 2014, which stated that: 
 
 
We are aware of the deliberate strategy aimed at destroying the progressive unity and peace in the sub-
region. Such events are disturbing and tragic and they have the effect to systematically decimate gains 
made by sister revolutionary movements. It is time for us the senior parties to close ranks and get rid 
 
of these forces and their obnoxious tactics (SWAPO Secretary-general Cde Mbuba 
Nangolo Mbumba, quoted in The Herald Dec. 5. 2014). 
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While it is noble for liberation movements to support each other, it is sinister to show 
solidarity with a sister ruling party when it loses elections or does not accept defeat. 
 
 
6.4 Monopoly in Political and Economic Spheres 
 
The post-colonial politics of the ruling parties often show a blatant lack of democratic 
awareness and forms of neo-patrimonial systems. The party machine serves as a vehicle of 
economic wheeling and dealing in favour of the political dons and their clientele (Saul 
2010b: 4). Such trends of political entrenchment of particular class interests at the expense of 
democracy and redistributive socio-economic measures are also visible in other Southern 
African countries other than Mozambique. The denial of collective political participation of 
the majority goes hand in hand with the continued socio-economic exclusion of the 
politically marginalised (see Melber 2003a and 2003b). 
 
 
Melber (2010) reckons that the unabated exploitation of Angola’s oil wealth by a powerful 
oligarchy within the ruling MPLA is one of the biggest scandals on the continent. Elections 
in Angola were postponed several times thereby denying citizens the right to choose a 
government of their choice. In such circumstances, constitutionalism and the rule of law are 
non-existent in the political system (Vidal/Chabal 2009). Instead, those in government and 
state take over civil society (Messiant, 2001) and turn the country into a corporate business of 
those in control of the party (Marques de Morais 2010a and 2010b, Sogge, 2010). Neither the 
enormous revenue income generated by the exploitation of crude oil, nor the wealth resulting 
from the mining of diamonds improve the living conditions of the ordinary people in a 
meaningful way (Croese, 2010). This is the scenario which obtains in Zimbabwe, a country 
with a lot of natural resources. 
 
 
The controversy around diamond mining at Chiadzwa and the lack of transparency about the 
proceeds is a case in point. Allegations of top army officials and government ministers 
looting of the diamonds at Chiadzwa abound, meaning that only the elite and not ordinary 
people have benefited from this key national resource. One minister is reported to have built 
an empire for himself from diamond proceeds yet ruling party leadership, besides being 
aware of the scandal and corruption allowed the minister go unpunished. 
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Like Angola, Zimbabwe’s general elections (as discussed in Chapter Two), have always 
been disputed, particularly in March 2008 when President Mugabe lost the presidential 
elections to Tsvangirai in the first round of voting. Election results were delayed by more 
than six weeks, purportedly because ZEC had to manipulate the votes to avoid a clear MDC 
victory. The July 31, 2013 harmonised elections were disputed by the opposition, which 
alleged that they had been rigged. 
 
 
Melber’s observation that autocratic governments tends to subordinate the state under the 
party, and politically motivated social and material favours as rewards for loyalty are 
common coercive measures, especially where there is a likelihood of internal dissent. Such 
examples, particularly in the recent past are many. 
 
 
The term ‘national interest’ means solely what they (ruling parties) say it means. Based on 
the ruler’s (self) perception, individuals and groups are allowed to participate in, or are 
excluded from, nation-building. The ‘national interest’ therefore serves the purpose “to 
justify all kinds of authoritarian practice” and that the concepts of “anti-national” or 
“unpatriotic” can be defined basically as any group that resists the power of the ruling elite of 
the day” (Harrison 2001:391). Such selective mechanisms of the exercise and retention of 
power have little or nothing to do with democratic principles, but have much in common with 
the command structures that emerged during the days of the liberation struggle, especially in 
exile (Melber 2010:page). 
 
 
A South African political activist summarized her experiences as follows: 
 
 
Many of my former comrades have become loyal to a party rather than to principles of 
justice…Unfortunately it is true that those who have been oppressed make the worst 
democrats. There are recurring patterns in the behaviour of liberation parties – when they 
come to power they uphold the most undemocratic practices (Kadalie, 2001). 
 
 
Given the disturbing revelations above, it is not surprising that the opposition parties in 
Zimbabwe, particularly the MDC have been labelled as unpatriotic and agents of regime 
change, puppets of the British with an agenda to re-colonise Zimbabwe. This ruling party 
rhetoric has become a cliché. The majority of ZANU PF Central Committee and Politburo 
members observe party loyalty rather than tenets of justice and democracy. 
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There is a lack of (self) critical awareness and extremely limited willingness to accept 
divergent opinions, particularly if they are expressed in public. Non-conformist thinking is 
interpreted as disloyalty, if not treason. This elimination of dissent drastically limits the new 
system’s capacity for reform and innovation. A culture of fear, intimidation and silence 
inhibits the possibilities of durable renewal at the cost of public good… (Pithouse, 2010b). 
 
 
Frantz Fanon presciently described in his manifesto, “The Wretched of the Earth”, the 
internal contradictions and limits to emancipation in anti-colonial resistance and organised 
liberation movements. Writing at a time when the Algerian war of liberation had not ended, 
Fanon presaged the abuse of government power after attainment of independence in the wake 
of establishing a one-party state. In a chapter entitled “The Pitfalls of National 
Consciousness” Fanon predicted that the state, which should convey a sense of security, trust 
and stability, instead foists itself on the people in a spectacular way, harassing and 
mistreating the citizens and in this way showing that it is in permanent danger (Fanon 
2001:132; cited in Melber 2010). Fanon criticizes the party for controlling 
 
 
…the masses, not in order to make sure that they really participate in the business of governing 
the nation, but in order to remind them constantly that the government expects from them 
obedience and discipline…The political party…instead of welcoming the expression of popular 
discontentment, instead of taking for its fundamental purpose the free flow of ideas from the 
people up to the government, forms a screen and forbids such ideas (Fanon 2001:146-147). 
 
 
 
In view of such frustrating realities, people in rural areas (ZANU-PF’s major strongholds), 
have accepted the ruling party despite economic meltdown – they do not question Mugabe’s 
misrule and failures. It would seem taboo to criticise ZANU-PF – there is some form of 
naturalisation between ZANU-PF and its supporters. Dissent is prohibited…people should 
endure with resilience, which is encouraged by songs and jingles which are repeated on ZBC 
television and all radio stations. Rambai makashinga (remain resilient or persevere) easily 
comes to mind as one typical jingle which was repeatedly aired during 2008 election 
campaigns. Indeed, Zimbabweans have embraced a culture of perseverance even when the 
economy bites. 
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6.5 Liberation Movements Solidarity? 
 
There is need to interrogate liberation movements in power’s support for each other to the 
extent that they endorse election results which may be flawed and rigged for that matter. The 
violent practices of ruling parties in Southern Africa can best be explained by ZANU-PF’s 
history which started between early 1983 and late 1986 during the Matabeleland 
disturbances. Willems (2004) argues that news is always a selection of events that are taking 
place in the real world at a particular moment in time. News is therefore not simply what 
happens, but that which can be presented as newsworthy. Whereas some events will be 
highlighted, others will be ignored. As Foucault (1978:27) has pointed out, silence is very 
much part of any discourse: 
 
 
Silence itself – the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is 
required between different speakers – is less than the absolute limit of discourse, the other 
side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside 
the things said, with them and in relation to them within overall strategies. 
 
 
Applying this to news production, Van Dijk (1991:114) argues that the analysis of the 
‘unsaid’ is sometimes more revealing than the study of what is actually expressed in text. In 
the analysis of political conflict in Zimbabwe, the state-owned press excluded reporting any 
violence executed by the ruling party, yet the open violent character of Mugabe’s rule has 
drawn world attention, specially between 2000 and 2008. This is a typical strategy of what 
Willems (2004) describes as selection and silence … in news reporting. 
 
 
The solidarity displayed by African leaders towards ZANU-PF and their sanction of the 
regime’s refusal to relinquish power after losing the 2008 elections is misplaced (Melber 
2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
208 
 
An example of such solidarity is when South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) 
in Namibia issued a statement congratulatory message to ZANU-PF after Robert Mugabe 
controversially won the 2002 presidential election. The statement said: 
 
 
On behalf of the leadership and the entire membership…our elation over the resounding 
victory scored…Your party’s triumph is indeed victory for Southern Africa in particular and 
the African continent at large. It is victory over neo-colonialism, imperialism and foreign 
sponsored puppetry. We in SWAPO Party knew quite well that despite imperialist 
intransigence and all round attempts by enemies of peace, democracy and the rule of law to 
influence the outcome of the elections in favour of neck-chained political stooges, people of 
Zimbabwe would not succumb an inch to external pressure. They spoke with one 
overwhelming voice to reject re-colonisation. Their verdict should, therefore, be respected 
unconditionally by both the external perpetrators of division and their hired local stooges, 
who have been parading themselves as democrats…As we join your great nation in 
celebrating this well-deserved and indeed well-earned victory over the forces of darkness and 
uncertainty, we wish to call upon the people of Zimbabwe to prove to the prophets of doom 
that they can do without their unholy blessing, through hard work. In the same vein, we call 
for unity of purpose among the African people as the only viable weapon to ward off outside 
influence (SWAPO Party 2002). 
 
 
Worth noting is the language used to describe opposition parties – ‘neo-colonialism, 
imperialism and foreign sponsored puppetry…,’ ‘neck-chained political stooges…prophets 
of doom…hired local stooges…forces of darkness and uncertainty…’ among others. Such 
language is typical of the predictable rhetoric of all liberation movements meant to mask 
their despotic nature. 
 
 
Melber (2010:89) questions the hypocritical nature of SWAPO when he notes that: 
 
 
‘…While the selective view he expressed seems unrealistic to the degree of being almost 
irrational, its (dis-) qualification would ignore the inner logic of the attitudes and policies 
displayed not only by SWAPO cadres, to an extent also by other political office bearers of 
other liberation movements.’ 
 
 
For the national liberation movements, the secure of power signals in their understanding 
something similar to what the American philosopher Francis Fukuyama (1992) dubbed as 
“the end of history”. 
 
209 
 
From this understanding follows that a liberation movement should stay in power forever 
after succeeding in its anti-colonial struggle. Jonhson (2002) echoes this view when he 
argues that: 
 
 
The NLMS (national liberation movements), share what can only be termed a common 
theology. National liberation is both the just and historically necessary conclusion of the 
struggle between the people and the forces of racism and colonialism. This has two 
implications. First, the NLMS – whatever senile sins they may commit – are the righteous. 
They not merely represent the masses but in a sense they are the masses, and as such they 
cannot really be wrong. Secondly, according to the theology, their coming to power represents 
the end of a process. No further group can succeed them for that would mean the masses, the 
forces of righteousness, had been overthrown. That, in turn, could only mean that the forces of 
racism and colonialism, after sulking in defeat and biding their time, had regrouped and 
launched a counter-attack (Johnson 2002). 
 
 
Consistent with this view the ZANU PF leadership has declared that Zimbabwe ‘will never 
be a colony again.’ The security chiefs have echoed President Robert Mugabe’s stance that 
only ZANU PF has the legitimacy to rule Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe national discourse may be 
interpreted by the following quote: 
 
Our votes must go with our guns. After all, any vote we shall have shall have been the product 
of a gun. The gun which produces the vote should remain its security officer – its guarantor. 
The people’s vote and the people’s guns are always inseparable twins (cited in Meredith 2002, 
iii). 
 
 
 
ZANU PF government’s version of history that derives from a discursive development within 
the nationalist movement is worth noting. This discourse can be termed ‘patriotic history’, 
and its key elements are the struggle against colonial and neo-colonial oppression and a 
cultural and ideological nationalism. For ZANU PF, struggles for power should be 
understood from this perspective. As a liberation movement, ZANU PF is not prepared to 
relinquish political power and acts against the will of the people. Through its totalitarian 
mindset it betrays the values of democracy and popular participation the party espoused in 
the past, which were assumed to be among the reasons for at least some of the international 
support by a solidarity movement. Melber (2010) argues that in return for continued despotic 
rule, at the cost of the ordinary people, they (NLMs) discredit their earlier legitimacy in 
liberating a country and its people. Victims turn into perpetrators. The rights of all are 
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sacrificed for the privileges of a few. There is less progress after independence than there was 
during colonialism. This shows that decolonization is an unfinished business (Melber 2010: 
90). Liberation movements and their leadership think that there is a conspiracy to reverse the 
gains of independence. 
 
This is the view expressed by SWAPO and ANC a few months before President Jacob Zuma 
took office as President of South Africa. When Zuma met with President Hifikepunye 
Pohamba and former President Sam Nujoma on 8 December 2008 SAWPO and ANC issued 
a joint communiqué which stated that: 
 
…there is a recurring reactionary debate around the need to reduce the dominance of former 
liberation movements on the African continent. In this regard the emergence of counter 
revolutionary forces to reverse the social, political and economic gains that have been made 
 
under the leadership of our liberation movements was discussed 
 
between SWAPO Party and the ANC, 9 December 2008). 
 
 
In his “Letter from the President”, Jacob Zuma after his return 
summarised and repeated part of the deliberations thus: 
 
Ruling parties often go through certain challenges after the first decade, when the interests of 
different strands within the broad liberation movement begin to diverge. People begin to 
explore other avenues, especially when they feel they are losing control and influence within 
the movement. The interests of people outside the movement, locally or internationally could 
also come into play. Political analysts and all those who claim to know Africa better than they 
know themselves tell us that it is good for Africa and democracy if the majority of former 
liberation movements were reduced. How do we as former liberation movements ensure that 
we do not steer away from our mandate of serving the poor and all our people, in the current 
climate of counter- revolution? (Zuma 2008 cited in Melber 2010). 
 
 
Melber (2010) asserts that the answer would actually be an easy one – simply by showing 
that the former liberation movements continue to provide the best policy choices for the 
majority of the people. In contrast to this ‘exit option’, which is rather a window of 
opportunity, views like the ones expressed by Zuma and his comrades seem to suggest that 
there is no indication whatsoever that once they occupy office they would be unwilling to 
leave even if the electorate votes for an alternative political party as was the case of 
Zimbabwe in March 2008. 
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 (Joint Communiqué 
 
Such an electoral verdict would be tantamount to an illegitimate regime change initiated by 
externally influenced and (mis-) guided elements willing to sabotage the project for socio-
economic and political emancipation, over which erstwhile liberation movements claim to 
hold a monopoly. Any attacks on the liberation movement in power border on blasphemy and 
are dismissed as imperialist conspiracy. The articulation of political opposition is seen as a 
reason to marginalise, exclude and coerce those with dissenting views as a legitimate 
response by those in power (Melber 2010). 
 
When the liberation movements took power their political office bearers were shaped by 
military mindsets. They categorised people as winners and losers and operated along the lines 
of command and obedience. In the case of ZANU PF and MDC the former is always the 
winner whose authority should not be questioned. 
 
According to Melber (2004) liberation movements tend to mark an “end of history” and any 
political alternative that does not emerge from within them will not be acceptable. This 
attitude explains the strong sense of camaraderie between the Mugabe regime and the 
government of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. 
 
The sad truth is that opposition parties that stand up against such governments tend to be part 
of the problem rather than the solution. All too often, they only want to share the spoils of the 
state apparatus and its bureaucracy among their cronies once they get into government. 
Scholars, analysts and ordinary people have criticised the MDC during its tenure in 
Government of National Unity for being obsessed with wealth accumulation, thereby 
forgetting their mandate. 
 
 
 
 
6.6 Representation of ZANU PF and MDC 
 
Media representations of the political conflict reflected the polarised political environment, 
thereby resulting in missed opportunities for serious national debates in a context where the 
performance of the economy had reached the lowest ebb since 1980 causing much suffering 
to Zimbabweans. The press became active participants in the conflict, instead of promoting 
peace. For instance, an opinion peace in The Sunday Mail of January 17, 2016 titled “SHARP 
SHOOTER: Gamatox Plot Thickens”, illustrates the adversarial relationship between the 
state-owned and the privately-owned press. The Sunday Mail reported that private press 
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sympathises with purged Vice President Mujuru and her ‘Gamatox’ allies with an agenda of 
propping up a ‘Gamatox government…’ 
 
Everything seems well orchestrated to reflect the hand of the Gamatox cabal working with the private 
media on a regime change agenda that seeks to eliminate all possible competition that has links to Cde 
Mugabe…As we watch, Gamatox is using its commissars in the private media to rubbish anything 
associated with the hierarchy of Zanu PF and is roping in disgruntled former members of the MDC-T to 
its People First coup plot. Gamatox is vainly trying to destroy Zanu Pf from within. It still has some rats 
from within, the rats that are spying on the Zanu PF status…The MDC-T sympathisers of the Gamatox 
ideology have been targeted and roped behind the scenes to grow the Gamatox support base.…On the 
 
other hand, Zanu PF needs to aggressively weed out any Gamatox remnants that have survived the initial 
 
and post congress cleansing (The Sunday Mail, 17 January, 2016). 
 
It can be argued that the state-owned newspaper instigated ZANU PF to continue purges of 
former VP allies which indeed happened. What is clear is that the newspaper links MDC-T to 
Zimbabwe People First - a clear indication that Zanu PF was afraid that if the opposition 
parties formed a grand coalition the ruling party could face a formidable challenge in the 
2018 elections. 
 
This shows that the state-owned press is used as conduit of propaganda by the ruling party 
whereby reporters become mouthpieces of ZANU PF in a project to portray opposition 
parties as hopeless. The Sunday Mail of September 13, 2015 published an article titled 
“Arrest the Build, Hope, WReNE circus” which at first sight appears meaningless because of 
acronyms used. Vukani Madoda, (The Sharp Shooter), author of the article sings praises on 
ZANU PF officials while at the same time employing language denigrating members of 
opposition, particularly Joice Mujuru and Tendai Biti. The newspaper’s representation gives 
an impression that the ruling party will be formidable force in 2018 elections. The Sunday 
Mail reported that: 
 
Zanu PF is still in control and is not perturbed by the howling of a failed former VP, or the broken 
record of Tsvangirai’s voice or the rumblings of a hungry former Finance Minister. 
 
The Herald of 17 December, 2014 has a similar agenda as The Sunday Mail and persistently 
denigrates Mujuru and her allies. The Herald’s headline, “Didymus Mutasa ropes in MDC-T 
in bid to subvert will of the people” depicts Mutasa as linked to the main opposition and its 
exhausted discourse that the opposition is funded by Western donors. This shows how 
reporters actively participate in fomenting political conflict. 
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The private media reported on how ZANU PF was brutally eliminating its perceived enemies 
from within the ruling party. The brutal purges of Joice Mujuru and her allies were allegedly 
plotted before the death of her husband, General Solomon Mujuru. ZANU PF’s merciless 
strategy was to get rid of Solomon Mujuru first so that the wife, Joice Mujuru, would be 
vulnerable and become an easy target by framing her in order to brutally expel her from the 
party. 
 
An article published in The Standard of January 13, 2013 titled “Tongogara, Mujuru: Did the 
revolution devour its own?” compares the mysterious deaths of ZANU PF’s two army 
commanders, Josiah Tongogara and Solomon Mujuru who both died in mysterious 
circumstances. Tongogara was the ZANLA chief of defence during the war of liberation and 
Mujuru was his deputy. 
 
The Standard reported that: 
 
The official version is that Tongogara died in a car accident in Mozambique on December 26, 1979, a 
few days after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement which ended the war of liberation. But 
another version said he died on December 23 1979, with the death only being announced three days 
later. Mujuru on the other hand, is said to have died of carbonation after a “fire accident” at his 
Alamein farm in Beatrice. 
 
There are theories that both were shot and killed, and the ‘accidents’ were staged. However, 
the private press has alleged that the revolution has been devouring its own. 
 
The Daily News seems to have picked the motif in its numerous articles, particularly 
following the ZANU PF pre and post congress purges. 
 
“Mugabe sweats over party wars” is one article that appeared in Daily News of 2 February 
2016 which alleges that Mugabe is caught “between a rock and a hard place” as the two 
ZANU PF factions battling for supremacy of the liberation movement. The newspaper quotes 
a politburo member saying: 
 
I don’t envy his position at all, he is being asked to choose between a faction linked to Vice President 
Emmerson Mnangagwa, whom he has known for five decades, and the other which appears to enjoy 
the backing of Amai (his wife Grace) and Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko… Mugabe appeared to 
tread a careful, middle road as he lashed the escalating factionalism that is devouring his party… 
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Often quoting political analysts and academics, Daily News focused on Mugabe torn in 
between factions. The paper asked the opinion of political analysts Eldred Masunungure and 
Maxwell Saungweme. Masunungure argued that President Robert Mugabe would not take 
sides in the party’s brutal wars as this would expedite its implosion. Masunungure also said 
that if Mugabe pronounces a successor, this would not unify the party but deepen the 
succession wars. 
 
On the other hand, Saungweme argued that it would be difficult for Mugabe not to side with 
his wife’s faction but at the same time he could not fire all his key lieutenants such as (his 
spokesperson George Charamba) and Lacoste (Mnangagwa). Saungweme is reported to have 
said, “But I think he deserves what he is facing as this is a direct result of him overstaying in 
power and not having a succession plan.” 
 
The newspaper blamed Mugabe for not putting his foot down to end this madness which had 
caused near collapse of the economy. “This is why not even the purging of (former Vice 
President) Mujuru in 2014 has stabilised the party. We now have Team Lacoste and the G40 
tearing each other apart and taking everything down with them”. 
 
The newspaper depicts the anarchy that was ravaging the ruling party as a reflection of an 
organisation in an “advanced state of decomposition”. 
 
Daily News of 21 February 2016 published an article with the headline ‘Zanu PF devouring 
itself,’. The newspaper quoted People’s Democratic Party (PDP) leader, Tendai Biti who said 
that ‘the current debilitating factional fights within President Mugabe’s Zanu PF are a sign of 
an exhausted regime - which is now devouring itself.’ 
 
Biti added that: 
 
...but the spaces are narrow, the nationalist mode that does not have energies directed at the national 
agenda focuses its energy on internal cannibalisation but it eats everything, when it has eaten 
everything it starts eating its own - self now, its internal bowels and intestines…Post - 2013… there 
begins a wave of internal cannibalisation, which is not new. The history of Zanu PF has always been 
the history of these contradictions. 
 
It is interesting to note the striking similarity in representation between the Daily News and 
The Standard with regard to historical references. 
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The image of a former liberation movement devouring itself became more prominent post-
2013, particularly with the brutal purges of former VP Joice Mujuru and her allies. The 
privately-owned newspapers represented ZANU PF as a party which has not changed its 
behaviour since 1963. 
 
The privately-owned press also showed its sympathy and support for MDC and its leader, 
Morgan Tsvangirai. For instance, The Daily News of 12 February 2016 published an article 
titled ‘MDC lashes Mugabe’. The newspaper’s first paragraph reads thus: 
 
The MDC has savaged President Robert Mugabe for insulting opposition leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai…instead of focusing on finding solutions for the country’s dying economy and Zanu PF’s 
seemingly unstoppable factional and succession wars. 
 
The issue of the economy being sacrificed was a recurrent theme highlighted by the private 
press but was hardly mentioned in the state-owned media. If it was ever mentioned, it was 
through the promise of ‘mega deals’ which hardly materialized. 
 
For instance, the Daily News reported that Mugabe had ‘climbed all over Tsvangirai and 
claimed that MDC no longer existed as a political party but the MDC argued that Mugabe 
should rather put his “waning energies” on Zimbabwe ‘s current economic woes and his 
party’s ructions, rather than talk ill of Tsvangirai.’ 
 
However, it is worth noting that the privately-owned press did not focus much on the MDC 
after 2013, probably because it devoted more space on ZANU PF’s factional battles as well 
as campaigning for the formation of former Vice President, Joyce Mujuru’s newly formed 
Zimbabwe People First (ZimPF). The other reason could be that the MDC was operating at a 
low profile due to its splits. Nevertheless, any article on MDC by the private press was 
sympathetic of the party and Mujuru’s party. 
 
The Standard of February 28, 2016 published a story with a headline “Mugabe warns 
Mnangagwa faction.” The view that President Robert Mugabe cannot take a side between the 
two factions can be challenged if the current purges of Team Lacoste are anything to go by. 
Naturally, he will side with his wife, First Lady’s faction, G40. The Standard confirms this 
perspective in its reportage: 
 
President Robert Mugabe has once again leapt to the defense of his wife, who is facing an internal 
revolt for trying to silence Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s backers in the bitter Zanu Pf’s war 
to succeed the 92 year old leader. 
 
216 
 
The newspaper reported that Mugabe spoke strongly against ZANU PF officials and 
followers that denigrate the First Lady, Grace Mugabe, but he also sang praises of the G40 
faction. In a pointed attack directed at the Mnangagwa faction, Mugabe said those targeting 
youth leader Kudzai Chipanga for challenging war veterans were wrong. Chipanga had been 
a target of vicious attacks by the state-owned media, which was fighting the G40 faction on 
behalf of Mnangagwa. 
 
News reporters in state-owned media have been in a crisis in relation to their coverage of the 
internal political conflict in ZANU PF. When Professor Jonathan Moyo was Minister of 
Information and Broadcasting Services, journalists toed his line. This explains the theory that 
Weevils (Moyo’s faction then) plotted the downfall of Gamatox (Mujuru’s faction). The state 
funded media fuelled Mujuru’s demise from 2013 till 2015. However, due to the factional 
struggles, Moyo was moved to Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, resulting in him 
losing influence on the state-owned media. As a result, Mnangagwa’s faction (Team Lacoste) 
took charge of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 
 
Practically, Presidential spokesperson George Charamba, who is suspected to belong to 
Team Lacoste faction and doubles as the permanent secretary of the ministry, gained control 
of the state-owned media. Journalists were still confused on how to cover ZANU PF 
succession struggles until Charamba was interviewed on 29 January 2016 by the so-called 
private radio station ZiFM when he spewed vitriol on G40 faction. This interview set the tone 
on the faction he supported, that is, Team Lacoste. 
 
The old adage: he who pays the piper plays the tune seems true in relation to the state-owned 
media. Although there is no written code, it has become a public secret fact that journalists in 
state-owned media take a cue from their boss, Charamba. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
reporters clearly show their allegiance and undisputed loyalty to the Mnangagwa faction. 
This further confirms that the youth leader, Chipanga, and anyone perceived to belong to 
G40, including Jonathan Moyo, have been a target of vicious attacks by the state controlled 
media. In this regard, journalists have ‘shelved’ professional ethics as they no longer report 
objectively and impartially and participate actively in political conflicts in the country. 
 
The Standard’s representation is that Mugabe seemed to be backing under fire political 
commissar, Savior Kasukuwere who stands accused of targeting Mnangagwa supporters 
through suspensions. 
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The newspaper reported that Mugabe warned ‘misguided and unruly youths’ who were 
going to extremes in denigrating party leaders, including his wife. The veteran ruler said it 
was unheard of in ‘our culture’ for youths to attack their leaders, worse still the wife of the 
head of the state. Mugabe was quoted by The Standard saying that: 
 
We hear a lot of misguided party members attacking my wife and that is very rude. These people do 
not respect us. We know there are some youths who are being given dagga to demonise their leaders 
and we will not accept that. 
 
It can be argued that the attack could have been directed at the Mnangagwa faction whose 
members have been taking turns to savage Grace after her Chiweshe rally where she attacked 
war veterans and Mnangagwa for allegedly fanning factionalism. 
 
As argued in Chapter Four, in the squabbles between the two factions, gender stereotypes 
were evoked. One such stereotype was that women should be relegated to the domestic 
sphere. The Standard news article referred to above alluded to this stereotype when it 
reported that: 
 
Another group of war veterans led by Francis Zimuto, who calls himself Black Jesus (itself a 
blasphemy) also dressed down Grace, advising her to stay at home and cook for Mugabe, while also 
telling her they only considered her as their step mother and, not First Lady. 
 
Another stereotype is represented by the last statement ‘…their stepmother, and not First 
Lady’ all because Grace is the second wife of Mugabe after Sally Mugabe, whom she is 
always compared to. The privately –owned media, together with a cross-section of society 
view Grace Mugabe as lacking the qualities of a first lady, arguably a result of not having 
received proper grooming compared to Sally Mugabe who was a symbol and embodiment of 
a real mother and hardly known in the public domain except in charity work. 
 
Of interest to note is that President Robert Mugabe apologised to the war veterans after they 
were water and canister sprayed when they had an unsanctioned meeting in Harare. The 
apology was meant to appease the war veterans because he needs their support in the 2018 
campaigns. 
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It should be noted that war veterans Minister, Christopher Mutsvangwa, who did not take 
heed of President Mugabe to observe discipline and respect, was fired from his ministerial 
post and was suspended for three years from ZANU PF. Private press reportage was 
therefore negative on Team Lacoste and sympathetic towards the G40 faction. 
 
I argue that media house editorial policies are not permanent, but fluid and in a state of flux 
usually determined by prevailing political environment as well as leadership in media. This 
explains why journalists were confused during Government of National Unity, pointed out in 
Chapter Three. 
 
 
 
 
6.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter argued that the government-controlled newspapers, namely, The Herald and The 
Sunday Mail and the privately-owned the Daily News and The Standard, used different 
representation strategies to portray political conflict in Zimbabwe. By selecting to report on a 
particular issue and silencing another, through choice of certain headlines, vocabulary and 
language, photographs and captions as well as cartoons they constructed events in a polarised 
manner. The newspapers became associated with diverging political opinions, showing 
political parties they support. The state-funded media clearly provided a positive image of 
ZANU PF while portraying the opposition in negative light, whereby the opposition was 
constructed as harbouring a regime change agenda. The privately owned press, on the other 
hand, blamed the ruling party for losing focus on pertinent issues such as the economy, 
corruption, mis-rule, abuse of human rights and an obsession with factional fights and 
succession. The private press showed sympathy and support for the opposition parties, 
particularly MDC-T and the newly formed Zimbabwe People First as presenting the 
possibility to form a grand coalition that could provide an alternative future government. The 
opposition constructed itself as focused on economic recovery and employment creation as 
well as tackling critical food shortages especially for rural population. This might have 
motivated the privately owned press to support the opposition. 
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The pro-government press employed propaganda techniques, particularly hate speech and 
inflammatory language against the opposition. It also used the anti-colonial and regime 
change discourses against MDC-T and Mujuru’s Zimbabwe People First. By labelling 
members of the ‘Gamatox’ faction, “rats” and arguing that any remnants of Mujuru’s allies 
who survived initial and post-congress purging should be weeded out, state-owned press fuel 
conflict within ZANU PF and in opposition. The pro-government press failed to critically 
assess the impact of factional and succession battles on the dying economy as well as the 
possible demise of the former liberation movement and likelihood of civil war after the 
departure of President Robert Mugabe. The state controlled press used officials who write 
under various pseudonyms as opinion and analysis pieces. However, the private press took 
advantage of the void created by pro-government press by digging into ZANU PF’s ugly past 
and relating it to the present and future, particularly that it is a party notorious for devouring 
its own. The private press also represented the nasty factional battles in ZANU PF. 
 
Members of the Zimbabwean public have been inundated by sensational and screaming 
headlines on a daily basis about factional and succession wars, as well as ever going 
suspensions and expulsions in political parties which has made it imperative for newspaper 
readers to read more than one newspaper in order to get the whole truth. With pro-
government media journalists supporting one faction of ZANU PF while vilifying the other, 
state-owned media reporting of issues was ethically compromised. Privately-owned reporters 
equally faced the same predicament in the sense that it uncritically supported the opposition, 
former Vice-President Joyce Mujuru and her allies, and yet they represented them negatively 
when they were still in ZANU PF. Their coverage of the MDC-T has also been very 
favourable, while splinters of the party such as Tendai Biti’s People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) were attacked. Hence political conflict in Zimbabwe has influenced media polarisation 
which determines representation of issues and events. This suggests that the future of 
professional journalism in Zimbabwe is bleak. 
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Chapter 7: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines press’s representation of political conflict pre and post Government of 
National Unity focusing on four newspapers, namely, The Herald, The Sunday Mail, Daily 
News and The Standard. The specific focus of the chapter was an analysis of the ideologies 
underpinning news reportage in the selected newspapers. It also compares the framing of 
power, succession struggles and factionalism in both the MDC and ZANU PF in the state-
owned and the privately-owned press. The rationale was to gain insights into the intra-party 
conflict. The period between 1999 and 2016 witnessed the most intense struggles in both 
ZANU PF and the MDC. Empirical data was drawn from news articles published in The 
Herald, The Sunday Mail, Daily News and The Standard between 1999 and 2016. It is during 
this period that all the selected newspapers were published consistently. However, the Daily 
News was closed in September 2003 and resumed publishing in 2010. This means that there 
was a void for nearly seven years. There was no textual material from the Daily News during 
this period. Had the Daily News not been closed down it would have sustained its critical 
stance as a watch dog press. 
 
7.2 Analysis of Findings 
 
The analysis in this chapter addressed two specific questions. The first question relates to 
how the press represented political conflict in Zimbabwe while the second question relates to 
how the state controlled and the privately owned press represented power, succession 
struggles and factionalism in both the ruling ZANU PF party and opposition MDC 
formations. 
 
7.3 Representation of Political Conflict 
 
Although election campaigns were given considerable coverage by the selected newspapers, 
the state-owned and the privately-owned newspapers’ representation of elections was 
radically different. The privately-owned newspapers were pessimistic about the prospects of 
free and fair elections. These newspapers highlighted fraudulent activities and malpractices 
by the ruling party, ZANU PF. The privately-owned newspapers also gave considerable 
attention to coercion by ZANU PF. Unlike the privately-owned newspapers, the state-owned 
newspapers projected the view that ZANU PF was the ‘people’s party’ and Mugabe the 
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candidate of choice. The representation of elections in the state-owned newspapers was also 
dominated by liberation war history or ‘patriotic history’ epitomised by the ‘third 
Chimurenga’ (land reform). The neo-imperialism discourse in the state-owned press was 
used to mask covert coercion by the government and state-sponsored violence which were 
taking place, particularly the land invasions. Because of its waning popularity, ZANU PF 
used the land issue as a campaign tool to rally the masses and to retain power by any means 
possible. The problematic Zimbabwean politics coincided with a series of other economic 
and social upheavals that the newspapers heavily represented and were perceived to have 
contributed to the political conflict. The representation points to the direct relationship 
between the electoral politics, economic downturn and social upheavals in Zimbabwe. 
 
While the privately-owned press, which supported the opposition, appeared to endorse 
regime change in Zimbabwe, consistent with the Western neo-liberal ideology of human 
rights and democracy, the state controlled newspapers accused the opposition of supporting 
the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Western countries, Britain, Australia, and the United 
States. The privately-owned press constructed the sanctions as ‘targeted sanctions’, imposed 
on the ruling elite due to gross human rights violations, thereby implying that the sanctions 
would not affect ordinary Zimbabweans. The ruling party’s common rhetoric and discourse 
was that the opposition was a proxy of the Western powers. Consequently, the state-owned 
press popularised the slogan, “Zimbabwe will not be a colony again” in order to whip up 
popular emotions. Pro-government newspapers suggested that the Western concept of 
democracy could not be simply reproduced in Africa in the manner suggested by the 
privately-owned press, a view shared by leftist and Pan-Africanist scholars (Ndlovu 
Gatsheni, & Willems, 2009b). 
 
However, the debate over whether democracy undermines African cultural values or not is 
open to debate. It could be argued that cultural relativism has created room for universalism 
regarding ideas of humanity, values and rights, values which are non-negotiable (Ogenga, 
2010). The state-owned newspapers criticised the West for double standards in relation to 
human rights which they argued were being applied selectively to advance the West’s 
political and economic interests. The privately-owned press emphasised the point that 
something needs to be done to save Zimbabwe from the multiple crises. Their argument was 
that ZANU PF “must go” and be replaced by a set of new crop of leaders from the opposition 
in order to effect regime change. The privately owned newspapers used negative stereotypes 
and labels against President Robert Mugabe in order to explain his hold on to power in spite 
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of increasing dissenting voices calling for change. Mugabe was thus, portrayed as a tyrant, 
anti-white dictator, solely responsible for the socio-economic and political problems in the 
country. They cited misrule, poor governance, allowing corruption in all state institutions as 
evidence that Mugabe had failed. 
 
An issue that received considerable attention in the privately-owned press was the issue of 
elections. Elections were often represented as characterised by violence, harassment, 
intimidation, coercion, torture, abductions and disappearances, which created an unlevelled 
playing field for free and fair elections. The privately-owned press also often highlighted that 
ZANU PF deployed war veterans, youth militia, and state apparatus agents such as police, 
army, and central intelligence officers during campaigns and elections in order to regain lost 
legitimacy and hegemony. ZANU PF was given bad press while opposition was represented 
as the ‘saviour’ and the messiah that would curb disorder, rot and decay that has been 
symbolic of Mugabe’s reign. 
 
It was assumed that change in leadership would automatically lead to socio-economic and 
political recovery in Zimbabwe. Efforts were made to scrutinise state colonial institutions 
that conceived and nurtured a ‘tyrant’ and how the opposition would cope with such inherited 
institutions that had monopolised power for thirty-six years. Zimbabwe’s elections were 
therefore framed as a shame and a fiasco with no possibility that they could, in any way, be 
free and fair, given the assumption that they were always rigged by Zimbabwe Election 
Commission, through (a complex and sophisticated machinery from military and intelligent 
units) and Nikkuvu, an Israeli based organisation. Such representation reflected how many 
Zimbabweans perceived the elections to be. 
 
Similarly, economic collapse and social upheavals characterised by high inflation and food 
shortages were represented as consequences of the ruling party’s sponsored electoral 
malpractices and politics of disorder. Some scholars contend that economic collapse was, 
partly driven by the political uncertainty in Zimbabwe which was characterised by lack of 
strong democratic institutions of governance to guarantee free and fair elections. What 
currently constitutes the institutions are inherited from colonial apparatuses that protected 
partisan interests. The privately owned press’ representation, however sensational or 
superficial, pointed out these institutional weaknesses that often increased the potential for 
political instability witnessed before and after elections. The privately owned newspapers 
argued that such institutions must change by, first and foremost, unseating Robert Mugabe, 
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who was viewed as the author of all economic problems in Zimbabwe. However, Willems 
(2005) pointed out the dangers of personalising the crisis. Although Mugabe is constructed as 
the major cause of the problems, there were other issues such as election violence and land 
invasions which were also responsible for the economic collapse in Zimbabwe. 
 
The privately-owned newspapers tend to put Mugabe at the centre of all the socio-economic 
and political problems in Zimbabwe. He is also blamed for the severe food shortages and 
high inflation in the country. The privately-owned press’s representation also suggests a link 
between Mugabe’s actions and the multiple crises in the country, to such an extent that it is 
often suggested that for Zimbabwe to recover in every sphere; politically and economically, 
Mugabe must go because he is the sole author of the country’s problems. 
 
Against this background, the state newspapers framed Mugabe as the only legitimate leader 
in both the party and government. Both The Herald and The Sunday Mail echoed ZANU 
PF’s view whereby all the country’s problems were blamed on local internal and external 
enemies of the state, including white commercial farmers, industrialists, the British and 
American governments as well as the opposition MDC party. These newspapers’ approach to 
reporting reflected a bias towards the state and the ruling party. The state-owned newspapers 
also failed to create an open platform to a variety of voices and their labelling of government 
critics as ‘traitors’, ‘sell outs’, and ‘unpatriotic’ does not only demonstrate their 
unprofessional approach and unbalanced reporting, but also their potential to promote 
conflict. By abandoning impartial and objective reporting, and propping up ZANU PF 
political agenda the state-owned newspapers defiled fundamental ethics of journalism. One 
would argue that the ubiquitous barrage of criticism against the MDC and its supporters for 
supporting the European Union’s targeted sanctions ignores ZANU PF’s actions that 
prompted the sanctions, including gross human rights violations. 
 
The stated-owned, Herald enjoyed monopoly as a daily newspaper between 2003 and 2010, 
after the pro-opposition newspaper, the Daily News had been closed. During this period, the 
stated-controlled newspapers were used by ZANU PF as propaganda mouthpieces to vilify 
MDC. The state-owned owned press became conduits for spewing vitriol to the opposition 
who were projected as ‘enemies of the state’. 
 
There was however, a slight change in state-owned and privately-owned newspapers 
reportage during the Government of National Unity (GNU) (2009-2013) because the 
opposition was now part of government. Because the two factions of the MDC were now part 
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of the government newspaper representation was geared towards fostering ‘unity’ and ‘core-
existence’, although analysts argued that the GNU was a marriage of convenience as both 
ZANU PF and MDC formations had informal parallel structures. During the Government of 
National Unity conflict simmered because there were many sticking points which blocked 
smooth implementation of GNU. Besides, the new constitution making process was carried 
out during the GNU, and this process escalated conflict. During this period, press 
representation reflected conflicts around the implementation of the GNU and reportage only 
changed artificially for a very limited time until election campaigns of 2013. During the 
GNU, newspapers largely maintained their ideological positions stance, characterised by Van 
Dijk’s (1998) view, that many group ideologies involve the representation of Self and Others, 
Us and Them. Thus, state-owned newspapers adopted the ‘We are Good and They are Bad’ 
approach. The ‘We’ group (ZANU PF) was presented in a favourable light and the ‘They’ 
(Opposition) group was represented unfavourably. 
 
With regards to the role of the press in conflict, the study concludes that the press actively 
participated and influenced political conflict by exacerbating fragile relationships between 
ZANU PF and opposition parties. All the newspapers selected for this study actively 
participated in political conflicts one way or the other. For instance, the privately-owned 
newspapers extensively covered succession battles in the ruling party while the state-owned 
newspapers were silent until 2014 when Vice President Joice Mujuru and her allies were 
purged from ZANU PF. The pro-government newspapers toed the ZANU PF political agenda 
and initially denied that there were factions in ZANU PF. The ZANU PF leadership created 
the impression that there was unity and discipline in ZANU PF because of the culture of fear 
which precludes members from freely talking about succession, as evidenced by the 
victimisation of those who dared to challenge Mugabe to step down. 
 
After ZANU PF resoundingly won the 2013 harmonised elections, President Mugabe was the 
first to acknowledge the existence of factions in ZANU PF. For the first time, the state-
controlled newspapers extensively covered the intra-party conflict - the purging of Joice 
Mujuru and her allies from ZANU PF. Worth noting is the contrasting framing of Mujuru in 
the state-owned and the privately owned newspapers. For instance, all stories about Joice 
Mujuru were on the front in The Herald and Daily News, but that is where the similarity 
ends. In its depiction of Mujuru, The Herald regurgitated as ‘fact’ the accusations levelled 
against her. It portrayed Mujuru as dabbling in witchcraft, as corrupt, inept, a factional 
leader, and a coup plotter. In all articles, the allegations were repeated as fact even though 
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Mujuru had not been arrested and charged for the alleged plot to overthrow and assassinate 
Mugabe. The Herald quoted analysts who supported its preferred view point. The selection 
of analysts who toe their line was deliberate as they were sympathetic to the state-controlled 
newspaper’s agenda. 
 
The study found out that political news is shaped by the media’s political agenda. The Herald 
also portrayed Mujuru as a sell out and a puppet of the West who undermined the ruling 
party by working with the MDC in efforts to stop the July 2013 national elections. Mujuru 
was accused of plotting with the United States to topple Mugabe; aiding the formation of 
opposition parties Mavambo and MDC and trying to hire assassins to kill Mugabe. This is 
evident in stories titled “Mujuru Hires Nigerian Sangomas (witch doctors) and “Mujuru 
Linked to Mavambo, MDC” (October 18, 2014) and US Exposes Mujuru Conspiracy” (June 
19, 2015). In the first two articles, The Herald merely regurgitated the President’s and First 
Lady‘s accusations that Mujuru hired Nigerian witch doctors to kill Mugabe and that the 
opposition parties had been formed in her house. 
 
On the opposition parties, The Herald linked Mujuru to the British by arguing that the MDC 
was founded in 1999 with the assistance of the United Kingdom’s Labour, Liberal 
Democrats, and Conservatives under the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. In the 
same article, The Herald blames Mujuru for Mugabe’s loss to Tsvangirai in the first round of 
the March 2008 elections. It claimed that Mujuru masterminded the “Bhora Musango/Ibhola 
egan’eni/Kick out the ball” campaign of 2008. The impression created by The Herald is that 
Mujuru is guilty as charged. The motive was to whip peoples’ emotions against Mujuru and 
the opposition which is linked to West. 
 
In contrast to The Herald, the opposition Daily News was sympathetic to Mujuru in all 
articles analysed. The Daily News maintained that the accusations against Mujuru remain 
“untested claims” since she has not been arrested, charged, and convicted. It could be 
because the Daily News, identifies with the underdog. In most articles, the Daily News uses 
the phrase: “untested allegations: or “untested claims” when referring to the accusations 
levelled against Mujuru. It argues that it could be the work of her political enemies in ZANU 
PF. It presents Mujuru as a victim of a rival faction (Weevils) vying to succeed Mugabe as 
leader of ZANU PF and as a President of Zimbabwe. The rival faction, Daily News implies, 
could be taking advantage of the fact that her powerful husband, retired General Solomon 
Mujuru was dead. It also implies that the rival faction could be responsible for his death in a 
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mysterious fire in 2011. For example, the stories “Ditch Zanu PF, Support Mujuru” (May 30, 
2015) and “Mujuru Fears for her life” (April 28, 2015) imply that Mujuru’s husband could 
have been assassinated by the family’s political rivals in ZANU PF who wanted him out of 
the way in order for them to be able to get rid of his wife. 
 
In the story “Ditch Zanu PF, Support Mujuru”, Daily News quotes Rugare Gumbo, who was 
fired together with Mujuru among others, from ZANU PF, saying that Mujuru’s husband’s 
death was suspicious, consequently, they feared for her life. The Daily News mostly quoted 
analysts sympathetic to Mujuru and those aligned to her, and hostile to ZANU PF, and it 
made reference to the manner in which Mujuru’s husband died. The intention was to create 
the impression that Mujuru’s husband was assassinated and that the allegations against her 
were the work of her political adversaries. The other projection was that ZANU PF is a party 
that devours its own, which can be traced back to the liberation struggle and many 
mysterious deaths after independence. The Daily News also depicted Mujuru as a moderate 
and popular politician who could defeat ZANU PF in the next elections in 2018. It praised 
Mujuru‘s response (and her silence) to the attacks by the First Lady, Grace Mugabe during 
so-called “Meet The People Rallies” as dignified. 
 
This thesis’s findings suggest that the purging of Joice Mujuru represents gender stereotypes 
in many ways as demonstrated in Chapter Four. The entire textual analysis examined 
narrative genres such as cartoons, photographs and captions used to represent power, 
succession struggles and factionalism. It also looked at textual devices, specifically; 
headlines, metaphors, analogies and intertexts in selected stories to thematically unpack their 
meanings. For example, the analysis of Mujuru’s purging revealed that the representation 
used gender stereotypes such as the thinking that women are weak, vulnerable and a betrayal; 
a Biblical allusion to Delilah (who betrayed Samson). Of interest to note in all cartoons on 
Mujuru is the fact that women are portrayed as being at the forefront in attacking her, thereby 
confirming the stereotype that women are their worst enemies. 
 
The Standard of November 23 to 29, 2014, in an article titled “Grace Mugabe derails gender 
movement”, the newspaper quoted two women Members of Parliament from the opposition 
who argued that the fallout between ZANU PF and Mujuru had reversed gains that had been 
achieved in the uplifting of women. MDC legislator Jessie Majome is reported to have said 
that: “This is a very disturbing gender debacle which has clearly confirmed that the country 
is still largely patriarchal. Men are still in control and are using women to oust other 
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women”. Mujuru is thus portrayed as someone who was furthering their interests by setting 
these women against each other, and of great concern was that other women were buying into 
this charade. 
 
The Standard also quoted MDC Secretary General, Priscilla Misihairambwi Mushonga 
saying that: 
 
This just confirms what we have always said, that space for women in politics is limited. We have been 
socialised in such a way that we believe that a woman can never dislodge a man from power…women in 
positions of power are targeted because they are vulnerable to such attacks … The men in respective 
camps are quietly watching as the ladies claw at each other. I feel that even if there are issues to be cleared, 
it should have been done differently and not in the public domain (The Standard, 29 November, 2014). 
 
The textual devices and narratives used suggest that the succession struggles in ZANU PF are 
as a result of intolerance to dissenting voices as well as decaying democracy due to 
Mugabe’s dictatorship and tyrannical tendencies. 
 
After Mujuru and her allies were purged from both the party and government, ZANU PF 
thought factionalism was nipped in the bud yet worse divisions emerged. There were 
instances in which the ruling ZANU PF did not want to openly talk about succession due to 
socially constructed fear of the unknown in a party known for mysterious deaths of suspected 
ambitious officials for presidency. Team Lacoste (a faction aligned to Vice President 
Emmerson Mnangagwa) openly declared Mnangagwa to succeed Mugabe and threatened 
bloodshed in the country if he was blocked from taking the reins from Mugabe ahead of the 
2018 general elections. However, Grace Mugabe and her supporters, including the G40, 
insist on consolidation around Mugabe. 
 
The projection is that if opposition parties have to wrestle over power from the ruling party, 
then they have to be wary of infiltration and form a grand coalition. While state controlled 
newspapers negatively framed opposition parties, the privately - owned press sympathised 
with it. 
 
There was no indication that Mugabe was contemplating standing down. There are many 
around him who want him to die in office, particularly his wife Grace and the party’s Youth 
and Women’s Leagues. Representations by The Herald of 26 May, 2016 during his address 
of the Million-Man March signal that Mugabe is “here to stay” (The Herald p.1). 
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The ZANU PF leadership has dismally failed to use its emphatic win in 2013 ‘to address the 
economic problems’ that have beset Zimbabwe since independence from colonial British 
rule. War veterans note with concern and shock the systematic entrenchment of dictatorial 
tendencies, personified by President Robert Mugabe and his cohorts which have slowly 
devoured the values of the liberation struggle in utter disregard of the constitution, 
demonstrated by the deliberate neglect and abandonment of people, failure to address 
economic issues among others. 
 
The current situation, whereby ZANU PF is fragmented is clearly President’s project to 
outfox his peers . Mugabe has always thrived on divide and rule tactics in order to protect his 
party presidential position. The chapter concludes that Mugabe has turned ZANU PF into his 
personal project whereby expulsions are the modus operandi for him to remain in perpetual 
power. As cartoons in chapter four depict, ZANU PF is a party that continuously devours its 
own members, including the vanguard war veterans who, since independence, have 
campaigned vigorously for Mugabe to remain in power. For decades, Mugabe and the war 
veterans — the force behind his continued hold on power since 1980 — had been involved in 
a love-and-hate relationship before it reached a thawing moment in 2016. They war veterans 
claimed they were ‘stockholders’ of ZANU PF and should have a say on what happens in the 
party, but Mugabe said they were mere stakeholders meaning that they had no control over 
the direction of the party. In July 2016, the war veterans fiercely attacked Mugabe, calling 
him a dictator, genocidal and urged him to resign, accusing him of running down the country. 
They regretted the role they played in the Mgagao Declaration that saw Mugabe take over 
power at the instigation of the freedom fighters. At the close of meeting in July, the war vets 
drafted an infamous communiqué that was later to characterise their hostile relationship with 
Mugabe until year-end. 
 
This study agrees with Willems’ (2004) and Chari’s (2010) works on selection and silence; 
salience and silence and argues that Mugabe’s shocking and deliberate omission of the late 
General Solomon Mujuru’s key role in convincing former freedom fighters to accept him as 
leader after the fall out Ndabaningi Sithole is symptomatic of this silence. In his address of 
Million – Man March on 25 May 2016, Mugabe spoke about how other leaders during the 
liberation struggle, among them the late Vice President Simon Muzenda and the late Air 
Marshal Josiah Tungamirai implored him to take up leadership of the party to give it 
direction after their leader, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole had left, Mugabe always downplays the 
role of cadres who challenge him. The state-controlled press takes the cue from its ‘masters’ 
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to adopt silence in its representation of events and personalities as evident in the article titled 
‘Factionalism treasonous: President’ (The Herald, 26 May 2016 p. 4). 
 
The study also found out that Mugabe is devoid of any remorse on Gukurahundi which he 
maintains will never apologise about but only describe as “a moment of madness”. This is 
evidenced when he made threats to war veterans who audaciously push for Mnangagwa to 
succeed him. Mugabe warned that there would be a ‘second’ massacre if ex-combatants 
threaten bloodshed. Such threats could open old wounds for the people of Matabeleland and 
parts of Midlands who were victims of Gukurahundi. 
 
The study argues that war veterans’ relationship with Mugabe and his ZANU PF has always 
been tenuous, dating back to the liberation struggle (see Kriger, 2003). Mugabe’s expulsion 
of former war veterans’ chairman, Christopher Mutsvangwa, and other ‘unrepentant’ war 
veterans and youths created an unprecedented development that is set to shack both ZANU 
PF and the country to their foundations, where irate ex-combatants threw down the gauntlet 
to President Mugabe to resign immediately in the interest of Zimbabweans. The Daily News 
of 22 July 2016 published an article with a headline “Go now, raging war vets tell 
Mugabe…as they pledge allegiance to Mnangagwa”. Such representation means that the 
former freedom fighters, until now Mugabe and ZANU PF’s political bulwark, declared that 
Mugabe’s continued stay in power was a stumbling block to the country’s development, in 
addition to allegedly being “a hard sell” for the anticipated 2018 presidential elections. 
 
The thesis argues the succession struggle in ZANU PF had reached its climax as evidenced 
by war veterans’ Communiqué on 21 July 206, as reported by Daily News of 22 July, 2016. 
The study concludes that this could be the breaking point for Mugabe and war veterans, 
which is a huge and ominous development. 
 
“We are saying this country will only go up when Mugabe steps aside because his 
management is no-longer respected by anyone, including his own ministers. If he announces 
his retirement date the economy will improve because there is nobody who will invest his 
money where the future is uncertain. Nobody will lend money to a 92-year-old and if he does 
not step aside, 2018 will be the most difficult year to campaign for us as war veterans. How 
do you campaign for someone you do not like and who does not like you either. The 
relationship between us as war veterans and the president has broken down” (War veterans’ 
national political commissar Francis Nhando, Daily News, 22 July, 2016). 
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The four newspapers analysed in this thesis represent opposed ideological positions and are 
the reason why there is polarisation in the press in Zimbabwe. The regime’s control over the 
state media explains its largely pro-ZANU PF stance. 
 
However, in the case of Mujuru and her alleged ‘Gamatox’ faction it is arguable that state 
controlled newspapers’ framing was influenced by ZANU PF factionalism. The faction in 
control of the Ministry of Information-and, by extension, the state media - dictated state 
media content. The reportage and framing might change with time. This was confirmed by 
the state controlled press’ framing of the new factions, namely the G40 and Team Lacoste 
which emerged after the purging of Mujuru and her perceived allies. State media was pro-
Team Lacoste but anti-G40. However, when Team Lacoste was under fire from Mugabe the 
state media quickly adopted a somewhat neutral approach in reportage of events and issues. 
Nonetheless, ZANU PF controlled state media maintained its anti-opposition stance. 
Journalists may have been sympathetic to different factions, but the views of the faction in 
control of state media carried the day. 
 
On the contrary, privately owned press adopt neo-liberal stance and the hunt for profits 
explain their anti-ZANU PF and anti-Mugabe stance. The consideration of whether the story 
will sell influenced the slant given to their stories. Their framing of events was guided by 
their ideology. The two privately-owned newspapers claimed that they were impartial 
watchdogs that hold the elite to account for their actions. They claimed that they were for the 
underdogs and against the status quo. This explains why their farming of Mujuru and her 
allies was sympathetic because they were the ‘underdogs’- the same way they represented 
opposition parties as underdogs. 
 
This study concludes that the differences in how the newspapers framed political conflict are 
a result of different ideological inclinations, commercial factors, and control and ownership 
patterns. These factors ultimately lead to polarisation in the newspapers’ representation of 
events in Zimbabwe. The privately - owned press’ pro-underdogs stance makes it pro-
opposition and anti-ZANU PF. On the other hand, the state controlled newspapers’ pro-
government stance largely supports the ruling ZANU PF (though torn in between factions) 
and is anti-opposition. Even though newspapers were polarised, they do not have fixed 
positions and permanent friends or foes. The Daily News may also still have an axe to grind 
with the ZANU PF government that once banned it. This thesis was a moving target because 
political conflict, factionalism and succession struggles continue to unfold in Zimbabwe.  
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7.4 Recommendations 
 
In view of the above findings this study offered the following recommendations for future 
research in media and how they represent political conflict in Zimbabwe: 
 
• Newspapers should have a broader historical understanding of the context in which 
political conflict is obtaining. 
 
• Since newspapers are read by many people and influence opinion, they should desist 
from sensationalising the framing of political parties and personalities because this will 
escalate the conflict. 
 
• Media houses should encourage objective reporting of events so as to promote peace 
journalism. 
 
• This thesis was limited to an examination media framing of conflict in the state-owned 
and the privately-owned press. Future studies could focus on the role of the broadcast 
media in either promoting conflict or building consensus. 
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